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Abstract
Preserving the Quality of Architectural
Tactics in Source Code
by Mehdi Mirakhorli
In any complex software system, strong interdependencies exist between requirements and software
architecture. Requirements drive architectural choices while also being constrained by the existing
architecture and by what is economically feasible. This makes it advisable to concurrently specify
the requirements, to devise and compare alternative architectural design solutions, and ultimately
to make a series of design decisions in order to satisfy each of the quality concerns.
Unfortunately, anecdotal evidence has shown that architectural knowledge tends to be tacit in
nature, stored in the heads of people, and lost over time. Therefore, developers often lack com-
prehensive knowledge of underlying architectural design decisions and inadvertently degrade the
quality of the architecture while performing maintenance activities. In practice, this problem can
be addressed through preserving the relationships between the requirements, architectural design
decisions and their implementations in the source code, and then using this information to keep
developers aware of critical architectural aspects of the code.
This dissertation presents a novel approach that utilizes machine learning techniques to recover and
preserve the relationships between architecturally significant requirements, architectural decisions
and their realizations in the implemented code.
Our approach for recovering architectural decisions includes the two primary stages of training and
classification. In the first stage, the classifier is trained using code snippets of different architectural
decisions collected from various software systems. During this phase, the classifier learns the terms
that developers typically use to implement each architectural decision. These “indicator terms”
represent method names, variable names, comments, or the development APIs that developers
inevitably use to implement various architectural decisions. A probabilistic weight is then computed
for each potential indicator term with respect to each type of architectural decision. The weight
estimates how strongly an indicator term represents a specific architectural tactics/decisions. For
example, a term such as pulse is highly representative of the heartbeat tactic but occurs infrequently
in the authentication. After learning the indicator terms, the classifier can compute the likelihood
that any given source file implements a specific architectural decision.
The classifier was evaluated through several different experiments including classical cross-validation
over code snippets of 50 open source projects and on the entire source code of a large scale software
system. Results showed that classifier can reliably recognize a wide range of architectural decisions.
The technique introduced in this dissertation is used to develop the Archie tool suite. Archie is
a plug-in for Eclipse and is designed to detect wide range of architectural design decisions in the
code and to protect them from potential degradation during maintenance activities. It has several
features for performing change impact analysis of architectural concerns at both the code and
design level and proactively keep developers informed of underlying architectural decisions during
maintenance activities.
Archie is at the stage of technology transfer at the US Department of Homeland Security where it
is purely used to detect and monitor security choices. Furthermore, this outcome is integrated into
the Department of Homeland Security’s Software Assurance Market Place (SWAMP) to advance
research and development of secure software systems.
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Problem Statement and Background
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Nowadays, a successful software production is increasingly dependent on how the final deployed
system addresses customers’ and users’ quality concerns such as security, reliability, availability,
interoperability and performance. Failure to address these qualities in a best case scenario, could
result in a significant drop in the number of users, negatively impact the market value of an enterprise
which uses the software, consequently result in the loss of value in stock price. In more extreme
cases it could even lead to catastrophic and systematic failures threatening public safety. The media
is full of reports of the impact of software failure. For example a software failure interrupted the
New York Mercantile Exchange and telephone service to several East Coast cities in February 1998.
In another recent example, one Illinois hospital jointly managed by the Departments of Veterans
Affairs (“VA”) and Defense (“DOD”) failed to achieve interoperability between the Departments’
EHR systems, costing the hospital at least $700,000 annually. This is despite the fact that the DOD
and VA had already spent $100 million to achieve this quality.
In order to satisfy such quality concerns, software architects are accountable for devising and com-
paring various alternate solutions, assessing the trade-offs, and finally adopting strategic design
decisions which optimize the degree to which each of the quality concerns is satisfied. The adopted
decisions are often based on well known architectural tactics, defined as re-usable techniques for
achieving specific quality concerns [81]. Bachman et al. provide a more formal definition for an
architectural tactic as “a means of satisfying a quality-attribute-response measure by manipulating
some aspects of a quality attribute model through architectural design decisions” [7]. Architectural
3
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tactics come in many different shapes and forms and describe solutions for a wide range of quality
concerns [64, 81]. For instance, reliability tactics provide solutions for fault detection, prevention
and recovery; performance tactics provide solutions for resource contention in order to optimize
response time and throughput, and security tactics provide solutions for authorization, authentica-
tion, non-repudiation and other such factors [64]. Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive overview of
some common architectural tactics.
Traditionally, software architecture has been seen as the “structure or structures of the system”.
From this perspective an architecture is defined as a set of software components, their externally
visible properties, and their interconnections [81]. However this view, addresses only the physical
infrastructure of a system, and fails to capture the importance of other architectural decisions.
As a result, the more modern definition by Bosch [19, 72], Kruchten [78], Perry [100] and others
emphasizes software architecture as a set of interrelated design decisions. These decisions can be
technology related, structural for shaping the skeleton of the system, process related, or they could
be related to governance issues. From this perspective, architectural quality is achieved not only
through traditional engineering practices such as module decomposition, information hiding and
abstraction [48, 119], but also through managing and preserving a broad set of tactical architectural
decisions.
Despite the tremendous effort that goes into designing and delivering a robust architectural solution,
architectural qualities are often eroded over time as a result of ongoing maintenance activities, which
are inevitably undertaken to correct faults, improve performance or other quality concerns, and to
adapt the system in response to changing requirements [71, 127]. In such a scenario, when the
software product evolves in subsequent releases, maintainability of the system decreases, making it
difficult to understand and modify. In the best case, changes accumulate and become obstacles for
further releases, while in a severe case the architecture degradation can lead to catastrophic failure.
This phenomenon has been referred to as Architecture Erosion [87][86][127][100][125]. Netscape
browser is a good example of architecture erosion [127]. In early 1997, Netscape and Microsoft
were in a browser war, where Netscape released Netscape Communicator version 4.0 and at the
same time Microsoft sent out its version 4.0 of Internet Explorer. A year later, for various reasons
Netscape was losing the competition. Therefore they urgently decided to move toward an improved
version of their Netscape Communicator to beat Microsoft. However, they could not deliver it. The
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architecture of the old version 4 was eroded and the source code was hard to modify. Finally in late
1998, Netscape, in a desperate attempt to regain its lost market share, decided to release its browser
as open source. After a few months, the old source code was discarded entirely and development of
a new browser (known as Mozilla) was started.
This is a challenging problem of software development recognized by both academics and practition-
ers. Perry and Wolf first drew attention to the problem in 1992 [100]. They defined architectural
erosion as ‘violations of the architecture’ and architectural drift as an ‘insensitivity to the archi-
tecture’ which occurs when the underlying rules are not clear to the developers and maintainers.
The problem is far from a theoretical one and unfortunately has not been addressed properly. Most
popular software engineering tools and environments fail to make underlying design decisions visible
to software engineers, and as a result maintainers are not kept fully informed of relevant underlying
design patterns, tactics, and constraints as they construct, maintain, and refactor a software system
[18][127].
In practice, the architecture of a system and its qualities can be maintained using traceability
methods that help developers fully understand the impact of design or implementation changes on
architecturally significant requirements [127].
In related work, Kruchten [78], Burge [23], and others have proposed a proactive approach to
preventing design degradation through using design rationales to document architectural decisions.
They argue that explicitly recording design decisions, justifications, alternatives, and conflicting
perspectives, is necessary in order to preserve architectural qualities. Several researchers have
attempted to address this problem through developing techniques for documenting or modeling
architectural decisions. The Architecture Design Decision Support System (ADDSS) [25], Process
based Architecture Knowledge Management Environment (PAKME)[13], and Architecture Ratio-
nale and Element Linkage (AREL)[118] are examples of these. However, these approaches fail to
address the scalability issues of managing potentially large numbers of architectural decisions. They
also fail to connect design decisions to code, and/or provide little support for actually utilizing this
knowledge during software maintenance.
Moreover, architecture erosion is very likely to occur if developers are ‘insensitive to the archi-
tecture’ [100] and the architecturally implied decisions/rules are not clear to them, or when the
developers lack experience and therefore misunderstand the key architectural decisions or do not
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have enough knowledge to implement/modify architectural decisions in a robust and optimum way
[127]. Although there have been numerous books, materials and tutorials on architectural tactics,
most of these are at a high level of design and provide insufficient guidance for how to implement
these tactics.
This dissertation, primarily suggests using Software Traceability, defined as the “the ability to
interrelate any uniquely identifiable software engineering artifact to any other, maintain required
links over time, and use the resulting network to answer questions of both the software product
and its development process” [33] and to establish links between uniquely identifiable and related
software engineering artifacts, as a means of preventing erosion. It proposes the new notion of
decision-centric-traceability which can potentially address the aforementioned problems through
explicitly documenting relationships between quality concerns, rationales, architectural decisions,
and source code. This technique puts architectural decisions (such as tactics) as the focus of the
tracing activity. In fact, in this approach the driving requirements, design rationale and constraints
are first traced to their corresponding architectural tactics, and tactics are then used to link the
requirements knowledge to the implementation artifacts. Such links can then be used to support
change impact analysis and program comprehension during the maintenance process by revealing
underlying design decisions. In order to trace each architectural tactic in an economical way, this
dissertation introduces the concept of tactic traceability information models, designed to guide the
creation of sufficient traceability links.
Secondly, this dissertation, proposes automated reconstruction of traceability links between quality
concerns and source code through using machine learning techniques to detect architectural tactics
in the code. Considering the acceptable level of accuracy achieved by this technique, it would
significantly minimize the cost of establishing and maintaining traceability links by dynamically
creating the links upon demand by developers.
Finally the third part of the dissertation, provides guidelines for developers, presumably less ex-
perienced ones, on how to implement architectural tactics by utilizing robust and effective design
patterns which tend to be more maintainable. These guidelines are extracted through observations
of various tactic implementations. First the tactical code was detected in a large number of software
systems, then various design patterns were detected in the software systems. Overlap analysis was
performed to find evidence of design patterns being used to implement a tactic. The results of this
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analysis are provided though a reference model for each tactic. This reference model allows the
developers to select one or more appropriate design patterns to implement a tactic based on the
context of their projects.
1.1 Contributions
This dissertation makes the following primary contributions:
• Identify Traceability Challenges of Architectural Decisions
Before proposing any specific guidelines for tracing quality concerns, it is necessary to understand
the issues that must drive any effective architecture traceability solution. The first part of this
dissertation presents the results of an extensive study conducted on tactical architectural decisions
implemented in highly dependable and complex avionic systems such as AirBus and Boeing family,
NASA Robotics, NASA Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV), Hadoop Framework and various other
performance centric systems. This study first identifies the key challenges of tracing architecturally
significant requirements and then provides the foundations and motivation for a new traceability
meta-model describing a traceability infrastructure for efficiently tracing individual quality concerns.
• Identifying Traceability Patterns for Tactics
The previously designed meta-model is extended in the form of the potentially transformative
notion of a Tactic Traceability Pattern (tTP), defined as an instantiable and reusable tactic-centric
traceability model. A tTP can reduce traceability effort by providing a reusable infrastructure
for tracing, detecting, managing, and preserving tactics throughout the maintenance phase of the
software system. Chapter 4 provides a more detailed description of the tTP concept and describes
a set of tTPs developed for this dissertation.
• Automating Trace Generation
Manually creating trace links is a difficult and expensive task. Therefore we have developed a novel
approach for automating the generation of trace links between tactics and the design and code
elements in which they are implemented. Chapter 5 describes this approach and presents the results
of its evaluation. The developed approach uses and trains a classifier to detect architectural tactics in
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the source code and to subsequently establish trace links to the tTPs. Trace links are established at
two levels of granularity, Tactic-Level and Role-Level. The classifier is trained through two different
training methods which either use a data set of tactical code-snippets or tactic-descriptions to build
the classifier. Furthermore, in order to create trace links at the Role-Level we have developed a
hybrid approach which utilizes a light-weight structural analysis technique to create fine-grained
trace links to the tactics’ roles in a tTP. Although the results are not as good as those obtained for
Tactic-Level link reconstruction, the output can still be used to help developers create links.
The major contribution of this work to the existing body of knowledge is the focus on architectural
tactics. This can be viewed from two perspectives. All the bulk of existing research on software
architecture discovery, recovery and reconstruction from source code has primarily focused on mod-
ularization and structure of software. The novel part of our work is taking into account tactical
architectural decisions which are pervasive types of decisions in various systems. Also from the per-
spective of software traceability this is the first work that has focused on automating the traceability
of architectural tactics into the source code.
•Informed Notification and Visualization of Design Rationale
In an IEEE Software article entitled “Draw me a picture”, Grady Booch [18] challenged the soft-
ware engineering community to develop new visualization tools capable of providing greater insights
into underlying frictions, design decisions, and social factors of a software system. Our traceability
approach makes an initial and partial contribution to addressing this challenge through notifying
the developer of underling decision and showing how different parts of the system work together to
achieve various quality goals. This can help reduce the risk of design erosion by keeping developers
informed of tactical architectural decisions behind the code and notifying them which architec-
tural tactics and related software qualities can be affected by the changes they implement. This
would address one of the key causes of architectural erosion known as insensitivity to design. The
notification mechanism is built primarily on top of our automated trace reconstruction technique.
• Presenting Reference Models for Implementing Tactics
Once a decision is made to utilize a tactic, the developer must generate a concrete plan for realizing
the tactic in the code. Unfortunately, there is not a single way to implement an architectural tactic.
From one system to another system a tactic can be implemented entirely differently and this is
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according the context and constraints of each project. The variability points found in individual
tactics can make this a challenging task, especially for less experienced developers. This is a typical
knowledge gap that exists between high level architecture design and low level programming as
the scope of concerns are different. To address this knowledge gap, we conducted an extensive
study of 50 open source systems to investigate how design patterns were used to implement various
tactics. Data mining techniques were used to identify potential pattern instances within tactic
implementations. This was followed by a manual analysis of the retrieved data to identify a distinct
set of variability points for each tactic, as well as evidence of corresponding design patterns used to
address them.
The output of this observation resulted in the construction of tactic-level decision trees depict-
ing variability points of a tactic and generating a reference model which provides implementation
guidance for the developers.
This perspective, recognizes Parnas’ notion of “design for change” [98][97]. In this perspective,
architectural erosion is tackled by providing guidance to help developers implement or modify
tactical decisions through the use of known design patterns. The use of design patterns is considered
more robust and maintainable way for low level implementation and tend to be more flexible for
evolution while at the same time are harder to erode [67][129][52].
1.2 Overview of the Methodology
In order to achieve each goal identified in the previous section, we apply a research methodology
which has three phase of problem analysis, solution design and solution validation.
In problem analysis we explore various challenges for addressing each of the research goals. The
problem analysis includes extensive studies of key challenges in the real systems from various do-
mains of Avionics, Business and Financial platforms, Distributed Computing Frameworks, Internet
Based Applications and etc. This has provided a realistic foundation for understanding the problem.
In the next phase, the gained insight in the problem analysis is used to drive an appropriate solu-
tion. In the validation phase we examine the proposed solution and rigorously validate it through
several experiments.
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1.3 Scope
As the scope of architectural qualities and their implementation is vast, we limit the scope of the
thesis to a subset of architectural decisions and primarily those known as tactics. The goal of this
dissertation is to demonstrate that solutions for preventing architectural erosion exist however it is
not intended as a survey of all known architectural design decisions. That is left for future research.
As part of this work, a set of information retrieval and data mining techniques have been applied,
however the purpose of the experiments in this dissertation is not to find the best available algorithm,
compare existing ones, or improve known methods. Instead, this dissertations investigates areas
in software architecture development in which such methods can be used as tools to help provide
useful support to cope with the problem of erosion.
Although we have proposed a catalogue of tTPs, the contribution of this dissertation, is not in
providing a fully validated set of tTPs, but rather in showing how a tTP can be used to support
effective software maintenance while reducing the likelihood of architectural degradation.
While the scope of the thesis was limited to what is mentioned above, any results that were poten-
tially applicable to a wider scope are indicated throughout the work.
1.4 Published Work
This dissertation includes work published in the following international peer-review workshops,
conferences and journals:
• Kouroshfar, E.; Mirakhorli, M.; Bagheri, H.; Xiao, L.; Malek, S.; Cai, Y.; “A Study on the
Role of Software Architecture in the Evolution and Quality of Software”, Submitted to the
ACM SIGSOFT 22th International Symposium on the Foundations of Software Engineering,
2014,ACM.
• Cleland Huang, M.; Ali Babar, M.; Mirakhorli, M.; “An Inverted Classroom Experience:
Engaging Students in Architectural Thinking for Agile Projects”, Software Engineering Edu-
cation and Training (SEET) Track, IEEE International Conference on Software Engineering
(ICSE’14).
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• Cleland Huang, M.; Czauderna, A.; Mirakhorli, M.; “Driving Architectural Design and Preser-
vation from a Persona Perspective in Agile Projects”, Agile Software Architecture, edited by
Muhammad Ali Babar, Ivan Mistrik, and Alan Brown, 2014.
• Mirakhorli, M.; “Preventing Erosion of Architectural Tactics through Their Strategic Imple-
mentation, Preservation, and Visualization”, 28th IEEE/ACM International Conference on
Automated Software Engineering (ASE), 2013.
• Mirakhorli, M.; Carvalho, J.; Cleland-Huang, J.; Maeder, P.; “A Domain-centric Approach
for Recommending Architectural Tactics to Satisfy Quality Concerns”, Third International
Workshop on the Twin Peaks of Requirements and Architecture, 21st IEEE International Re-
quirements Engineering Conference (RE’13), 2013.
• Mirakhorli, M.; Cleland-Huang, J.; “Traversing the Twin Peaks”, IEEE Software,vol.30, no.2,
March-April 2013.
• Mirakhorli, M.; Maeder, P.; Cleland-Huang, J.; “Variability points and design pattern usage
in architectural tactics”, Proceedings of the ACM SIGSOFT 20th International Symposium
on the Foundations of Software Engineering, 52,2012,ACM.
• Mirakhorli, M.; Shin, Y.; Cleland-Huang, J.; Cinar, M.; “A tactic-centric approach for au-
tomating traceability of quality concerns”, Proceedings of the 2012 International Conference
on Software Engineering, 639-649,2012,IEEE Press. ACM SIGSOFT Distinguished Pa-
per Award
• Cleland-Huang, J.; Mirakhorli, M.; Czauderna, A.; Wieloch, M.; “Decision-Centric Traceabil-
ity of Architectural Concerns”, The 7th International Workshop on Traceability in Emerging
Forms of Software Engineering (TEFSE 2013).
• Mirakhorli, M.; Cleland-Huang, J.; “Using tactic traceability information models to reduce the
risk of architectural degradation during system maintenance”, Software Maintenance (ICSM),
2011 27th IEEE International Conference on Software Maintenance, 123-132,2011,IEEE.
• Mirakhorli, M.; Cleland-Huang, J.; “A pattern system for tracing architectural concerns”,
Proc. of the Pattern Languages of Programming Languages (PLOP), 2011.
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• Mirakhorli, M.; Cleland-Huang, J.; “Tracing Non-Functional Requirements”, Software and
Systems Traceability, 299-320,2012,Springer
• Mirakhorli, M.; “Tracing architecturally significant requirements: a decision-centric approach”,
33rd International Conference on Software Engineering, 1126-1127,2011,IEEE.
• Mirakhorli, M.; Cleland-Huang, J.; “Tracing architectural concerns in high assurance systems
(NIER track)”,Proceedings of the 33rd International Conference on Software Engineering,908-
911,2011,ACM.
• Mirakhorli, M.; Cleland-Huang, J.; “A decision-centric approach for tracing reliability con-
cerns in embedded software systems”,Proceedings of the Workshop on Embedded Software
Reliability (ESR), held at ISSRE10, 2010.
• Mirakhorli, M.; Cleland-Huang, J.; “Transforming trace information in architectural docu-
ments into re-usable and effective traceability links”, Proceedings of the 6th International
Workshop on SHAring and Reusing Architectural Knowledge, 45-52,2011,ACM.
1.5 Organization
This dissertation is organized as follows: The Part I includes the literature review presented in
Chapters 2 and 3. Part II of this dissertation focuses on creating architecture traceability. In
Chapter 4 we present the traceability challenges of architectural decisions that we have identified
as a result of studying various real systems; Also illustrates the idea and utilization of Traceability
Patterns for Tactics. Chapter 5 presents the approach and results for automating the generation of
trace links from architectural tactics to source code. Chapter 6 presents a ranking comparison of
our tactic detector approach with a number of Off-The-Shelf text categorization methods as well as
a voting approach including all the classification methods. In Part III we will show how to use the
previously developed approach to help reduce the risk of design erosion by keeping the developers
informed of tactical architectural decisions behind the code.
Part IV presents our tactic reference models developed to support tactic’s implementation and
modification.
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Finally, Part V and chapter 9 presents the conclusions of the thesis, the main threats to validity,
as well as future work that can be done to augment it. All the case studies used through this
dissertation are presented in Appendix A.
“All the world’s a stage,
And all the men and women merely players:
They have their exits and their entrances;




In our work, we utilize concepts and techniques from various areas of software engineering and
computer science such as software architecture, requirements engineering, software traceability, and
data mining and information retrieval. In this chapter, we provide background information on these
areas and introduce a set of definitions used throughout the thesis.
The first section of this chapter presents various definitions for the concept of Software Architecture
followed by a description of Architectural Tactics as common approaches to design an architecture
in section 2.2. In Section 2.3, a set of real systems implementing architectural tactics are discussed.
Section 2.4 describes the phenomena of architecture erosion which makes software qualities degrade
over time. This section presents the common causes of such phenomena and describes the state of
art and practice for dealing with such problems.
2.1 Software Architecture
Every software development process or life-cycle is structured around a set of classical disciplines
represented as Requirements Engineering, Software Design, Implementation,Testing and Mainte-
nance. Following the principles and practices in each of these disciplines results in the creation of a
robust working product from an initial customer request. While the requirements engineering dis-
cipline helps analysts to elicit, analyse and understand the customers concerns and users needs, the
design discipline leads to the development of abstract solutions to transit from such requirements
15
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to implementations and a working product. In this process, Software Architecture Design occurs
at the overlap of the two aforementioned disciplines. It includes, principles and practices of both
requirements engineering and software design. Over the last decade, software architecture design
has increasingly been considered as a key activity to influence software qualities such as security,
reliability, performance and so on. Therefore it has been the focus of a wide range of research and
practice.
2.1.1 Definitions of Software Architecture
There are various definitions for architecture of a software system. Traditional definitions consider
software architecture as the structure or skeleton of a system. In this definition, architecture is a
collection of components building a software system. For example, Len Bass [81] defines software
architecture as
“The software architecture of a program or computing system is the structure or struc-
tures of the system, which comprise software elements, the externally visible properties
of those elements, and the relationships among them”.
Similarly Mary Shaw and David Garlan [55] describe software architecture as:
“...a level of design concerned with issues beyond the algorithms and data structures
of the computation; designing and specifying the overall system structure emerges as
a new kind of problem. Structural issues include gross organization and global control
structure; protocols for communication, synchronization, and data access; assignment of
functionality to design elements; physical distribution; composition of design elements;
scaling and performance; and selection among design alternatives”.
The IEEE 1471-2000 standard [60] has defined the term Architecture as:
“The fundamental organization of a system embodied in its components, their relation-
ships to each other, and to the environment, and the principles guiding its design and
evolution”
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Additionally, this standard provides a description for each of the terminologies used in this definition
of architecture. A system is a collection of components organized to implement a specific set of
functions. The term system is very broad and can include individual applications, subsystems,
systems of systems, products and product families, whole enterprises, and other such interests.
The environment, is in fact the context and determines the setting for developmental, operational,
political, and other factors influencing the system [60].
A stakeholder in this definition is an individual, team, or organization with interests in a system [60].
A key criticism to all the above definitions is that they address only the physical infrastructure of
a system, and fail to capture the importance of other architectural decisions. The proponents of
alternative definitions Bosch [8], Kruchten [9], Perry [10] and others refer to software architecture
as a set of interrelated design decisions which work together to shape the structure, behavior,
properties, processes, and governance of the delivered solution. Among these, Bosch argues that,
“we define software architecture as the composition of a set of architectural design
decisions. This reduces the knowledge vaporization of design decision information, since
design decisions have become an explicit part of the architecture”.
Kruchten in The Rational Unified Process 1999, defines architecture as:
“An architecture is the set of significant decisions about the organization of a software
system, the selection of the structural elements and their interfaces by which the sys-
tem is composed, together with their behavior as specified in the collaborations among
those elements, the composition of these structural and behavioral elements into progres-
sively larger subsystems, and the architectural style that guides this organization—these
elements and their interfaces, their collaborations, and their composition”.
From this perspective, architectural quality is achieved not only through traditional engineering
practices such as partitioning and abstraction [119][48], but also through managing and preserving
a broad set of architectural decisions.
Analysis of different architectural decisions indicate that these decisions appear in different shapes
and forms. Sometimes architects select an architectural pattern or style to shape the structural
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organization of a software system, sometimes they prefer architectural tactics focusing on how to
achieve a specific level of quality and finally in many cases architects make process related decisions
affecting development and organizational issues in a team.
Primarily this dissertation focuses on tactical architectural decisions, therefore in the next section
we only cover architectural tactics as a category of decisions made by architects.
2.2 Architectural Tactics
Architectural tactics are fundamental design decisions. They have been extensively used in a wide
range of software systems, from avionic domains to e-commerce, web-based solutions and even game
industries. Architectural tactics are known as reusable solutions for satisfying quality concerns such
as security, performance, reliability, and so on.
Bachman et al. [7] define a tactic as
“A means of satisfying a quality-attribute-response measure by manipulating some as-
pects of a quality attribute model through architectural design decisions”.
In a simpler definition, an architect uses a set of techniques to achieve the required quality attributes,
these techniques are called tactics. A tactic is a design decision that influences the achievement of
a quality attribute response; tactics directly affect the system’s response to some stimulus.
Len Bass [81] claims that the focus of a tactic is on a single quality attribute response and it has a
single facet. Within a tactic, there is no consideration of trade-offs. He argues that this is the main
difference between tactics and architectural patterns (e,g layering, pipe and filter) that trade-offs
are built into architectural patterns. Patterns are multi-faceted, they are a bundle of decisions
addressing multiple issues at the same time, therefore exposing trade-offs.
The Software Engineering Institute (SEI) [112] has identified a catalogue of existing architectural
tactics. In this section we introduce a few categories of this catalogue including those we have used
throughout the rest of this dissertation.
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2.2.1 Availability Tactics
Availability tactics are critical approaches for mitigating the faults in a system and either preventing
them from leading to system failure or at least bounding the effect of the faults by making system
repairs possible with acceptable cost. All known approaches for maintaining system availability
depend on some sort of replication, health monitoring to detect a component or system failure and
finally recovery mechanisms after a failure is detected. This can be fully automated or involve inter-
vention of system administrators. Therefore there are three strategies to handle system availability,
(i) fault detection, (ii) fault recovery and finally, (iii) fault prevention.
Fault detection. The most commonly used tactics for detecting software faults are heartbeat,
ping-echo and exceptions.
• Heartbeat (dead man timer). One component emits a heartbeat message periodically indicat-
ing that it is alive while a second component monitors the health of the heartbeat sender by
listening to the heartbeat message. If the heartbeat receiver does not receive the the heartbeat
message then it assumes that heartbeat sender component has failed, therefore it notifies the
user/correction component.
The heartbeat tactic can be implemented by a piggy backing mechanism. In this case the
heartbeat message is carried by the communicated data.
• Ping/echo. Monitoring component emits a ping message and expects to receive back an echo
within a predefined time slot from the component under scrutiny.
• Exceptions. This is one of the most commonly used programming techniques for recognizing
faults. An exception is thrown when a fault is recognized. This requires an exception handler
to deal with the occurred fault.
Fault recovery. The fault recovery process has two steps, preparation and recovery. In preparation
the logistics, data and synchronizations for a recovery act is done while in recovery phase the actual
fault recovery happens. In the following we discuss few different fault recovery tactics.
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• Voting. Redundant components performing functionally equivalent tasks send their output
to a voter component which is responsible for selecting the most accurate results. The ar-
chitect needs to make decisions about the number of redundant processes (triple or more),
and to select a voting algorithm: “majority rules”, “preferred component”, “NSelf Checking
Programming” or some other algorithm. This architectural tactic is used to correct faulty
operation of algorithms or failure of a processor (if components are deployed on different pro-
cessors). Redundancy can be physical-redundancy or logical redundancy. Processes could have
the identical redundancy (replication), functional redundancy or analytical redundancy. This
tactic can be implemented along side N-Version Programming so that the software for each
redundant component is developed by different teams, in different programming languages
and is executed on dissimilar platforms or operating systems. However there is a spectrum
for the dissimilarity level, and the less extreme case is to develop a single software component
on dissimilar platforms.
• Active redundancy (hot restart). As the name implies, redundancy is the key factor in this
architectural tactic. There are redundant components, which all respond to events in parallel.
These components are running all in the same state. The system uses the response from one
of these components, and the rest are discarded. In case of a fault in the primary component,
the system uses results from the secondary replica. The downtime of systems using active
redundancy tactic is usually very low around a few milliseconds since the secondary replica is
in the same state as the primary replica and the recovery time is equivalent to the switching
time from primary to secondary replica.
Implementation of this tactic requires realtime synchronization between redundant compo-
nents. This is done to ensure that all messages to any redundant component are sent to all
redundant components and they are all running in the same state.
• Passive redundancy (warm restart/dual redundancy/triple redundancy). In this tactic, one
component (the primary) responds to events and informs the other components (the standbys)
of state updates they must make. In the case of a fault, the system has to ensure that
the backup state is sufficiently fresh before resuming services. Implementation of this tactic
requires periodic synchronization which is usually done by the primary component. This tactic
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will result in a higher downtime compared to active redundancy but it would be cheaper and
easier to implements.
• Spare. A system implemented using this tactic has a standby spare computing platform
which is configured to replace many different failed components. The downtime of a system
using this tactic would be a few minutes to a few hours as the system must be rebooted
to the appropriate software configuration and have its state initialized when a failure occurs.
Implementation of this tactic requires implementing the checkpoint mechanism to save system
state to a persistent device periodically. Periodic logs of all state changes to a persistent device
allows for the spare to be set to the appropriate state.
• Checkpoint/rollback. This is a tactic which uses a checkpoint to record system state during
normal execution and later uses this log to recover the system to a previously safe state. The
logging is done either periodically or in response to specific events.
Fault prevention. The following are some of the common fault prevention architectural tactics.
• Removal from service. The idea is to remove a component of the system from operation to
prevent anticipated or predicted failures. For example, a process can be restarted to prevent
the memory issues attached to that to make the whole system to go to not-responding state.
The removal from services can be implemented both as manual or automated feature of the
system.
• Transactions. This is a construct commonly used to achieve data integrity. A transaction
is the collection of several sequential steps such that the entire collection can be undone at
once. The transaction tactic is used to prevent any data from being affected if one step
in a process fails. Another usage of transaction tactic is in distributed or parallel system
to prevent collisions among several simultaneous threads accessing the same data. In such
systems transactions are implemented through different committing protocols such as two
phase commits and so on.
• Process monitor. The idea is to monitor the running processes and kill/restart them in case
a fault is detected. In the implementation of this tactic there is a monitoring process which
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can delete the nonperforming process and create a new instance of it, initialized to some
appropriate state as in the spare tactic.
2.2.2 Performance Tactics
A wide range of performance tactics have been developed during the last decades. The main idea
behind these tactics is to tune either response time, latency or throughput of a system. To deal
with these performance indicators, three different categories of tactics have been developed: resource
demand, resource management, and resource arbitration.
Resource Demand. User or Process requests in a software system usually causes resource de-
mands. Performance of the system would be affected by the frequency of the requests and the
resources consumed by each request. This category of performance tactic is designed to deal with
the aforementioned parameters. In other words, the latency of a system can be decreased by reduc-
ing the resources required for accomplishing a task or by controlling the number of requests and
minimizing it.
• Increase computational efficiency. The most common way of decreasing latency is through
algorithmic improvements to performance sensitive part of a system. This includes selection
of algorithms, data structures and techniques which can lead to more efficient implementation
of functions.
• Reduce computational overhead. Latency can be improved by avoiding overheads among
computational elements of a software such as preprocessing, intermediaries, parameters mar-
shalling and so on. Intermediaries or communication adoptors usually are chosen in favorit of
modifiability while they hinder performance of the system. This is a classic modifiability/per-
formance tradeoff.
• Manage/control event rate by sampling. Reducing the demand is possible through partial
sampling of the requests or incoming events. If there is no control over the arrival of externally
generated events, queued requests can be sampled at a lower frequency, possibly resulting in
the loss of requests.
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• Bound execution times. Confine execution time used to respond to an event or request. This
tactic is applicable in iterative or data-dependent algorithms, limiting the number of iterations
or a computed threshold is a method for confining the execution times.
• Bound queue sizes. This controls the maximum number of queued requests. It is a fair
sampling mechanism which controls the number of requests and consequently the resources
consumed by the system.
• Asynchronous Communication. Once an operation is performed synchronously, a method is
invoked, a request is sent, the results are returned, and the application resumes. In such design,
one operation can be done at a time, other operations block until completion. Sometimes in
order to decrease the response time or increase the throughput, it is useful to initiate a new
request while another one executes. This requires asynchronous communication and method
invocation, where the control returns to an application before obtaining a response.
Resource Arbitration. Resource management tactics are only applicable when there is a chance
to increase resources or introduce concurrency. These tactics deal with contentions over resources by
adding more resources and controlling the assignment of them. Another way to deal with resource
contention is to schedule the resources such as processors, memories, buffers, networks and so on.
Some common examples are:
There are various scheduling strategies. It is the responsibility of the architect to understand
characteristics of each resource, recognize contextual forces of the system creating the contention
over these resources and then select a proper scheduling strategy.
• First-in/First-out. FIFO is a fair scheduling strategy with treats all requests for resources as
equals and satisfy them in the order they have initiated. The problem about this strategy is
that, a small task can get stuck behind a very large task for long time to generate a response.
Also if some of the requests have higher priority than others this scheduling strategy can be
problematic as it ignores priorities.
• Fixed-priority scheduling. Fixed-priority scheduling as its name implies, considers a fixed
priority for each process and assigns resources to these processes in that priority order. This
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scheduling strategy results in better service for higher-priority requests while making a low-
priority, but important, task wait for a long time to be serviced.
Variation of priority strategies are: semantic based scheduling. Len Bass defines this strategy
as: “Each stream is assigned a priority statically according to some domain characteristic of
the task that generates it.”
Other strategies include: deadline monotonic. This is a static priority assignment for real-
time deadlines, In this strategy the higher priority is assigned to the streams with shorter
deadlines. rate monotonic This is a static priority assignment for periodic streams. In this
strategy the higher priority is assigned to streams with shorter periods.
• round robin. Round robin is a dynamic scheduling strategy, which performs in a fair way. It
orders the requests first then, at every assignment possibility, it assigns the resource to the
next request in that order.
• earliest deadline first. Earliest deadline first is a dynamic scheduling strategy which assigns
priorities based on the pending requests with the earliest deadline.
2.2.3 Security Tactics
Achieving security as a high level goal is dependent on a set of goals which define security character-
istics in a system in terms of nonrepudiation, confidentiality, integrity, and assurance. To address
these goals, architects choose tactics for resisting attacks, detecting attacks, and recovering from
attacks. In this section we cover some examples of such tactics.
Resisting Attacks
• Authentication. User/Process Authentication is widely used in almost every system deal-
ing with sensitive data or activities. This tactic ensures that a user or remote computer is
actually who it is supposed to be. Username/Passwords, digital certificates, and biometric
identifications are typical techniques to implement authentication.
• Message authentication: is used to provide integrity and authenticity assurances on the mes-
sages communicated between programs. Therefore a short piece of information called a mes-
sage authentication code (often MAC) is used for verifying both user authenticity and integrity
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of communicated messages. This would enable the integrity assurances to detect accidental
and intentional message changes, while at the same time enabling authenticity assurances
affirm the message’s origin.
• Authorization. User/Process Authorization ensures that an authenticated user or remote
computer/process has the rights to access and modify either data or services. This tactic is
usually implemented through some access control patterns within a system. Access control
can be by user roles/classes or by some specific policies. Therefore there are two major types of
authorization. Role Based Access Control (RBAC) or Policy Based Access Control (PBAC).
• Maintain data confidentiality. Data should be protected from unauthorized access. Confiden-
tiality is usually achieved by applying some form of encryption to data and to communication
links. Encryption provides extra protection to persistently maintain data beyond that avail-
able from authorization. Communication links, on the other hand, typically do not have
authorization controls. Encryption is the only protection for passing data over publicly acces-
sible communication links. The link can be implemented by a virtual private network (VPN)
or by a Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) for a Web-based link. Encryption can be symmetric (both
parties use the same key) or asymmetric (public and private keys).
• Maintain integrity. Data must be delivered as it is intended. This tactic can be implemented
by encoding redundant information in data, such as checksums or hash results.
• Limit exposure. An attack mainly depends on exploiting a single weakness or breach to attack
all data and services on a host. The architect can design the allocation of services to hosts so
that limited services are available on each host.
• Limit access. This tactic limits the ways a system can be accessed. For example Firewalls
restrict access through only a set of predefined ports or sources, therefore requests from
unknown sources may be a form of an attack. The negative aspect of this tactic is that, It is
not always possible to limit access, especially for applications which are deployed on a cloud
infrastructure or are public on the web.
• Secure Session. allows an application to only require the users to authenticate once and con-
firm that the user requesting a given action is the user who provided the original credentials.
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This architectural decision will ensure that the authenticated users have a robust and cryp-
tographically secure association with their session.
Detecting Attacks Attack detection tactics are mainly applied to the computer network, com-
munication infrastructure of a system. The intrusion detection systems are the typical ways to
realize this tactic. The main idea is that the behaviour of the system or network traffic is compared
to patterns of normal or abnormal behaviours stored in a database. This database contains large
number of historic patterns of known attacks or patterns of the normal behaviour.
• Audit Trail: is the most commonly used approach for detecting the attacker. Implementation
of this tactic requires storing information about each transaction done in the system plus the
identification information of that. Such audit information can be used to trace the actions
of an attacker, and support system recovery. Audit trails are often attack targets themselves
and therefore should be maintained in a trusted fashion.
Recovering from Attacks Architectural tactics in this category are basically either about restor-
ing the damage or identifying an attacker (for either preventive or punitive purposes). Restoring
the damage is achieved through many of the well known availability tactics. This could be imple-
mented through introducing redundancy at multiple part of the system. Diversity is also a typical
architectural tactic which is usually used along with availability tactics to increase system security.
In fact, the redundant elements of a system are developed by different technology and deployed on
dissimilar platforms, so that attackers can not use the same approach to bring down the replicated
services used to replace the primary service under the attack.
Chapter 2. Background and Definitions 27
2.3 Tactics in Action
In a preliminary study, we reviewed the design specifications for several high-assurance software
systems including the Airbus A320/330/340 family, Boeing 777, Boeing 747 [11], NASA robots
[65, 95, 113, 115, 116] and over twenty high-performance open-source software systems in order to
determine how architectural tactics were used in actual practice [88, 89]. The study included the 16
commonly utilized tactics shown in Table 2.1, and confirmed claims by Bass [81] and Hanmer [64]
that architectural tactics are commonly utilized across high-performance projects. For example, we
found tactics such as heartbeat and resource pooling across the vast majority of the studied (high-
performance) systems, while others, such as active replication, were found in a few of the more
specialized systems.
Table 2.1: An Analysis of Tactics Across Several Performance-centric and/or Safety-critical Sys-
tems






































































































1 RIFE: a Web application engine with support for content management. • • • • • •
2 Fault-Tolerant Corba: (OMG Document ptc/2000-04-04) • • • • • • • • • • •
3 CARMEN: Robot Control Software, with navigation capabilities • • •
4 Rossume: an open-source robot simulator for control and navigation. • • • • •
5 jworkosgi: implementation of the JMX and JMX Remote API into OSGI
bundles.
• • • • • • • • •
6 SmartFrog: Distributed Application Development Framework • • • • • • • • •
7 CarDamom: Real-time, distributed and fault-tolerant middleware • • • • • • • • • • •
8 ACLAnalyser: Tool suit to validate, verify and debug Multi Agent Systems • • • • • •
9 Jfolder: Web-based application development and management tool. • • • •
10 Enhydra shark: XPDL and BPMN Workflow Server • • • • • • •
11 Chat3: An instant messenger. • • •
12 ACE+TAO+CIAO: Framework for high-performance, distributed, real-time
systems.
• • • • • • • • •
13 Google Chromium OS: • • • • • • • • •
14 x4technology tools: Framework Enterprise application software. • • • • •
15 OpenAccountingJ: web-based Accounting/ERP system. • • •
16 Airbus Family: Flight Control System*. • • • • • • • • •
17 Boeing 777: Primary Flight Control (PFC)*. • • • • • • • •
18 NASA CEV: Crew Exploration Vehicle using guidance-navigation* & con-
trol model.
• • • • • • • • •
19 Hadoop Framework: a development framework to support cloud computing. • • • • • • • • • •
20 OfBiz: an enterprise automation and E-Commerce software. • • • • • • •
Legend: * = Tactics identified from architectural documents. In all other cases, tactics were observed directly in the code.
2.4 Architecture Erosion
In this dissertation our concern focuses on the use and preservation of architectural tactics. We
therefore provide an overview for the well known problem of software architecture erosion which
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alternatively sometimes called design erosion or design decay. This phenomena directly impacts
architectural qualities and the intent that the architecture was designed for.
First we present a few definitions for this phenomena and its contributing causes, and we then list
existing attempts to deal with this problem.
2.4.1 Definition
Perry and Wolf [100] define architectural erosion as ‘violations of the architecture’ and architectural
drift as an ‘insensitivity to the architecture’ which occurs when the underlying rules are not clear
to the developers and maintainers. About this issue, David Parnas [99] argues that,
“Programs, like people, get old. We can’t prevent aging, but we can understand its
causes, take steps to limit its effects, temporarily reverse some of the damage it has
caused, and prepare for the day when the software is no longer viable. ... (We must)
lose our preoccupation with the first release and focus on the long term health of our
products.”-Parnas(1992)
Parnas identifies the roots of software aging in premature maintenance engineering work and residual
bugs over years of software evolution. Huang et al. [69] and Grottke et al. [39] consider software
erosion as an issue which helps development of software aging. In the following section, we take a
detailed look at the software erosion problem specifically from an architecture perspective.
2.4.2 Causes of Erosion
Real-world industrial studies have been conducted to investigate the causes of design erosion. One
of these is the work conducted by Bengtsson et.al. [127] which has identified that architecture
erosion is the result of problems associated with the way software is commonly developed. These
problems are:
(i)Traceability of design decisions. The current notations used to create software and all of its by-
products such as different artifacts, lack the expressiveness needed to describe concepts used during
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design. This has resulted in a situation in which it is hard for developers to track design decisions
and reconstructed them from the system.
(ii)Increasing maintenance cost. As software evolves, it becomes more complex, and this usually
results in high maintenance cost. Refactoring is not an easy task and may cause developers to make
suboptimal design decisions in order to minimize the cost. This could happen for various reasons,
often because the developers do not understand the architecture or because a more optimal and
perfect decision would be too difficult and expensive to implement.
(iii)Accumulation of design decisions. Design decisions are hierarchical in nature. A high-level
architectural decision is followed by many low-level decisions [89], and design decisions are accumu-
lated and interact in a way such that revision of one would force reconsideration of all of the others.
A consequence of this problem is that if programmers decide to refactor the design for any reason,
they must work with a system design which is not going to be optimal.
(iv) Iterative methods. The goal of architecture design is to create a plan to move from requirements
to implementation in a way that future change requests can be easily covered. Unfortunately, this
conflicts with the iterative nature of many software development methods, especially in the agile
family. These methodologies typically incorporate new requirements that may have an architectural
impact during development, whereas a careful and optimized design requires knowledge about these
requirements in advance.
(v)Lack of continuous refactoring. If refactoring is not ongoing over the life-cycle, then small design
or implementation issues, architectural smells or decision inconsistencies will be accumulated, and
consequently the software qualities will degrade.
Although erosion has been a commonly accepted problem of software development, there are only a
few practices, techniques and methods particularly designed to mitigate this problem. The existing
works in this area can be divided into two categories, Prevention: a strategy for using tools or
practices which accept paying an upfront cost to prohibit the erosion problem, or Repair : postponing
this concern until it is the right time to do a big refactoring to reconstruct the eroded or drifted
design.[127][91]
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2.4.3 Strategies to Prevent Erosion
The first step in preventing design erosion is having a more mature software development process.
From a Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) perspective, this would address the set of
concerns identified by Bengtsson et.al. [127]. The most important factor in such a development
process which can prevent design erosion is: proper documentation of architecture design, so that
it is accessible to developers and gives them up-to-date knowledge about the architecture of the
system. Therefore the chances that they break an architectural principle or strategic decision during
code refactoring are low.
Parnas [99] emphasizes insufficient architecture design documentation, miscommunicated design
principles and poor developer training as the key roots of erosion. Many of these factors can be
addressed by the current artifacts, notations and practices developed in the community. Mature
development processes emphasize efficient and sufficient documentation of design knowledge from
requirements to design and implementation. Len Bass [81] prescribes a detailed documentation
of requirements, especially qualities in form of a precise description template which is ready for
rigorous analysis, as well as documenting the design architecture through different architectural
views suitable for different stakeholders.
Similarly, Philippe Kruchten suggests the 4+1 View Model [77], Grady Booch [18] prescribes docu-
mentation of the architecture through multiple views and emphasizes that a single view cannot be
suitable for presenting and communicating the architecture.
Beside these process related strategies, the linkage between architecture and implementation can
provide a basis for monitoring architectural compliance at any time. Murphy et al.,[94] developed the
reflexion models technique which compares a reconstructed model of the implemented architecture
to a hypothetical model of the design intended by the architect. These two models are mapped by
an analyst to find the deviation between intended and implemented architecture. This technique
does not provide any tool support for mapping and deviation analysis. This technique is later
extended in [108], the assumption is that the intended architecture exists, then repeatedly the
analysts refine the implemented architecture as development progresses, and compare it against the
intended architecture.
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The Archium tool [25] checks runtime architectural properties. It is mainly developed to explicitly
model architectural design decisions and to ensure that the implementation is aligned and consistent
with the decisions. This tool considers architecture as a collection of design decisions. The idea
behind this work is that capturing design decisions would prohibit design knowledge vaporization
and contribute to the prevention of design erosion.
Although all of these guidelines play a role in preventing erosion, unfortunately their effect in ad-
dressing this problem has been identified as minimal. Therefore, some researchers and practitioners
have adopted other strategies for dealing with architecture erosion issue.
2.4.4 Strategies to Repair Erosion
This category of approaches, is applicable once erosion has already occurred. These approaches
are typically re-engineering techniques which first try to identify erosion, then reverse-engineer the
system and recover the architecture from source code, and finally repair the recovered architecture
to align it with the intended architecture. The existing contributions in this category can be divided
into the main areas of software architecture reconstruction and refactoring. As mentioned earlier,
the repair strategy would not enforce a constant cost during the software development process but
instead, once dealing with erosion became necessary, it would impose a sudden cost of repairing the
degraded software.
• Architecture Reconstruction Techniques
Over the last decade, different tools and techniques have been proposed for reconstructing
architecture from source code or runtime artifacts. This is mainly conducted to understand
the program structure or architecture so that developers can modify the eroded system and
restore it to the intended architecture, or renovate the architecture by changing it to a new
optimal design.
The Architecture Reconstruction Method (ARM) [63] is one of the first semi-automatic meth-
ods for architecture recovery from source code. This method is designed based on the pattern
matching idea, to identify a set of patterns provided by the user in a reverse-engineered model
of the implemented architecture. This method requires human involvement in most steps,
such as specifying the patterns that might be used in the system architecture, or validating
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patterns instances retrieved from searching the reverse-engineered models. Correctly detected
and verified patterns, are then used to reconstruct the architecture. The actual reconstruct
architecture is visualized using the Rigi visualization tool.
Reflexion models by Murphy et.al. [94] is used to map a hypothetical model of the intended
architecture to the results from a static analysis of the source code. Lung et.al. [83] uses
clustering techniques to refine the reflexion models and create a high level abstraction of the
system structure/architecture. Classes and packages are the element of clustering techniques.
Lung uses filtering to remove ad hoc elements and noises out of the abstracted models.
Mancoridis et al., [84] has created a tool called Bunch which uses dependencies between
classes and generates a call graph which is later used to cluster classes and create a high level
structural abstraction of the system.
Sartipi [111] has developed a software architecture recovery method based on pattern match-
ing. This technique uses a pattern matching language called Architecture Query Language.
The user needs to hypothesize the architectural patterns used in the intended architecture and
describe them using the AQL. Later this description is used for searching the hypothesised
pattern in the abstract graph constructed from source code.
Instead of focusing on the structure of the software, Jansen et al. [73] emphasize recovering
architectural design decisions. Their approach which is called Architectural Design Decision
Recovery Approach (ADDRA) is based on differences in architecture design across different
versions of the system. First, detailed designs from selected versions of the implementation
are recovered to generate architectural views for each version. Then the delta, which indicates
the differences between these views are inspected to identify the architectural design decisions.
This approach is slightly different from other approaches as it is focusing on decisions rather
structure.
• Architecture Refactoring
Architecture refactoring is widely used to reconcile implemented architecture with intended
architecture. Martin Fowler has presented a set of refactoring techniques to replace and repair
violation of a good design.[5] Architecture refactoring systematically restructures the software
implementation code in a way that the eroded implementation stays aligned with the existing
design rules, alternatively the refactoring might enforce new design rules with changing the
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dependencies among packages, moving functions or alerting the partial structure of the system.
Architecture refactoring is often is done to improve design fragments of software architectures
which can have a negative impact on system maintainability. For example, requirements
change and this might results in the adoption of a design solution which is inappropriate for
that context, or the new solution might result in undesirable behaviour. In such situation,
refactoring the architecture is necessary to remove the issues known as architectural smells
and prevent their accumulation which may end in design erosion. Many researchers also have
conducted studies on identification and categorization of various architectural smells, [53][54]
architectural antipatterns [22], and refactoring of a design [47][5]. A number of different
tools and IDEs have been developed to support code refactoring; unfortunately, none of them
emphasize the architecture-level concerns. Therefore it remains the developers’ responsibility
to take care of these issues.
2.5 Summary
Our focus in this dissertation is on architectural tactics. Like other architectural concerns they
have a tendency to erode over time. Given their importance for realizing critical system qualities
it is important to preserve them. This chapter provided a summary on several different types of
architectural tactic. Furthermore it discussed the problem of architectural erosion and articulated
the current notions used to address this important problem.




This chapter provides a quick overview of traceability fundamentals and introduces the essential
traceability terminology and concepts used in this dissertation.
3.0.1 Definition of Software Traceability
The COEST [33] defines Requirements Traceability as,
“the ability to interrelate any uniquely identifiable software engineering artifact to any
other, maintain required links over time, and use the resulting network to answer ques-
tions of both the software product and its development process”.
The source artifact is the artifact from which a trace originates, and the target artifact is the artifact
at the destination of a trace. Software traceability is the ability to relate the concepts and data
within a software artifact (source artifact) to another software artifact (target artifact). This can
be done by explicitly connecting the artifacts together (e.g establishing a trace links) or implicitly
providing this connection (e.g. tagging the artifacts).
The IEEE Standard Glossary of Software Engineering Terminology (IEEE Std 610.12-1990) [4]
provides a more general definition of traceability:
35
Chapter 3. Traceability Fundamental 36
“the degree to which a relationship can be established between two or more products of
the development process, especially products having a predecessor-successor or master-
subordinate relationship to one another”.
Explicit traceability results in the creation of trace links which is a specified association between
the source artifact and the target artifact. A trace link can have tag indicating the semantics of the
link, and by default the direction of a trace link is from source artifact to target artifact, however
it is possible to have inverse or bi-directional trace link.
Software traceability has been identified by many organizations such as the Federal Drug Adminis-
tration (FDA) [3] , Federal Aviation Administration(FAA) [6] and Department of Defence (DOD)
[49] as a mandatory software engineering practice for safety critical software projects in order to ac-
complish compliance verification, impact analysis, regression test selection, safety-case construction,
requirements allocation and coverage analysis.
3.0.2 Traceability information model (TIM)
The traceability information model (TIM) is a graph style model which defines the trace artifact
types, the trace link types and the permissible trace relationships on a project, in order to address
anticipated traceability-related queries and traceability-enabled activities and tasks [58].
Best practices for software traceability dictate that each particular project needs a TIM expressing
what should be traced in the project. A TIM can capture additional information such as semantics
of trace links, cardinality and link direction.
Creating a TIM can help to ensure that traceability is established strategically for a project. Ramesh
[104] has developed a set of well known but generic traceability information models through sys-
tematic analysis of the traceability problems. (more details on [104])
3.0.3 Tracing and Related Concepts
The operation of establishing trace links between different artifacts or using those trace links is
called tracing. Tracing like any other computer aided activity, can occur in three different forms:
manual, automated and semi-automated [57].
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In manual tracing, a human establishes and uses the traceability links. Although there should be
some basic tool support such as drag and drop features to decrease most of tracing burden.
Conversely in automated tracing, the trace links are established via automated techniques, methods
and tools. Finally, in semi-automated tracing the trace links are established via a combination of
automated techniques, methods and tools and human activities.
In all of these cases, the trace links can be established either through traceability creation by
associating two (or more) artifacts, trace capture by creating the trace links concurrently with the
creation of the artifacts, or trace reconstruction by establishment of trace links after the generation
or manipulation of associated artifacts.
Forward traceability is tracing in the same order as the artifacts appear in a developmental path,
which is not necessarily a chronological path, such as forward from quality requirements through
design decisions to source code.
Backward traceability is tracing in the antecedent steps in a developmental path, again not nec-
essarily a chronological path, such as backward from code through design decisions to quality
requirements.
Trace granularity indicates the level of detail at which a trace is recorded and performed. The
granularity of a trace is defined by the granularity of the source artifact and the target artifact. For
example, at a coarse-granularity, an architectural decision is traced to a subsystem or component,
while the same decision at fine granularity could be traced into two different methods in a Java
class.
3.0.4 Automated Traceability
Several IR methods have been developed to automate the creation and recovery of the trace links.
These approaches work based on the similarity between the words in the text contained software
artefacts. A trace link is established between two artifacts if they have high textual similarity.
Typically utilizing IR methods contains the following steps:
1. pre-processing of the documents to extract the vector of words.
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2. corpus indexing with an IR method.
3. ranking the candidate links.
There are several strategies to pre-process a textual document. For example text normalization can
be used to remove white spaces and non-textual characters from the text. stop word removal can
be used to remove stop words or common words (i.e., articles, adverbs, etc) that are not useful to
capture the semantics of each artefact. Furthermore, many times Stemming is used for reducing
inflected or derived words to their stem or root form.
After preprocessing the documents several different IR methods can be used to create the trace links.
Based on a survey conducted on the available research papers indicated that probabilistic models
[10, 36], VSM [16], and LSI [101] are the three most frequently used IR methods for traceability
recovery.
Jane Cleland-Huang et.al [36] have used the probabilistic model based on conditioned probability
to recover links between requirements and UML diagrams, while others have utilized similar prob-
abilistic models to recover the trace links between requirements and source code [9, 10], and links
among requirements and regulatory codes. [31].
Several researchers have used the VSM to recover traceability links among requirements [66], re-
quirements and source code [9], [10], [85], test cases and source code [44], and defect reports and
source code [133].
Despite the wide usage of VSM, there is a major criticism on VSM that it does not take into account
relations between terms [45]. For instance, having a term like “programmer” in one document and
another term like “developer” in another document does not contribute to the similarity measure
between these two documents. Therefore LSI [45] was developed to overcome this problem by taking
into account the synonymy problems, which occur with the VSM model.
LSI addresses this problem by explicitly taking into account the dependencies between terms and
documents. It assumes the existence of a “latent structure” in word usage and uses statistical
techniques to estimate this latent structure. For example, both “programmer” and “developer” are
likely to co-occur in different documents with related terms, such as “codes”, “programs”, etc.
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3.0.5 Event-Based Traceability
Event-based traceability (EBT) developed by Cleland-Huang et.al.[29] provides an infrastructure for
using trace links to answer change impact analysis queries. It also supports long-term evolutionary
change so that the traceability scheme can be maintained.
In Event-Based Traceability (EBT), source artifacts can be considered as publishers of change
events and target artifacts as subscribers. When a source artifact goes through some changes,
all subscribers are notified of the change. The event-notification architecture enables the EBT
traceability scheme to handle change robustly.
3.1 Tracing Architectural Concerns
Non-functional requirements, describing quality concerns such as performance, reliability, availabil-
ity, and security, often exhibit complex interdependencies and trade-offs [80][43] and have broad-
reaching impacts across the architectural design and implementation of a software intensive system.
Non-functional requirements are often realized in the design and implementation code as architec-
tural tactics.
The cross cutting nature of NFRs, creates significant challenges for tracing them, resulting in the
proliferation of traceability links. As a result, tracing NFRs can be expensive, and unfortunately
many organizations do not even attempt to trace them; however this means that change requests
during software maintenance are often implemented with very little understanding of how system
qualities are affected by the change. This section summarizes existing practices and techniques
developed for tracing NFRs.
3.1.1 Software Architecture Practices that capture NFR traces
In practice, many architectural assessment and project scoping techniques implicitly trace NFRs
into architectural designs [62][103][76][75]. Implicitly means that the relationships between NFRs
and design decisions are created or embedded in the artifacts without establishing a traceability
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matrix. The benefits of building implicit traceability on top of such methods is that project stake-
holders realize immediate benefits from their traceability efforts. The disadvantage is that NFR
traceability links are often embedded in documentation that is specific to a given activity, and it is
therefore difficult to extract and use those links to support other unrelated activities. For example,
NFR trace links which are created and documented within an architectural analysis document, will
likely be available for future architectural analysis activities, but will not be readily available for pro-
grammers who may need to understand how a low level code modification impacts an architectural
decision. This section, provides an overview of four software engineering methods and activities that
incorporate the creation and utilization of NFR traceability links. These methods and practices
are the Architectural Tradeoff Analysis Method (ATAM), Architectural Documentation, Enterprise
Architectural Frameworks, and management of architectural knowledge.
• Architecture Tradeoff Analysis Method (ATAM)
The Architecture Tradeoff Analysis Method (ATAM) is a qualitative approach to risk and trade-off
analysis of an architecture with respect to a set of clearly articulated quality scenarios [81][76][75].
The evaluation process starts with a presentation of the business drivers, including a high level
description of quality attributes such as security, safety, or reliability. This is followed by a short
presentation of candidate architectures. Quality scenarios are then generated and prioritized, and
architectural solutions addressing those qualities are identified and documented. As a result of
these steps, the prioritized NFRs are mapped onto their corresponding architectural decision and
the design fragment in which the architectural solution is implemented. and the NFRs are then
evaluated to determine how well they address the specified quality attributes.
ATAM implicitly documents traceability relationships among quality scenarios and the architec-
tural elements in which they are realized. These mappings create a de facto traceability matrix,
documenting relationships between quality concerns, tactical architectural decisions, and lower level
design solutions. Unfortunately, as previously noted, this information is not easily accessible for any
purpose other than architectural analysis. However, Mirakhorli et al [90] have partially addressed
this problem by developing a utility for extracting traceability information from ATAM documents
and using it to construct a more traditional traceability matrix.
• Architecture Documentation Methods
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Architectural documentation approaches such as Views-and-Beyond [81], Siemens S4V [68], and
RUP 4+1 [77] provide guidelines and a template for documenting architectural solutions across
multiple views. Each view depicts a coherent set of architectural elements from a specific perspective
such as hardware resources, runtime behavior, or data usage, and is presented visually with a
supporting catalog describing the behavior and property of each element, its interfaces, and the
qualities associated with each interface. Architectural decisions and rationales associated with each
view are also documented.
The catalog of elements implicitly captures traceability relationships among architectural elements
and the quality concerns exposed by a component or its interfaces.
• Enterprise Architectural Frameworks
An enterprise architectural framework provides a mechanism for describing and communicating
architectural concerns, for comparing different architectural solutions, and for helping to ensure
the integrity and completeness of a solution. Several architectural frameworks, including the
Command, Control, Computers, Communication, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
(C4ISR) framework [24], have directly addressed issues of tracing quality concerns. C4ISR was de-
veloped by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) to improve the operational capabilities of warrior
systems across defense agencies. The C4ISR framework encompasses three different architectural
views. The Operational View (OV) artifacts define operational elements, activities and tasks, as well
as the information exchange needed to accomplish an operation. The System View (SV) artifacts
describe the physical systems, software services and interconnections needed to support operations.
Finally the Technical View (TV) defines technical standards, implementation conventions, rules and
criteria governing interaction and interdependences of system parts. C4ISR utilizes traceability in
several different ways. For example the System Interface Description is used to map supporting
security and communication requirements to system interfaces, while the Operational Information
Exchange Matrix (OV-3) is used to describe operational node connectivity characteristics such as
Throughput, Security, Timeliness (e.g., 10/minute), and Required Interoperability Level. In these
cases, the traceability matrices are used to map qualities to software elements; however the traces
are relatively high level and do not provide detailed mappings from quality concerns to subsystems.
• Knowledge Management Tools
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Software architectural knowledge management tools provide support for documenting architec-
turally significant requirements, the architectural decisions that were made to satisfy those re-
quirements, and the rationale behind those decisions [12]. Documenting architectural knowledge
helps developers and architects maintain existing systems and can also be used to improve the archi-
tectural design of future systems. Tyree and Akerman [123] proposed a taxonomy of items needed to
effectively document design rationales including issues, decisions, assumptions, arguments, implica-
tions, related decisions, related requirements, related artifacts, related principles, and notes. Other
researchers, such as Kruchten [79] and Burge [23], have proposed similar ontology to document
architectural decisions. All of these works assume the underlying use of traceability links to relate
architectural decisions to external artifacts such as requirements, design documents, and architec-
tural assessments. Several tools have been developed to capture and re-use architectural knowledge.
Although the primary focus of these tools is on architectural knowledge, the organization of that
knowledge relies upon user-created traceability links.
Most architectural management tools, such as Process-based Architecture Knowledge Manage-
ment Environment (PAKME) [13], Archium [72] and Architecture Design Decision Support System
(ADDSS)[25] , help architects to create traceability links between knowledge related items, such
as requirements and design decisions, and external documents. However, the tools we evaluated
support only relatively coarse-grained traceability between documents and do not support finer
grained traceability between NFRs and specific design or code elements in which architectural deci-
sions are realized. Furthermore, the tools have not yet been integrated with architectural modeling
tools [117], which further limits their ability to support NFR traceability to critical elements of the
architecture.
3.1.2 Custom Processes and Techniques for Tracing NFRs
In addition to software architecture practices which utilize NFR traceability to support their prime
objectives, there are several other techniques, some of which are designed specifically for creating
and maintaining NFR traces. In this section we describe four techniques including use of UML
Profiles, Goal-Centric Traceability, Tracing through Design Patterns, and Decision-Centric Trace-
ability. The benefit of these approaches is that they provide higher degrees of automation for using
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and understanding traceability links, and in some cases are designed specifically with maintainabil-
ity in mind; however unlike the methods described in the previous section, these approaches are
constrained to either specific modeling environments or development practices, and do not neces-
sarily return immediate benefits to the trace creators. This makes their consistent, project-wide use
unlikely.
• Techniques that Embed Traceability Links into UML The Unified Modeling Language
(UML) is used to visualize, specify, and construct elements of an object-oriented system. It mod-
els boundaries and interactions between the system and its users, the communication between
objects, the state of those objects, the static structure of the system, and the system’s physical
architecture[109]. Standard UML can be customized for a particular domain through the use of
UML Profiles, which allow the semantics of standard UML elements to be refined via stereotypes,
tags, and the object constraint language (OCL) [130]. For example, a «trace» stereotype could be
created and associated with a dependency link to depict a traceability relationship.
Several researchers have developed UML profiles for supporting traceability of NFRs. For example,
Salazar-Zrate [110] modeled NFRs and related them to functional elements through use of a «NFR
Behaviour» stereotype, and then described behavioral attributes using OCL.
The Architecture Rationale and Element Linkage (AREL)[118] approach provides two new UML
profiles for modeling Architectural Entities (AE) and Architectural Rationales (AR). These profiles,
and an associated tool, allow architects to visualize AEs and their related ARs. AEs can represent
functional requirements, non-functional requirements, components, processors, or text documents;
while ARs describe quantitative rationales such as the costs, benefits, and risks associated with
architectural decisions, and the qualitative rationales which document the issues, arguments, al-
ternatives, and trade-offs associated with a design decision. An AREL model is represented as an
acyclic graph, in which causal dependencies between design rationales and design objects can be
traversed in order to extract traceability links.
In related work, Zhu et al [135] have proposed two UML profiles for modeling architectural decisions
and NFRs. One of the limitations of embedding traceability links into UML diagrams is the fact that
trace links are limited to individual models. Cysneiro et al. addressed this limitation by developing
a Language Extended Lexicon (LEL) that facilitated the tracing of goals across multiple UML
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diagrams. Their approach embedded controlled keywords from the LEL into goals and elements of
the UML models [42].
UML approaches enable traceability relationships to be depicted within the design model, but suffer
from scalability problems which make even medium-sized models difficult to create and understand.
Furthermore, many UML profile approaches are limited to tracing structural elements and exclude
traces to a broader set of models such as deployment or implementation models. Both of these
issues are major short-comings, as both scalability and heterogeneity were identified through our
study of safety and performance-critical systems as fundamental requirements for tracing NFRs.
Despite these issues, the idea of incorporating traceability into UML models is quite appealing,
simply because UML models are a natural part of many software development projects. However,
it should be noted that such approaches focus on the notation of the trace links and provide very
limited guidance for how and where to establish useful and effective links for tracing NFRs.
• Aspect Oriented Approach:
Aspect Oriented Requirements Engineering (AORE) approaches focus on identifying cross-cutting
concerns, many of which are architectural in nature [61, 106]. As a precursor to Aspect Oriented
Programming (AOP), AORE’s primary purpose is to identify candidate cross-cutting concerns,
some of which will later be recognized as aspects and implemented as such in the final code. The
concepts of AORE provide an enticing framework for tracing NFRs, as many early aspects do in
fact represent specific quality requirements. For this reason, several researchers have explored ideas
of using early aspects to trace NFRs [96, 105, 120]
The first approach, referred to as “Aspect-oriented development model with traceability mecha-
nisms” [96] facilitates the separation, composition and traceability of cross-cutting concerns (both
functional and nonfunctional). This approach includes a dynamic view in which cross-cutting con-
cerns are traced to use-cases and scenarios, and a static view in which they are traced to conceptual
classes. In related work, Tekinerdogan [120] developed a concerns traceability meta-model (CTM)
for tracing concerns throughout the life cycle. The meta-model provides support for bidirectional
traceability between concerns in the requirements and design, and for traces between concerns and
other artifacts.
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• Goal Centric Traceability: Goal-Centric Traceability (GCT) provides traceability support
for managing and maintaining NFRs and their related quality concerns over the long-term life of
a software intensive system [34]. As its name suggests, GCT is a goal-oriented approach which
assumes that quality concerns are modeled in a goal hierarchy such as the NFR framework [80], i*
[134], Tropos [26], or an ATAM utility tree [81]. GCT also assumes that during the initial analysis,
design, and implementation of the software system, a number of different models are developed to
evaluate the quality of the design. These might include ATAM scenarios for evaluating how well
a design satisfies critical use cases, a Software Performance Execution (SPE) graph to evaluate
response time goals, a system execution graph to measure throughput and latency [128], an attack
graph [118] to evaluate security attributes, usability metrics to evaluate a graphical user interface,
or an executable test-case to evaluate functionality that is needed to satisfy quality goal. GCT
refers to these kinds of models as Quality Assessment Models (QAMs) [34]. The GCT framework,
includes: (i) a goal model that captures stakeholders’ quality concerns and their trade-offs, (ii) a
set of QAMs that have been designed to evaluate the extent to which the architecture satisfies the
stated quality goals, (iii) a traceability infrastructure that is used to link QAMs to goals, (iv) GCT
algorithms that manage the automated impact analysis and propagation of change across the goal
hierarchy, and finally (v) an impact report which describes the potential impact of a change on the
overall quality goals.
GCT supports two specific traceability tasks. The first involves identifying the initial impact of a
change upon the GCT model. The second traceability task is triggered once an initial impact point
is discovered. This second task is internal to the GCT model, and utilizes the internal structure of
the goal model, the executable traceability links between specific goals and QAMs, and the GCT
propagation algorithms. In GCT, an executable trace is defined as a trace which carries sufficient
semantics to be processed automatically, so that the QAM can be parameterized and re-executed,
and output values are returned to the GCT model for evaluation.
The primary advantage of GCT is that it provides support for maintaining quality concerns over the
long-term by making use of QAMs that were already created during the initial development phase;
however GCT is only viable if tool support is available to automate the process, and if QAMs, such
as simulation models, are created as an integral component of the development process. GCT is
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therefore best deployed for only a critical set of goals, for which executable QAMs are available,
and as such cannot be seen as a holistic solution for tracing all NFRs.
• Design Pattern-Based Approaches: A design pattern represents a reusable solution to a
commonly occurring problem in software design [51]. In addition to solving a specific functional
problem, design patterns often address a specific class of quality concerns such as maintainability,
flexibility, or portability. Gross and Yu [59] and Cleland-Huang [35] proposed tracing NFRs to
software designs through the use of existing design patterns as intermediaries. This technique
supports traceability for any NFR that can be implemented as a design pattern.
3.2 Summary
This chapter described the fundamental traceability concepts used in this dissertation. Furthermore
it summarized the key approaches previously used for tracing quality concerns. The work described
in the following chapters relies on these concepts and extends the existing work already published









The architecture of a system and its qualities can be maintained with the support of traceabil-
ity methods and a related change-impact analysis infrastructure. This infrastructure could help
the developers to fully understand the impact of design or implementation changes they make on
architecturally significant requirements and quality concerns. Unfortunately, the current state of
software traceability methods does not provide this level of support. Existing traceability meta-
models, solutions or techniques do not provide specific guidelines for how traceability links should
be established between quality concerns and software design and implementation artifacts. Further-
more, current methods tend to result in a proliferation of traceability links and create a situation
in which traceability is difficult and costly to maintain, and in which links degenerate into an
inaccurate and non-useful state.
Contribution: In this chapter, the important challenges of architectural traceability have b iden-
tified and summarized through an extensive study of architectural decisions in highly dependable
and complex avionic systems. The conducted study involved reviewing the specifications of several
high-assurance software systems including the Airbus A320/330/340 family, Boeing 777, Boeing
7J7 [11, 113] , NASA robots [70, 95], NASA Crew Exploration Vehicles [65, 115, 116] and also im-
plemented code of performance-centric systems such as Google Chromium OS, Hadoop Framework
etc. Furthermore these traceability challenges have drew the novel concept of Tactic Traceability
Patterns (tTPs). tTPs reduce the cost and effort of traceability through providing a set of re-usable
traceability links.
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4.1 Introduction
The proliferation of traceability links is one of the main issue of using traceability practices. This
issue is visible through series of Ramesh’s [104] traceability meta-models that were produced from a
study of traceability practices in industry. The Traceability Information Model (TIM) depicted in
Figure 4.1, is derived from these meta-models and shows significant redundancy of traceability paths
for establishing relationships between issues, conflicts, alternative options, arguments, rationales,
assumptions, requirements, and design decisions.
Figure 4.1: Components from Ramesh’s Metamodel - Rationale SubModel [104]
For example decisions can be traced directly to requirements, or they can be traced indirectly
through either rationales or through issues and conflicts. There is a lack of any guidance to inform
architects as to the best way to establish traceability. Moreover, various studies have significantly
emphasized the need to simplify the creation and use of traceability [8].
Proliferation of traceability links is exacerbated when tracing architectural concerns which describe
quality attributes such as performance, security, reliability, and maintainability. Such concerns
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often have a cross cutting nature, and therefore exhibit a broad reaching impact across the system.
These concerns are often realized through components and behaviors that are visible in a variety of
architectural and implementation views at very different abstraction levels. Here the main criticism
to standard traceability meta-models arises as they do not begin to address this degree of complexity
and cannot tame it.
Before prescribing specific traceability guidelines for tracing quality concerns, it is necessary to
understand the issues that must drive any effective architecture traceability solution. Therefore, we
first report the results of an extensive study of architectural decisions that we conducted in highly
dependable and complex avionic systems. The conducted study involved reviewing the specifications
of several high-assurance software systems including the Airbus A320/330/340 family, Boeing 777,
Boeing 7J7 [11, 113] , NASA robots [70, 95] see AppendixA.1, NASA Crew Exploration Vehicles [65,
115, 116] and also implemented code of performance-centric systems such as Google Chromium OS,
Hadoop Framework and so on. For each of the systems studied, we identified critical quality goals,
architecturally significant requirements, architectural decisions, tactics, patterns, design solutions,
and views and models in which each of these techniques were visible. This study provided the
foundations and motivation for a new decision-centric traceability approach that includes a meta-
model describing the required traceability links, and a strategic process for applying the meta-model.
4.2 Identified Challenges
As a result of this study we observed seven issues that significantly can influence the proposed
traceability approach. Each of these is discussed below:
• Decisions are Hierarchical in Nature. It is quite common that architectural decisions have
a hierarchical nature. Architects usually start with a high level decision, then they adopt different
low level supporting decisions to tune the effectiveness of their initial high level decision. Although
both high and low level decisions are often traceable back to individual driving user or system level
requirements, it is often only the lower-level decisions that are traceable forward to the architectural
views or source code. For example, in all of the avionics cases studied, the reliability requirement
was at least partially achieved through a decision to deploy redundant components; however this
high level decision was realized through a variety of different sub-decisions. The airbus architecture
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utilizes logical redundancy through use of multi-process threading, while the Boeing architecture
deploys components on different processors. In the Boeing 777, the Primary Flight Control (PFC)
system includes three replicated software modules deployed on separate processors [11]. At runtime,
each of the PFCs receives the same input values from which they independently compute output
values, and the results are evaluated using a “majority” voting algorithm.
In contrast, the Airbus flight control system uses a “2-Self Checking Programming” as the voting
mechanism. This includes two software units for command and monitoring, which also receive
identical inputs. The units are located on a single processor but run on separate operating system
processes. The results generated by the command unit are compared to those of the monitoring
unit and in the case that the results do not match, airplane control is switched to another com-
puter. Another architectural decision that we observed in Airbus case studies, involved the use
of N-Version Programming to mitigate against the possibility of duplicating design errors across
redundant components. In this case, sub-decisions involved selecting programming languages, mak-
ing team assignments, adopting different algorithmic solutions, and using different hardware and
software platforms.
These examples demonstrate that high-level architectural decisions are often associated with a
fairly extensive set of subsequent lower-level decisions which impose constraints on the behavior,
structure, and deployment of the system, and which work synergistically to support and shape the
higher level decision. Tracing the high-level decision therefore translates into first understanding
how a high-level decision is realized through lower level decisions, and secondly understanding how
to effectively trace those lower level decisions into the architectural design and implementation.
• Visibility of Architectural Decisions. Different architectural decisions are visible in different
views, therefore traceability links must be established across a wide variety of architectural views.
From observing the various architectural decisions in both the avionics systems and in non-mission
critical system such as Chrome, Hadoop and OfBiz„ it is evident that different decisions have very
different scopes of impact. While some decisions, such as Single Sign in (SSN), may deal with the
structure of the system and lead to creation of sub-systems, layers or specific components, other
decisions, such as fault recovery or performance decisions, affect how elements interact, perform
their responsibilities or appear at runtime, and are more likely to be visible in behavioral models
and runtime views. Furthermore, a layered view may show tactical decisions concerning the system’s
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portability, while a deployment view may depict decisions concerning the system’s performance and
reliability. Some decisions are visible in multiple views, for example a decision might be traced to
both architectural models (e.g., a class, an interface, a process or thread, a package or subsystem
etc.) as well as implementation artifacts. An effective traceability scheme therefore needs the ability
to trace quality concerns to a wide variety of architectural and implementation views.
• Granularity of Architectural Impact. Many architectural decisions are characterized by a
set of roles and constraints. For example, an availability tactic such as heart-beat is traced at a
coarse-grained level to a component that emits a heartbeat message and another that listens for
and monitors those messages and reacts accordingly. However, it may also be traced to one or
more variables controlling the heart-beat rate. To preserve system reliability we need to trace the
heart-beat decision to both the component level and to the variable level. Traceability links must
therefore be created and maintained at various levels of granularity.
• Tacit Architectural Knowledge. Sometimes architects make tactical decisions but these
decisions are not explicit. In fact these decisions represent tacit knowledge which is rarely articulated
and, by definition, never documented, they exist but in form of tacit knowledge in the head of
architects and developers. To prevent architectural erosion, tacit knowledge must be articulated as
a design decision, even if it is not traceable into any specific architectural view. For example, an
architect might decide that concurrent threads should not have direct write access to shared data.
Because such decisions are implicit, our study did not reveal them explicitly. Nevertheless, they are
included in this discussion, because of their importance to the traceability issue. If traceability is to
be used to prevent architectural erosion, tacit decisions must be explicitly articulated, documented,
and traced.
• Architectural Trade-offs. Design decisions exhibit tradeoffs and interdependencies. It is neces-
sary to capture such interdependencies so that the impact of a change to one decision is understood
across the broader context of other architectural decisions. Our study identified numerous examples
of potential design trade-offs. For example, redundancy requirements in avionics systems, trade-off
against weight requirements and performance requirements, and similarly security requirements in
Chrome trade-off against performance. Relationships between decisions, including both positive
contributions and negative trade-offs need to be explicitly modeled as traceability links.
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• Rich Semantics. Balasubramaniam’s prior study on traceability highlighted the need for trace-
ability links to be semantically typed [5]. This is especially important in tracing architectural
concerns because of the various roles played by different components in realizing architectural de-
cisions. For example, a given component might provide diversity for an N-Version design strategy,
while another component might be responsible for coordinating voting tactics. Semantically typing
each traceability link provides enhanced support for making sense of the traceability links, in a way
that the links convey more conceptual informations and can be used for better support of important
tasks such as architectural preservation.
• Minimalistic Strategy. Complex high-assurance and high-performance systems are rich with
design decisions. Given the known problems of creating, maintaining, and using traceability links,
it is important to develop a minimalistic traceability strategy that removes redundancy, while
retaining only those traceability links needed to support critical software engineering tasks such as
impact analysis and architectural preservation.
4.3 Decision-Centric Traceability Meta-Model
As a result of the above study and after careful considerations of all the observations from these
systems, we developed a decision-centric traceability meta-model for capturing architectural design
decisions and creating traceability links between architectural components and the non-functional
requirements and concerns they are designed to satisfy. The model is depicted in Figure 4.2,
and shows that traces are established from quality concerns, through architectural decisions to
architectural elements visible across various architectural views. In this meta-model the trace
redundancy is removed, while the expressivity required for a traceability model is maintained.
Figure 4.3 illustrates how the model might be instantiated for a redundancy decision that involves
voting and N-Version programming.
Establishing all traces through architectural decisions, and disallowing traces from quality concerns
directly to the architectural design, addresses all of the issues identified through our conducted
studies. As depicted in Figures 4.3, decisions can be structured hierarchically to capture the way
in which sub-decisions shape and help to achieve higher level decisions. Traceability links can then
be created at any granularity level through the hierarchy of decisions. The proposed meta-model
























Figure 4.2: Decision-Centric Traceability (DCT) Meta-Model
promotes capturing traceability links around design decisions and therefore it supports visualization
of design knowledge. This increases the program comprehension and provides enhanced support for
helping trace users to understand the impact of a decision across multiple architectural views. Since
architectural decisions are frequently realized through the use of standard tactics, architectural pat-
terns, or constraints, many of which include recognized roles; traceability links can be semantically
typed to depict specific roles played by the architectural component in realizing a specific decision.
For example, in Figure 4.3, traceability links to architectural components contributing to the redun-
dancy tactic are semantically typed as “Coordinates”, “Assigned to”, “Provides Diversity”, which
immediately conveys the role of the component in realizing the decision.
The proposed meta-model suggests tracing the requirements through design decisions into design
components and implementation modules. We extended the notion of the meta-model for each
specific architectural tactics, and proposed an augmented model in which, it is clear where to create
traceability links in order balance the costs versus benefits of tracing architectural concerns. [46].
This extension results in the Tactic Traceability Pattern (tTP), designed to help architects establish
strategic traceability links which can be used during the maintenance phase to visualize underlying
architectural tactics and tradeoffs, and to keep maintainers fully informed of underlying decisions
and rationales. The proposed tTPs explicitly differentiate between reusable traceability links i.e.
those links internal to the tactic, which can be used across multiple projects, versus project specific














































Figure 4.3: An example of tracing and visualizing the redundancy tactic using DCT meta-model
traceability links established as mappings from concrete elements of the architectural design to
components of the tTPs.
In this part of work, we are interested to examine the following research questions,
• RQ1. Does using tTPs potentially reduce the cost and effort of establishing and maintaining
traceability links?
• RQ2. How useful are tTPs for notifying the developers of potential erosion through architecture-
change impact analysis?
All the tTPs described in section of the dissertation, were identified through observing the use of ar-
chitectural tactics across several high-assurance software systems including the Airbus A320/330/340
family, Boeing 777, Boeing 7J7 [114], NASA robots [70, 95], NASA Crew Exploration Vehicles
[65, 113, 115, 116], Google Chromium OS[2] and many other and over twenty high-performance
open-source software systems. We conducted an study which included the 16 commonly utilized
tactics shown in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1: An Analysis of Tactics Across Several Performance-centric and/or Safety-critical Sys-
tems






































































































1 RIFE: a Web application engine with support for content management. • • • • • •
2 Fault-Tolerant Corba: (OMG Document ptc/2000-04-04) • • • • • • • • • • •
3 CARMEN: Robot Control Software, with navigation capabilities • • •
4 Rossume: an open-source robot simulator for control and navigation. • • • • •
5 jworkosgi: implementation of the JMX and JMX Remote API into OSGI
bundles.
• • • • • • • • •
6 SmartFrog: Distributed Application Development Framework • • • • • • • • •
7 CarDamom: Real-time, distributed and fault-tolerant middleware • • • • • • • • • • •
8 ACLAnalyser: Tool suit to validate, verify and debug Multi Agent Systems • • • • • •
9 Jfolder: Web-based application development and management tool. • • • •
10 Enhydra shark: XPDL and BPMN Workflow Server • • • • • • •
11 Chat3: An instant messenger. • • •
12 ACE+TAO+CIAO: Framework for high-performance, distributed, real-time
systems.
• • • • • • • • •
13 Google Chromium OS: • • • • • • • • •
14 x4technology tools: Framework Enterprise application software. • • • • •
15 OpenAccountingJ: web-based Accounting/ERP system. • • •
16 Airbus Family: Flight Control System*. • • • • • • • • •
17 Boeing 777: Primary Flight Control (PFC)*. • • • • • • • •
18 NASA CEV: Crew Exploration Vehicle using guidance-navigation* & con-
trol model.
• • • • • • • • •
19 Hadoop Framework: a development framework to support cloud computing. • • • • • • • • • •
20 OfBiz: an enterprise automation and E-Commerce software. • • • • • • •
Legend: * = Tactics identified from architectural documents. In all other cases, tactics were observed directly in the code.
4.4 Tactic Traceability Patterns
A tTP provides the required infrastructure for tracing a specific architectural tactic into the design
and implementation. Each tTP is centered around a tactic and defines both backward traceability
to the driving requirements and rationales of the tactic, and forward traceability to the architectural
elements in which it is realized. Moreover, a tTP defines the internal structure of a tactic in terms
of its primary roles and parameters, also relationships between the roles and proxy elements which
are used to map architectural elements in design models and code (i.e. concrete classes, methods,
variables, files etc in a project) to the tTP. which are used to map architectural elements in design
models and code to the tTP. Forward traceability is done by using these proxies. Traceability links
between tactics and architecture are therefore established as mappings between a proxy and concrete
design or implementation element. Backward traces include links to goals, quality requirements and
rationales associated with the tactic, however if necessary, these can be customized for a specific
project.
tTPs primarily lead to effective traceability when building families of systems which implement
similar tactics, or when using very common tactics that tend to be implemented in similar ways
across different products.
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Figure 4.4: Traceability Pattern for Heartbeat Tactic
As an example, Figure 4.4 depicts the tTP developed for the heartbeat tactic. As previously ex-
plained Heartbeat is an architectural tactic used in many of dependable systems to monitor the
availability of a critical process. This tactic contributes to the achievement of quality goals such as
reliability and availability. The tTP associated with the heart beat tactic, defines three primary roles
shaping this tactic as receiver, emitter, and fault monitor. In addition to these roles, this tTP iden-
tifies supporting parameters of heart beat rate, heart beat message, checking interval, and acceptable
silence threshold. Heart beat rate indicates the frequency with which the heartbeat message is emit-
ted, heart beat message represents the data structure required to transmit the heart beat, checking
interval represents the frequency with which the receiver must check for the incoming heartbeat
message, and finally the acceptable silence threshold indicates the maximum interval that can elapse
between observed heartbeats signals before a failure decision is made. The Heartbeat tTP, models
each of these roles and parameters, along with their relevant proxies connected via maps links.
The proxies in tTP are used for creating traceability links to the concrete architecture.
The tTP conveys generic knowledge about architectural tactics through modeling structural rela-
tionships between roles and parameters. For example, the Heartbeat tTP depicts that, the heart
beat emitter sends a pulse to the heartbeat receiver, and the emitter manages both the heart beat
rate and the heart beat message.
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Figures 4.5 through 4.7 depict examples of three additional tTPs representing redundancy with
voting, semantic based scheduling, and layers and partitions. Each of these tTPs includes quality
goals, rationales, requirements, and roles, as well as proxies for mapping the tTP to architectural
elements.
Figure 4.5: Tactic Traceability Pattern for Redundancy with Voting
Figure 4.6: Tactic Traceability Pattern for Semantic Based Scheduling
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Figure 4.7: Tactic Traceability Pattern for Partitioning/Layers
One of the primary motivations behind designing a catalogue of tTPs is the support they provide for
reducing the potential architectural erosion during the software maintenance process. This is done
through two tasks of link creation and link usage which let us apply tTPs and benefit from them.
During link creation, the architect/developer first identifies all the tactics used in the architecture
of the system, he/she instantiates a tTP for each of these identified tactics, and then connects the
tTP to the concrete implementation or design artifacts by mapping the proxies in the tTP to the
relevant elements in the architecture and code.
Although the established trace links can be used to support manual inspections of the architecture,
greater value can be realized through instrumenting an IDE to automate the use of the traceability
links. Such automated tool should provide support for registering architectural elements mapped to
tTP proxies, monitoring those elements for any changes during maintenance activities, and finally
utilizing the infrastructure of the tTP to generate timely notifications to software maintainers
to keep them informed of architectural decisions related to any components they are currently
modifying.
An example of such a notification is provided in Figure 4.8. It illustrates a notification message that
might be displayed if a developer modifies an architectural component mapped to the heartbeat
tactic’s emitter component. Visualizing tactics in this way abstracts out the important factors of
the underlying design rationale, and makes design decisions understandable to software maintainers.
A functioning prototype has been developed for this purpose. Using this prototype the developer
can create a new tTP, establish trace links by mapping the proxies to the concrete elements in the
source code. The established links are used by an event-based traceability [29] infrastructure to
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Figure 4.8: Design rationale displayed to user when they modify the heartbeat emitter component
monitor changes that a developer makes to source code. If a change impacts an element that traces
back to a tactical role, the developer will be notified.
4.5 Examining the Research Questions
This section presents the results of two experiments conducted to investigate the use of tTPs in the
software maintenance process. These experiment were designed to examine the following research
questions:
• RQ1. Does using tTPs potentially reduce the cost and effort of establishing and maintaining
traceability links?
• RQ2. How useful are tTPs for notifying the developers of potential erosion through architecture-
change impact analysis?
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The case study of a Lunar Robot system, reconstructed from an extensive set of publicly available
NASA documents [70, 95] was conducted to examine the research questions. The detailed descrip-
tion of this case study, various design models and views, other artifacts such as list of requirements,
and architectural decisions/tactics are described in details in Appendix A section A.2. The Lunar
Robot system uses a reference architecture common to safety critical systems, therefore it provides
a realistic environment for evaluating the utility of tTPs for preserving architectural qualities.
4.5.1 Examining RQ1. Reducing Cost and Effort
Counting the number of traceability links is a commonly adopted technique for estimating traceabil-
ity effort. Therefore, we conduct an experiment to compare the number of traceability links needed
to trace architectural tactics in the Lunar-Robot both with and without the use of tTPs. Conse-
quently, two different traceability matrices were created. The first matrix, established traceability
by using tTPs and mapping architectural elements to tTP proxies. The second matrix established
traceability in a more traditional way without using tTPs. Similarly both traceability matrices pro-
vided forward and backwards traceability between architectural elements, tactics, rationales, goals,
and requirements. In both of these matrices, the traceability links were created at a coarse-grained
level to components, and also at a fine-grained level to the methods and/or parameters.
Eighteen different instances of tactics found in the Lunar Robot were considered to establish these
two traceability matrices. The tactics included several cases of heartbeat, two cases of redundancy,
three cases of N Self-Checking Programming, and several additional tactics as shown in Table A.2
of AppendixA.
Table 4.2 compares two traceability matrices generated in terms of the number of traceability links
created for each tactic. The table shows the number of times each architectural tactic was adopted
in the Lunar-Robot architecture, the number of links needed to support coarse grained traceability,
both with and without the use of tTPs, and lastly the number of additional links needed to achieve
fine-grained traceability to the method or parameter level using the tTP. As Table 4.2 depicts,
Fine-grained links were only counted for scenarios which used the tTP. This is because such traces
would be unlikely without the guidance of the tTP.
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A pattern is dominant across all the results. In all cases, the use of tTPs reduced the number of
traceability links which were required to establish and maintain in a specific project. On average,
tracing each tactic through using a tTP required 5.4 links, while 9.28 were required for tracing tactics
without tTPs. Moreover, these results showed that the total number of reusable links for a tactic plus
the project-specific links can sometimes be greater than the number of links created without benefit
of a tTP. This interesting observation highlights the fact that a catalogue of tTPs can be created
once and reused across multiple projects. Also, the results show that the amount of additional effort
needed to achieve fine-grained traceability is often very minimal given the existing infrastructure
of each tTP. It should also be pointed out that the assumption is that equal effort is required to
establish a traceability link using a tTP versus creating a link without the tTP. Furthermore, The
additional links which are internal to the tTPs are not included in Ramesh’s metamodel [104]. The
unique benefits of the links is in providing a larger and richer set of semantically typed traceability
links which could not be created without incorporation of the tTPs. Finally using tTPs replaces
an ad-hoc typing of traceability links created by multiple stakeholders, with a simple mapping of
an architectural element to a proxy in the tTP which provides a rich set of consistently typed
traceability links.
All these results indicate that the answer to the research question of RQ1. Does using tTPs
potentially reduce the cost and effort of establishing and maintaining traceability links?
is positive. These observations have shown that the tTP simplifies the traceability task and therefore
reduces the cost and effort of creating a traceability link. For two main reasons, we believe that
the results of this case study is sufficient to draw a conclusion. Firstly, this is a real system not a
toy example and the tactics covered in this example are realistic example of tactics which might
be used in any industrial project. Secondly with out the loss of generality, a tTP implies the same
benefit every time it is used. Therefore a single case study is enough to show usability of tTPs. A
major reason for reduction of trace link is that tTPs change the task of link creation to mapping
and therefore a set of trace links will be reused and not re-created. The links which are internal to
a tTP are reused every time a tactic is traced and the trace user instead of creating all the links
just maps the proxy to the design or code elements. In conclusion, based on the observed results














Coarse Grained Trace Links Additional Fine-Grained Links
Tactic without tTP with tTP with tTP
per tactic Total per tactic Total re-used from tTP Per Tactic Total
1. Heartbeat, Piggy backing and CRC check 6 9 54 4 24 6 4 24
2. Redundancy with voting 1 7 7 3 3 6 6 6
3. Active redundancy with degradation 1 17 17 9 9 6 5 5
4. Multi Threading 1 12 12 9 9 4 1 1
5. Separate processes with configuration files 1 19 19 9 9 5 2 2
6. Layers (1) 1 9 9 7 7 4 2 2
7. Layers (2) 1 11 11 9 9 Shared with Layers (1) 2 2
8. Transaction 2 5 10 2 4 4 0 0
9. N Self-Checking Programming w. Acceptance Tests 3 7 21 6 18 6 3 9
10. N-Version Programming 1 7 7 6 6 4 3 3
TOTALS: 167 98 45
In summary, this experiment demonstrated that for our Lunar-Robot case study, the use of tTPs reduced the number of project-specific traceability links. Therefore the answer to the research question
RQ1. Does using tTPs potentially reduce the cost and effort of establishing and maintaining traceability links?
has been positive.
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4.5.2 Evaluation RQ2. Usefulness of tTPs in Maintenance Scenarios
The second experiment was designed to examine research question of RQ2.
This experiment tested whether tTPs provided adequate support for the goal of keeping developers
informed of underlying architectural decisions during the maintenance process.
The software architecture change characterization framework defined by Williams and Carver has
been used to develop different maintenance scenarios [131]. This framework addresses key areas
involved in making changes to software architecture. It classifies the type of change as perfective,
corrective, adaptive or preventative and identifies the characteristics of a software change that will
have an impact on the high-level software architecture.
Table 4.3 shows eighteen change scenarios we have created using the above framework. Changes
have had different scope and scale of impact. Some changes have impacted the whole architecture,
such as in scenario #1 where a component is removed and existing ones are refactored. Some
changes did not impact the architecture, instead they impacted the low level design, this is illus-
trated in Scenario #2 where the UI was modified. There are some changes that have not changed
the architecture but resulted in changes in the source code, such as refactoring the code to eliminate
the encryption method for messaging on the moon’s surface (Scenario #6). Each one was simulated
by creating change events, and then generating appropriate information displays. Table 4.3 also
depicts the category of change covered by each maintenance scenario, the number of expected noti-
fication messages (as determined through a manual analysis), the number of successfully generated
notifications (true positives), the number of unnecessary notifications (false positives), the number
of missed notifications (false negatives), and the number of correctly ignored maintenance tasks
(true negatives).
Among all 18 scenarios, nine of them affected tactical architectural decisions, and our prototype
tool correctly recognized these potential impacts and generated appropriate notifications. The
remaining nine scenarios indicated either micro-changes or functional changes that did not affect
tactical architectural decisions. From all of these, our tool correctly filtered out three scenarios,
but generated notifications for the remaining six. These six notifications represented false positives,
meaning that tactic information was displayed, even though the actual change did not impact the
tactic. Clearly, displaying unnecessary information can desensitize the developer to the importance
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of such messages; however it should be noted that changes made to the large percentage of classes and
components that are entirely unrelated to any tactic will never result in architectural notifications.
False positives are therefore limited to classes which do contain or support an architectural tactic.
Furthermore, false positives do not provide unrelated information, but do in fact provide information










Table 4.3: Maintenance Scenarios
Change Scenario Motivation Impact FeaturesNG Imp Description Arch Des Code
1. Y Y
New communication channel established directly between
IVHM::Logger and the Robot Executive and with the
CS::Task Sequencer & Dispatcher is removed
Refactoring, Perfor-
mance Enhancement * Data transfer: Flow of data from system to
external systems
2. N N
IVHM::Actuators Robust Regulators module communicates





IVHM::Simulation and Diagnosis Engine retrieves information
from the shared repository instead of communicating with the
Logger.
Refactoring: Perfor-
mance Enhancement * *
4. Y Y
Component Data Manager is moved from Navigation Domain
process to Control System process and combined with compo-
nent Mission Data Loader
Architecture refac-
toring * * *
5. Y Y A security enhancement changes the encryption algorithmused to send mission information to agents on the LEO.
Secure data trans-
mission * * Data access: Receipt of data from externalsystems/repositories
6. Y N
Communication module is changed to eliminate encryption
from messages sent between the Lunar Robot and the MCC
whilst on the moon.
Performance en-
hancement *
7. Y Y Rover’s processor is upgraded to provide greater processingpower. A mistake occurs and memory is accidentally reduced. Enhancement * Devices: Hardware devices used by the
system
8. Y Y
High resolution stereo cameras added to work with existing
forward looking infrared cameras and laser sensors. The new
data will be processed by modifying an existing algorithm in
the obstacle detector component
Hardware enhance-
ment * * *
9. Y Y Multi-threading is used instead of multi-process for all thethree domain of Navigation, Guidance and Control
Architecture refac-
toring * * *
10. Y N Communication module is modified to remove a defect Defect removal * * System interface: Software interfaces with externalsystems
11. N N Change in Operator Panel, modification of user interface, newmenu item, changes look and feel of dialog UI enhancement * * human computer interaction interfaces
12. Y N Change in protocol for communication with Mission ControlCenter (MCC) at the earth
Adaptive enhance-
ment * * Communication: Interfaces to other systems/data
13. Y Y Mission data and operations are logged following completionof a task instead of following each simple action
Performance En-
hancement * Computation:algorithm functions and
modification of data14. N N Component Relative Navigation is modified to fix bugs Defect removal *
15. Y Y Change in functionality in a performance critical module(PPOD)
Addition of new
functionality * * *
16. Y Y Obstacle Detection component is merged into both Path Plan-ning threads
Corrective mainte-
nance/self checking * * *
17. Y N Data stored by the IVHM::Logger in the Robot’s blackbox, ismodified to be stored in encrypted format Security * I/O format ofinformation processed
by system18. Y N IVHM Simulation and Diagnosis Engine is modified to decodedata stored in encrypted format in the blackbox Security * * *
*‘NG’ = Notification generated due to potential impact of the change; ‘Imp’ = a true risk of affecting an underlying architectural decision. Hence (Y,Y)= True positives,
(N,N) = True negatives, (N,Y)=False negatives, and (Y,N) = False positives.
Chapter 4. Traceability Challenges of Architectural Decisions 68
4.6 Summary
This chapter first reports the results of an extensive study of architectural decisions conducted
in highly dependable and complex avionic systems. The conducted study involved reviewing the
specifications of several high-assurance software systems including the Airbus A320/330/340 family,
Boeing 777, Boeing 7J7 [11, 113] , NASA robots [70, 95], NASA Crew Exploration Vehicles [65, 115,
116] and also the implemented code of performance-centric systems such as Google Chromium OS,
Hadoop Framework etc. As a result we summarized some of the important issues facing architectural
traceability and presented a meta-model for tracing architecturally significant requirements. To our
knowledge, these issues have not previously been addressed in such a systematic manner, and as
a result existing traceability approaches for tracing architectural concerns and supporting design
rationales tend to suffer from well documented maintenance, and usage problems.
In this chapter, we proposed the generic decision-centric meta-model to trace quality concerns into
design and implementation artifacts. This meta-model suggests tracing the requirements through
design decisions into design components and implementation modules. We extend the notion of the
meta-model for a representative selection of architectural tactic, and proposed an augmented model
called tTP in which, it is clear where to create traceability links in order balance the costs versus
benefits of tracing architectural concerns. As our results have indicated, tTPs reduce the cost and
effort of traceability through providing a set of re-usable traceability links. However, upfront effort
is required to create the tTPs. Clearly our approach is constrained by the extent to which similar
tactics are reused across projects.
“A computer would deserve to be called intelligent if it could deceive




Manually tracing architectural decisions into the code, can be prohibitively expensive as it may
involve creating and maintaining an almost impossible number of traceability links; but on the
other hand, failing to trace architectural concerns leaves the system vulnerable to problems such as
architectural degradation.
Contribution: A cost effective approach which automates construction of traceability links for
architectural tactics can be significantly beneficial. To achieve this aim, we present a novel approach
which utilizes machine learning methods and lightweight structural analysis to detect tactic-related
classes. The detected tactic-related classes are then mapped to a tactic Traceability Pattern (tTP)
by achieving traceability in in an automated way. We train our trace classifier using code extracted
from fifty performance-centric and safety-critical open source software systems.
To achieve the Automate Trace Generation goal we first, introduce and examine set of algorithms
and processes designed to automatically reconstruct traceability links for architectural tactics. This
builds on the tTPs proposed in the previous chapter which required all traces to be created manually.
Second, we evaluate the effectiveness and applicability of our classifier for an industrial setting
through an extended study of a large scale software system.
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5.1 Proposed Approach
The problem of detecting architectural tactics in source code is an increasingly challenging task.
This is mainly because of the nature of architectural tactics and the ways and forms in which they
are implemented. In the literature, there have been various techniques for detecting design patterns
in the source code, unfortunately these approaches can not be applied to detect architectural tactics
as design patterns are different from tactics in scope of impact, level of abstraction and the type of
concerns they address. Therefore detection of tactics turns out to be a more challenging task. More
specifically, Design patterns tend to be described in terms of classes and the associations among
them [51], while it is unlikely for tactics to be described in terms of roles and interactions [81].
This means that a single tactic could potentially be implemented using a variety of different design
patterns or proprietary designs. For instance, our studies of the heartbeat tactic in real systems
showed that this tactic has been implemented using (i) direct communication between the emitter
and receiver roles (found in Chat3 and Smartfrog systems), (ii) the observer pattern [51] in which
the receiver registered as a listener to the emitter found in the Amalgam system, (iii) the decorator
pattern [51] in which the heartbeat functionality was added as a wrapper to a core service (found in
Rossume and jworkosgi systems), and finally (iv) numerous proprietary formats that did not follow
any specific design pattern.
Architectural tactics are not dependent upon a specific structure, or structural constraints similar to
those found in design patterns, therefore, we cannot use structural analysis as the primary means of
identification. To detect the tactics in the code in an automatic way, we propose an approach which
relies primarily on information retrieval (IR) and machine learning techniques to train a classifier
to recognize specific terms that occur commonly across implemented tactics, however we also use
light-weight structural analysis to support the differentiation of specific tactic roles.
Figure 5.1 depicts the steps involved in the proposed process. First, a tactic-classifier identifies all
classes related to a given tactic, and then creates tactic-level traceability through mapping those
classes to the relevant tactic. Second, we use a more finely-tuned classifier which is enhanced by
a lightweight structural analysis package to identify the roles of each tactic as defined in tTP. For
example, in the case of the heartbeat tactic, the classifier attempts to identify heartbeat emitter and
heartbeat receiver roles, or in the case of the voting tactic, it attempts to identify voting coordinators
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and voters. The detected tactic-related classes are then mapped to tactic Traceability Patterns
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Figure 5.1: An Overview of the Tactic-Related Trace Reconstruction Process
The classification of classes into various tactics has been achieved by utilizing a text classification
technique previously used in other domains such as classification of textual non-functional require-
ments and for tracing them to software regulations. [37] [32].
Typically classifiers include three phases of preparation, training, and classifying which are defined
as follows:
Phase i. Preparation. Standard information retrieval techniques are used to pre-process all the
data and transform each class into a vector of terms.
Phase ii. Training. In the training phase, the classifier learns the key terms commonly used to
implement each architectural tactic. In this phase, the classifier takes a set of pre-classified code
segments as input, and produces a set of indicator terms that are considered representative of each
tactic type. For instance, the term of priority, is found more commonly in code related to the
scheduling tactic than in other kinds of code, and therefore the classifier gives it a higher weighting
with respect to scheduling tactic.
More formally, let q be a specific tactic such as heart beat. Indicator terms of type q are mined by
considering the set Sq of all classes that are related to tactic q. The cardinality of Sq is defined
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as Nq. Each term t is assigned a weight score Prq(t) that corresponds to the probability that a
particular term t identifies a class associated with tactic q. The frequency freq(cq, t) of term t in














Phase iii. Classification. During the classification phase, the indicator terms computed in
Equation 5.1 are used to evaluate the likelihood (Prq(c)) that a given class c is associated with the
tactic q. Let Iq be the set of indicator terms for tactic q identified during the training phase. The






where the numerator is computed as the sum of the term weights of all type q indicator terms that
are contained in c, and the denominator is the sum of the term weights for all type q indicator
terms. The probabilistic classifier for a given type q will assign a higher score Prq(c) to class c that
contains several strong indicator terms for q. Classes are considered to be related to a given tactic
q if the classification score is higher than a selected threshold.
We applied the classifier in different ways to detect architectural tactics at multiple level of granu-
larity, to examine the following research questions:
• RQ3. How accurately does the Tactic Detector generate trace links using two different training
methods of tactic descriptions and code snippets? Which one produces better classification
results?
• RQ4. How effectively can the Tactic Detector identify tactic-related classes for the five tar-
geted tactics in HADOOP?
• RQ5. How accurately does the Tactic Detector generate role-level trace links for each archi-
tectural tactic?
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The following sections present the design and evaluation results of these experiments. Each ex-
periment design involved creation of a specific data set which were created over the course of 7
months. The results of experiments and examination of research questions were evaluated using
four standard metrics of recall, precision, F-Measure, and specificity computed as follows where
code is short-hand for code snippets.
Recall = |RelevantCode ∩RetrievedCode||RelevantCode| (5.3)
while precision measures the fraction of retrieved code snippets that are relevant and is computed
as:
Precision = |RelevantCode ∩RetrievedCode||RetrievedCode| (5.4)
Because it is not feasible to achieve identical recall values across all runs of the algorithm the F-
Measure computes the harmonic mean of recall and precision and can be used to compare results
across experiments:
F −Measure = 2 ∗ Precision ∗Recall
Precision+Recall (5.5)
Finally, specificity measures the fraction of unrelated and unclassified code snippets. It is computed
as:
Specificity = |NonRelevantCode||TrueNegatives|+ |FalsePositives| (5.6)
5.2 Tactic Level Link Reconstruction
The initial step for reconstructing tactic-related traceability links applied the classifier described
in Equations 5.1 and 5.2 to recognize and detect classes which implement the desired tactic. Two
different experiments were conducted to investigate different training methods. In the first experi-
ment, the training method involved using tactic descriptions to train the classifier, while the second
experiment used actual code snippets taken from classes implementing each of the tactics for the
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training purpose. Both these experiments were repeated using a variety of term thresholds and
classification thresholds. Due to the significant cost and effort of manually constructing the ‘an-
swer sets’ needed to evaluate our approach against non-trivially sized projects, we limited the work
described here to the heartbeat, scheduling, resource pooling, authentication, and audit trail. These
tactics were selected because they represented a variety of reliability, performance, and security
concerns.
The main objective behind designing and conducting these two experiments were to examine
whether the classification method described in Equations 5.1 and 5.2 could be used to identify
tactic-related classes for the five targeted tactics, and also to determine whether the tactic de-
scriptions or the code snippets produced better classification results. We hypothesized that the
code-trained classifier would be more effective for retrieving tactic-related classes.
5.2.1 Experiment 1: Training with tactic descriptions
In this experiment, for each of the five targeted tactics i.e. heartbeat, resource pooling, scheduling,
audit trail, and authentication, we established a dataset containing ten descriptions of tactic taken
from text books, online descriptions, and publications. For training purposes, the dataset also
included 20 descriptions of non-tactic-related IT documents so that the common IT terms could be
filtered out from trained indicator terms. The following text provides an excerpt from a description
for the audit trail tactic:
A record showing who has accessed a computer system and what operations he or she
has performed during a given period of time. Audit trails are useful both for maintaining
security and for recovering lost transactions.....
In order to build the testing set, for each of the five tactics we identified 10 different open-source
projects, which incorporated the tactic in their design and implementation. From each of these
projects the code segments that were implementing the tactic were retrieved. Furthermore, four ad-
ditional non tactic-related classes were retrieved for testing purposes.The following code represents
two methods extracted from a code snippet for the audit tactic.
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Table 5.1: Indicator terms learned during training method 1
Tactic Name Document trained indicator terms
Heartbeat heartbeat, fault, detect, messag, period, watchdog, send, tactic, failur, aliv
Scheduling prioriti, schedul, assign, process, time, queue, robin higher, weight, dispatch
Authentication authent, password, kerbero, sasl, ident, biometr, verifi, prove, ticket, purport
Resource Pooling thread, pool, number, worker, task, queue, executor, creat, overhead, min











In this experiment, we first trained the classifier using the descriptions of tactics and then tested the
trained classifier against the testing set (extracted code snippets). The experiment was repeated
using a variety of term thresholds and classification thresholds.
Table 5.1 shows the top ten indicator terms that were learned for each of the five tactics using tactic
descriptions training techniques.
The results of running the description trained classifier over tactics’ code snippets is shown in Figure
5.2. We reported the F-Measure results for several combinations of term and classification threshold
values. In four of the five cases, namely scheduling, heartbeat, audit, and pooling the F-Measure was
higher than 0.70 which could be interpreted as an acceptable result. One phenomenon that needs
explaining in these graphs are the horizontal lines in which there is no variation in F-Measure score
across various classification values. This generally occurs when all the terms scoring over the term
threshold value also score over the classification threshold.
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Figure 5.2: Experiment 1: Trained using Tactic Descriptions
5.2.2 Experiment 2: Training with code snippets
The second experiment involved training the classifier using code snippets. We used the code based
dataset already created in experiment(1). Basically for each of the five targeted tactics, 10 different
open-source projects, in which the tactic was implemented were identified and code segments that
were closely related to the tactic were extracted. We also retrieved four additional non tactic-related
classes for training and testing purposes.
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Table 5.2: Indicator terms learned during training
Tactic Name Code trained indicator terms
Heartbeat heartbeat, ping, beat, heart, hb, outbound, puls, hsr, period, isonlin
Scheduling schedul, task, prioriti, prcb, sched, thread, , rtp, weight, tsi
Authentication authent, credenti, challeng, kerbero, auth, login, otp, cred, share, sasl
Resource Pooling pool, thread, connect, sparrow, nbp, processor, worker, timewait, jdbc, ti
Audit Trail audit, trail, wizard, pwriter, lthread, log, string, categori, pstmt, pmr
Table 5.2 shows the top ten indicator terms that were learned for each of the five tactics using the
code snippets training technique. Although there is significant overlap, the code-snippet approach
unsurprisingly learned more code-oriented terms such as ping, isonlin, and pwriter.
Because of the time-consuming nature of finding and retrieving architectural tactics from real sys-
tems, we adopted a standard 10-fold cross-validation process in which the code-snippets dataset
served as both the training and testing set. This dataset has 10 projects, where from each project
we have 1 code snippet implementing a tactic and four unrelated code-snippets. Typically 10-fold
cross-validation experiment has 10 executions which in each, the data was partitioned by project
such that in the first run nine projects were used as the training set and one project was used for
testing purposes. Following ten such executions, each of the projects was classified one time. The
experiment was repeated using the same pairs of term thresholds and classification thresholds used
in the previous experiment.
Figure 5.3 reports the F-Measure results for the 10-fold cross validation technique over the code
trained classifier using several combinations of threshold value. In three of five cases scheduling,
authentication, and pooling the F-Measure was higher than 0.85. Also the other two remaining
tactics were close to 0.80. Comparing these results with previous experiments we observe that
in four of the five cases, scheduling, authentication, audit, and pooling the code-trained classifier
outperformed the description-trained classifier. In the case of heartbeat, the description-trained
classifier performed better at term threshold values of 0.05 and classification thresholds of 0.3 to
0.4.
Experiment 3. Industrial Case Study
The third experiment aimed to reconstruct tactic-related traceability links in a real large scale
software system. Therefore the Apache Hadoop software framework, a system which supports
distributed processing of large datasets across thousands of computer clusters was selected as a
case study. The Hadoop library includes over 1,700 classes and provides functionality to detect and
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Figure 5.3: Experiment 2: Trained using Code Snippets from Tactics implemented in Open Source
Systems
handle failures in order to deliver high availability service even in the event that underlying clusters
fail.
The detailed information about Hadoop’s Architecture and tactics adopted in this system can be
found in Appendix A.3. In order to conduct the experiment(3), the first step included building an
‘answer set’ for evaluation purposes by manually identifying heartbeat, resource pooling, scheduling,
audit trail, and authentication tactics in Hadoop. Creation of the answer set was accomplished by (i)
reviewing the available Hadoop literature[1] to look for any references to specific tactics, and then
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manually hunting for the occurrences of those tactics in the source code, (ii) browsing through the
Hadoop classes to identify tactic-related ones, (iii) using Koders (search engine) to search through
the code using key terms (to reduce bias, this search was performed by two researchers in our group
prior to viewing the indicator terms generated during the classification training step), and finally
(iv) posting a question on the Hadoop discussion forum describing the occurrences of tactics we
found, eliciting feedback, and acquiring confirmation from Hadoop developers. The results of these
activities are documented in the Appendices A.3. Table A.3 shows the occurrences of the five tactics
we identified in Hadoop, and which were then used as the ‘answer set’ for the remainder of the case
study. Our analysis showed that 1,557 classes were not tactic related, 145 classes implemented one
tactic only, 14 classes implemented two tactics, two classes implemented one tactic, and one class
implemented four tactics.
The results observed in Experiment(1) and Experiment(2) were used to decide the optimum thresh-
olds to execute the case study in a way that promised the best outcome. Based on these results,
in order to achieve high recall levels in the case study, we decided to use the code-trained classifier
developed in our previous experiments with the following threshold levels (i.e. term threshold of
0.001 and classification threshold of 0.5) to classify all 1,700 classes in Hadoop according to the five
targeted tactics.
Figure 5.4: Results for Coarse-Grained Tactic Traceability in Hadoop
The above thresholds were used to classify all the 1,700 Java files in Hadoop Framework. The results,
reported in terms of Recall, Precision, Specificity, and F-Measure are depicted in Figure 5.4. These
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results indicate that we were able to correctly reject approximately 97-99% of the unrelated code
snippets in each of the cases. In three cases of audit, resource pooling, and heartbeat we were able to
recall all of the related code snippets; however for scheduling and authentication we were only able
to recall 87% and 70% of the related code snippets respectively In all five cases precision ranged
from 60% to 87%.
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5.3 Role Level Link Reconstruction
In the previous section we examined the performance of a classifier for establishing tactic level
traceability through different training techniques. This section describes the approach we took to
train a classifier to differentiate between various tactic roles defined by a tTP. To build such a
classifier we constructed a Role Snippets Dataset. This dataset was a new code snippets dataset in
which we collected several separate code snippets for each of the tactic’s roles. For example, each
project for the scheduling tactic included one code segment implementing the scheduler role, one
code segment implementing the scheduled by role, as well as four unrelated code segments.
The previously described 10-fold cross-validation experiment was repeated with the role-based train-
ing methods to see if we could effectively retrieve classes according to their role in the project. Initial
experiments and observations indicated that the terms used across roles in a given tactic were quite
similar and so differentiation was poor. To tackle the observed problems an extensive exploratory
investigation was conducted to determine the best possible solution to classify Java classes by roles;
Here we report only the final technique that was adopted.
5.3.1 Light Weight Structural Analysis
The classifier described previously is used in the first two steps of this process, while steps three
to five utilize a light-weight structural analysis developed through extensive analysis of the tactic-
related code found in Fault Tolerant CORBA, the Google Chromium OS and the ROSSUME robotic
system. As a result of this analysis, we hypothesized that utilizing class hierarchy information and
class dependencies caused by method calls and method invocations could further improve the quality
of tactic traceability. Therefore we proposed a hybrid approach for detecting tactic’s roles. The
resulting technique is specified as follows:
1. The tactic-grained classifier is first run against the entire set of classes in order to identify an
initial set of tactic related classes for each tactic.
2. The role-grained classifier is then run against the subset of classes returned by the tactic-
grained classifier. Following this step, each of these classes is assigned a probability with
respect to each of the tactic related roles.
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3. Based on observations that tactic related-behavior is often specified in base classes, proba-
bilities are propagated across “extends” relationships if the probability in the base class for
a specific tactic role is higher than that of the derived class. Values are not propagated
across “implements” relationships because classes that implement an interface define their
own behavior.
4. Based on observations that most tactics require communication between roles, dependency
analysis is performed to eliminate classes that do not interact with other tactic classified
classes. For example, a class assigned some probability of being a heartbeat receiver is in
fact unlikely to actually play that role unless it is associated with other classes which are
also classified as heartbeat-related. However, this heuristic is not valid for all tactics, as some
tactics might implement roles using inbuilt class libraries. For example resource pooling might
be implemented using the classes from Java.util.concurrent, meaning that it is possible to have
a tactic-related, yet isolated class. Furthermore, in the case that standard library functions
are used in this way, it becomes relatively trivial to identify the occurrence of such a tactic.
For purposes of our study, we therefore apply this heuristic to all tactics apart from resource
pooling.
5. Wherever feasible, classes are placed into functional groupings according to their associations,
so that different instances of the same tactic can be separated out.
6. Finally, classes are classified according to the role with the highest probability score, as long
as that score is higher than a predetermined threshold.
Beside these 6 steps, we also explored other options for structural analysis, such as method signa-
ture, direction of method calls, indirect dependencies, and many other types of dependencies, For
example, while it might seem reasonable to differentiate between a heartbeat sender and receiver
according to the direction of the heartbeat message, the variety of implementations made this quite
difficult.
In order to evaluate the light-weight structural approach, we used Hadoop case study. The role
based code snippets needed in experiments could not be used for the purpose of evaluation as they
did not carry associated structural information. We therefore conducted an evaluation within the
richer context of the Hadoop Framework.
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5.3.2 Role-Level Trace Reconstruction in a Real Case Study
The role-grained classifier was used to classify the tactic-related classes by role. Based on initial
analysis of results and gained intuition, the classification threshold (i.e. the minimum threshold
needed to classify a class according to a specific type) was set at 0.5. Figure 5.5 reports these
results and indicates that in each case, the fine-grained classifier was able to classify one dominant
role better than the other one. For instance, in the scheduling tactic the “scheduler” role tended to
contain more tactic-specific terms than the “scheduled by” role, and was therefore classified more
accurately.
Figure 5.5: Results for Fine-Grained Tactic Traceability in Hadoop
A more detailed and specific explanation of these results is shown through an example of one of the
heartbeat instances in Hadoop. Figure 5.6 depicts the role-based classification for the heartbeat
tactic used in Hadoop’s HDFS subsystem.
Tactic roles are depicted as emitter or receiver stereotypes and are also shaded in gray.
For example DataNode which implements DatanodeProtocol sends the heartbeat message to the
NameNode, therefore each of them has the emitter stereotype. In Figure 5.6, roles are ordered
according to probability for each class, and if all probabilities fall below the classification threshold
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Figure 5.6: Reverse Engineered Role-Grained Traces for a Heartbeat Tactic in Hadoop
an additional unclassified role is added. All classes with bold borders have been correctly classified
either as a specific tactic role or as unclassified. As depicted in the diagram, we were able to
correctly classify two out of three receivers, one out of two emitters, and to correctly reject eight
out of 11 unclassified classes. The missed emitter was in fact an interface and not a fully defined
class. Classes originally misclassified by the tactic-grained classifier as heartbeat related are marked
with an X.
As described early in this chapter, the last part of Role Level link construction is mapping the de-
tected roles to their corresponding proxies in the tTP. This step will provide fine-grained traceability
links with enhanced semantics. The link semantic is achieved through the information embodied in
each tTP. As it is depicted in Figure 5.7, a subset of role-classified classes are mapped to specific
roles in a tTP, and other classes which were classified as tactical but unclassified to any role, are
mapped at the tactic level. These mappings are performed automatically as part of the classification
process, and as a result, the classified classes are traced to other tactic-related classes, to quality
goals, and to related requirements. For example, in this case the mapping of DataNode.java as a
Heartbeat emitter and FSNamesystem.java as a Heartbeat receiver establishes a relationship between
them of type Sends Pulse. Similarly it establishes that both java classes contribute to achieving the
reliability requirement that “HDFS must store reliability even in the presence of failures.”
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Figure 5.7: Trace Reconstruction through Mapping Classified Classes at both Tactic and Role
Granularities to a tactic Traceability Pattern
5.4 Examining the Research Questions
This section summarizes the results of experiments conducted in the previous sections and answers
whether the research questions related to the goal of automating trace generation. In total, we con-
ducted four different experiments to examine effectiveness of the proposed solutions for automating
tTP based traceability. These experiment were designed to examine the following research questions
as defined in chapter 1:
• RQ3. How accurately does the Tactic Detector generate trace links using two different training
methods of tactic descriptions and code snippets? Which one produces better classification
results?
• RQ4. How effectively can the Tactic Detector identify tactic-related classes for the five tar-
geted tactics in HADOOP?
• RQ5. How accurately does the Tactic Detector generate role-level trace links for each archi-
tectural tactic?
In order to answer research question RQ3 we created a table (Table 5.3) which reports the results
from the use of the two different training methods of Tactic-Descriptions and Code-Snippets to train
the tactic level classifier. These experiments were run for various term and classification thresholds.
In order to compare the results of these two experiments, we report only a result which achieved
the high levels of recall (0.9 or higher if feasible) while also returning as high precision as possible.
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Table 5.3: A Summary of the Highest Scoring Results
Tactic Training Method F-Measure Recall Prec. Spec. Term/ Classification
threshold
Audit Descript. 0.758 1 0.611 0.972 0.001 / 0.3Code 0.758 1 0.611 0.833 0.001 / 0.5
Authentication Descript. 0.588 1 0.416 0.945 0.005 / 0.2Code 0.956 1 0.916 0.977 0.005 / 0.4
Heartbeat Descript. 0.75 0.6 1 1 0.01 / 0.4Code 0.689 1 0.526 0.775 0.001 / 0.2
Pooling Descript. 0.695 0.8 0.615 0.98 0.005 / 0.6Code 0.9 0.818 1 1 0.05 / 0.7
Scheduling Descript. 0.705 0.545 1 1 0.05 / 0.8Code 0.88 1 0.785 0.931 0.01 / 0.4
These results show that in four cases the code-trained classifier recalled all of the tactic related
classes, while also achieving reasonable precision for most of the tactics(.0.526 for Heartbeat to
0.916 for Authentication). The description-trained classifier achieved recall of 1 for only two of
the tactics and its precision was changing from 0.416 for Authentication to 1 for Scheduling and
Heartbeat. In all cases except Heartbeat tactic, the code based training method achieved a higher
level for F-Measure.
The results showed that the code snippets trained classifier generally outperformed the description
trained classifier. This can be concluded from the higher F-Measure which we observed in four out
of five cases trained using the code snippets.
The results of the experiment conducted on the Hadoop case study to reconstruct tactic level trace
links indicates that the proposed approach performed reasonably well on a real case study. These
results showed that for four of the five tactics we were able to recall 100% of the tactic-related classes
at precision values ranging from 18-88%. In the case of the authentication tactic we were only able
to recall 60% of the tactic-related classes. Considering the search space for architectural tactics in a
large project such as Hadoop, the answer to research question RQ4 can be interpreted as positive.
While at the same time, the last experiment on using hybrid approach to reconstruct role-level trace
links did not achieve a high level of F-Measure for all the roles in a tactic, and suffered from a large
number of false positive cases. Therefore we are not able to have a positive answer for RQ5 and
conclude that constructing role-level trace links using our approach was successful.
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5.5 Summary
This chapter has presented a technique for automating the reconstruction of traceability links
between classes and their related architectural tactics. It has been demonstrated and evaluated
within the context of a large-scale performance-centric software system. Integrating the concept
of tTPs with existing notions of trace retrieval and classification introduces a novel approach to
tracing architectural concerns, and minimizes the human effort required to establish traceability. It
produces traces which can be used to support critical software engineering tasks such as software
maintenance and ultimately to help mitigate the pervasive problem of architectural erosion.




Off-the-Shelf Classifiers for Detecting
Architectural Tactics
In the previous chapter we presented our novel approach based on a custom made classifier to
automatically establish traceability links. Our classifier is built specifically based on the nature of
architectural tactics in the source code however there are several off-the-shelf classifiers which could
also be used in this context.
Contribution: This chapter presents a ranking comparison for the performance of our tactic detec-
tor approach presented in the previous chapter with a number of Off-The-Shelf text categorization
methods as well as a voting approach including all the classification methods. Although we evalu-
ated several of the classification techniques in the context of this work, we only report the results
for the methods which performed the best and do not include the discussion and the results of the
weak classification techniques.
The results are reported in terms of the Recall, Precision and Specificity which all together measure
the overall performance of these methods and are commonly used in this context. Our results show
that overall, our custom Tactic Detector outperformed the other classifiers and ranked first. In the
following sections, the datasets and experiments used to compare and rank classifiers are presented.
90
Comparison 91
6.1 Datasets for Architectural Code Snippets
The initial experiments described in Chapter 5 utilized a small Code Snippets Dataset which was
developed to support the task of training and evaluating the tactic-grained classifier. In this chapter
in order to extend the scope of the work and rank several classification techniques we increased the
number of projects used in the training set from 10 to 50 projects and furthermore instead of five
architectural tactics we covered 10 tactics.
For each of the ten targeted tactics, 50 different open-source projects were identified in which the
tactic was implemented. For each of these projects we performed an architectural biopsy where we
retrieved a source file implementing the tactic and one random non-tactical source file. As a result
we built a balanced training set from 50 different open source projects.
Each of the code snippets in the training set were selected through one of the following search
methods:
• Direct Code Search: Search for the tactic using source code search engines such as Koders.
In this search approach we utilized several different keywords commonly used in literature
to present and implement these tactics. After retrieving the example of tactical files, a code
review was conducted to determine if the file was tactical or not.
• Indirect Code Search: Searching through the meta-data of projects and developers’ posts
in online forums to find the projects which have implemented architectural tactics. Once a
candidate project was selected, the source code review was conducted to identify code snippets
implementing tactics and to perform the architectural biopsy.
• Tactics’ How-To: Searching through online learning materials and libraries (e.g. MSDN) to
find how-to-examples of implementing architectural tactics in a specific language.
6.2 Classification Methods
This section introduces a set of off-the-shelf classification methods chosen to answer the following
research question:
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• RQ6 What is the best classification technique for detecting architectural tactics?
For this purpose, six well known text classification methods have been chosen. The fist step of this
experiment includes a preparation phase where all data was preprocessed using standard information
retrieval techniques. Terms were stemmed, stop words were removed and the remaining terms were
represented as a vector of terms. These vectors of terms were provided as input for each of the
classification methods. In each case we justify the reason for including the method in our study.
6.2.1 Tactic Detector
As previously discussed in the chapter 5, the Tactic Detector has two phases of training and clas-
sification. The training phase takes a set of preclassified code segments as input, and produces a
set of weighted indicator terms that are considered representative of each tactic type. For example,
a term such as priority, is found more commonly in code related to the scheduling tactic than in
other kinds of code, and therefore receives a higher weighting with respect to that tactic. During
the classification phase the vector of indicator terms is used to predict whether any given source
file implements a specific tactic.
6.2.2 Support Vector Machine
A Support Vector Machine (SVM) is a powerful classifier used in various application domains such as
bug prediction, text classification and feature selection [74]. SVM selects a small number of critical
boundary samples from each class in the training set and builds a linear discriminant function
that separates the instances of each classes with a maximum possible separation. When there is no
linear separation, the training data is transformed into a higher-dimensional space where it becomes
linearly separable. The automatic transformation is done through the technique of “kernel method”
[82].
The main property of SVMs that makes them a suitable classifier for our problem is that their
ability to learn is independent of the dimensionality of the feature space. SVM based classifier
performs well on data with a high dimensional input space which is the case in text classification
[74][121]. Typically these methods have been successful in classifying corpii with very many (more
Comparison 93
than 10000) features [74]. Particularly this is due to the power of SVMs in avoiding the over fitting
problem independent of the number of features. In fact SVMs work according to the margin with
which the classes are separated not based on the number of features.
Additionally SVM methods perform well on sparse vectors. This is the case for all text classification
problems and is valid for our tactic classification problem in which each java file has only a few
non-zero entries.
6.2.3 Classification by Decision Tree (J.48)
Decision Trees (DTs) are a supervised learning method used for classification and regression. The
goal is to create a model that predicts the type of a source file by learning simple decision conditions
inferred from the words used in tactical files. This decision tree based model is a tree for which
internal nodes are test conditions and leaf nodes are categories (tactical/non-tactical). Each internal
node of the tree examines an attribute, in our case term frequency. Each branch from a node in the
tree examines the value for the attribute.
The attributes which are used to build the tree are chosen based on the information gain theory. It
means that the decision tree uses a set of attributes that give maximum information. And the leaf
node predicts a category or class [102].
Building a training set for our problem, each file in the training set is represented as vector of
terms, and has a categorical type of tactical or non-tactical. The problem is to determine a decision
tree that on the basis of word frequencies in each file predicts correctly the value of the category
attribute. C45 decision tree generating algorithm is used to induce classification rules in the form
of decision trees from a set of given examples.
6.2.4 Bayesian Logistic Regressions (BLR)
One of the effective methods commonly used for the purpose of text classification is Bayesian Logistic
Regression model. This method can be applied to problems with a large number of predictor
variables, larger than 10000 [56]. Therefore it is suitable for the text classification problem where
the dimensionality is high and reducing it can impact the accuracy of the results. In the context of
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Figure 6.1: Decision Tree Built to Detect HeartBeat Tactic
text classification, this method provides highly accurate predictions and is generally as effective as
classifiers produced by the support vector machine approach.
Utilizing BLR, we aim to learn a classifier, y = f (x), from a set of training examples
D = (x1, y1), ..., (xi, yi), ..., (xn, yn). Each document of xi, is presented in terms of a vector of word
frequencies, xi = [xi,1 , ..., xi,j , ..., xi,d ]. The values yi ∈ {+1,−1} are class labels encoding Tactical
as (+1) or nonTactical as (-1) of the vector in the category.
In BLR we are interested in conditional probability models of the following form
p(y = +1|β, xi) = ψ(βTxi) = ψ(∑j βjxi,j)
In what follows we use the logistic link function ψ(r) = exp(r)1 + exp(r)
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For detecting architectural tactics, p(y = +1|xi) will be an estimate of the probability that the ith
source file is tactical. Then a threshold is needed to make decision about this.
6.2.5 AdaBoost
Boosting is an approach in machine learning that creates a highly accurate prediction model by
combining many relatively weak and inaccurate ones. The AdaBoost algorithm proposed by Freund
and Schapire [50] is one of the most widely applied methods in several domains including software
engineering.
Boosting is performed by running a given weak classification algorithm repeatedly over the dis-
tribution of the training data and then building an accurate classifier by computing a weighted
majority vote of the weak classifiers. The weight assigned to each classifier (in Weka) is equal to
log(1/Beta)wherebeta = error/(1-error). AdaBoost increases the weight of cases which are hard to
classify at each iteration.
6.2.6 Ensembled Rule Learning: SLIPPER
Another method utilized in this chapter is the rule-based learning algorithm called SLIPPER (for
Simple Learner with Iterative Pruning to Produce Error Reduction) [38].
SLIPPER is a standard rule-learning algorithm which is based on confidence-rate boosting and is
commonly used for text classification. In this method a weak learner is first boosted to identify a
weak hypothesis (an IF-THEN rule), then the training data are re-weighted for the next round of
boosting. The main difference of this approach with traditional rule-learning methods is that the
data used for learning the rules are not removed from the training set. Instead they are given a
lower weight in the next boosting rounds.
The weak hypotheses generated from each round of boosting are merged into a stronger hypothesis
in order to ultimately build a binary classifier. The SLIPPER method is recognized as a scalable
approach which can work on noisy data with high dimensionality while other divide and conquer
rule learning methods suffer from this point. Furthermore, the rule sets generated by this approach
are smaller in size in comparison with C45 rules.
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6.2.7 Bagging
Bagging, a method described by Breiman [20], works in the same way as boosting but utilizes
a simpler way for generating the training set. This approach creates individual classifiers for its
ensemble by training each of them on a random redistribution of the training set. Each of the
classifiers is trained on a data set created through random sampling of the original training set
with replacement. Therefore many of the original items in the training set may be repeated in the
resulting training sets while some may be left out. A majority vote on the classification results
defines the final results.
Similarly to the boosting case, the training sets are also samples of the original data set, but the
“hard to classify” cases more frequently appear in the later training sets. This is mainly because
Boosting aims at correctly predicting hard to classify cases.
Bagging is more effective on “unstable” learning algorithms such as decision trees where small
changes in the training set result in large changes in predictions [21].
6.3 Tuning Classifiers through N-Fold Cross-Validation
N-fold cross validation experiment is commonly used for tuning the classification methods to find
their best thresholds or examining the generalizability of the results when there is a limited number
of data points. In our work, we use N-fold cross validation experiments to fine tune each of the
classification techniques. We conducted a 5-Fold cross validation experiments over 50 code snippets
collected previously. Several rounds of experiments were conducted, where we manually modified
the classifiers parameters to obtain the parameters which result in the best accuracy for each of the
classifiers. These parameters are reported at (WEBSITE). Tables 6.1 to 6.10 report the outcome of
each of the classification techniques in forms of recall, precision and F-Measure on each individual
architectural tactic.
The results of the 5-Fold cross validation experiments indicate that SVM classifier was the overall
weakest classifier. The remaining 6 classifiers exhibited very close accuracy across several architec-
tural tactics. However, it should be stated that the purpose of these experiments was not to rank
the classifier. The 5-fold cross validation experiments were performed to solely tune each classifier,
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Table 6.1: 5-Fold Cross-Validation for Audit Tactic
SVM Slipper J48 Bagging AdaBoost Bayesian TD
Precision 0.96 0.85 0.85 0.88 0.85 0.94 0.84
AuditRecall 0.46 0.78 0.85 0.88 0.85 0.91 0.92
F-Measure 0.62 0.81 0.85 0.88 0.85 0.92 0.88
Table 6.2: 5-Fold Cross-Validation for Authenticate Tactic
SVM Slipper J48 Bagging AdaBoost Bayesian TD
Precision 0.91 0.96 0.98 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.96
authenticateRecall 0.58 0.94 0.92 0.92 0.94 0.80 0.98
F-Measure 0.71 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.89 0.97
Table 6.3: 5-Fold Cross-Validation for HeartBeat Tactic
SVM Slipper J48 Bagging AdaBoost Bayesian TD
Precision 0.91 0.84 0.77 0.89 0.91 0.92 0.77
HeartBeatRecall 0.62 0.84 0.88 0.84 0.86 0.70 0.92
F-Measure 0.74 0.84 0.82 0.87 0.89 0.80 0.84
Table 6.4: 5-Fold Cross-Validation for Pooling Tactic
SVM Slipper J48 Bagging AdaBoost Bayesian TD
Precision 0.97 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.98 0.94 0.92
PoolingRecall 0.66 0.96 0.96 0.94 0.96 0.96 0.98F-Measure 0.79 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.97 0.95 0.95
Table 6.5: 5-Fold Cross-Validation for Scheduler Tactic
SVM Slipper J48 Bagging AdaBoost Bayesian TD
Precision 0.98 0.88 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.86
schedulerRecall 0.88 0.92 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.88F-Measure 0.93 0.90 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.87
Table 6.6: 5-Fold Cross-Validation for Asynch Tactic
SVM Slipper J48 Bagging AdaBoost Bayesian TD
Precision 0.58 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.80 0.95
AsynchRecall 0.92 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.78 0.84F-Measure 0.71 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.79 0.89
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Table 6.7: 5-Fold Cross-Validation for HMAC Tactic
SVM Slipper J48 Bagging AdaBoost Bayesian TD
Precision 0.78 0.96 0.96 0.94 0.96 0.95 0.91
HMACRecall 0.76 0.96 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.84 0.82F-Measure 0.77 0.96 0.98 0.96 0.98 0.89 0.86
Table 6.8: 5-Fold Cross-Validation for RBAC Tactic
SVM Slipper J48 Bagging AdaBoost Bayesian TD
Precision 0.83 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.86
RBACRecall 0.60 0.86 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88F-Measure 0.70 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.87
Table 6.9: 5-Fold Cross-Validation for Session Tactic
SVM Slipper J48 Bagging AdaBoost Bayesian TD
Precision 0.63 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.76 0.91
SessionRecall 0.80 0.98 0.98 0.96 0.98 0.87 1.00F-Measure 0.71 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.81 0.95
Table 6.10: 5-Fold Cross-Validation for CheckPoint Tactic
SVM Slipper J48 Bagging AdaBoost Bayesian TD
Precision 0.62 0.90 0.94 0.94 1.00 1.00 0.94
CheckPointRecall 0.42 0.92 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.97 0.94F-Measure 0.50 0.91 0.94 0.94 0.97 0.99 0.94
and examine the individual accuracy of the classifiers, a second experiment was designed to examine
how each of the classifiers performed on an independent large scale software project.
6.4 Ranking the Classifiers based on Hadoop Case Study
In the previous section, a 5-fold cross validation experiment was used to identify best parameters for
each classifier. Using those parameters, each classification method was used over Apache Hadoop
framework, a large scale software project.
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The purpose of this experiment was to (i) rank the classifiers based on their performance, (ii) create
a majority voting mechanism between the classifiers and compare it with the tactic detector and
lastly (iii) make a suggestion about which classifiers should be used in future.
The following subsections report the results of this study for each architectural tactic in Hadoop.
In addition to Recall, Precision and F-Measure, Sensitivity is also reported as it shows more details
about the power of each classifier in reducing false positive cases which is very important in the
utilization of the classifiers in practice.
6.4.1 Audit Trail Tactic
The outcome of each classifier in detecting Audit Trail tactic in Apache Hadoop project is presented
in the Table 6.11. In Hadoop, the Tactic Detector (TD) with the F-Measure of 0.83 outperformed
the other classifiers. It also performed better than the majority voting. The low accuracy of majority
voting method is because most classifiers participating in the voting had a very low accuracy. The
high sensitivity of tactic detector indicates that not only does it detect the audit trail source files
with high accuracy, it also ignores the majority of non-tactical source files.
Table 6.11: Classifiers Comparison: Audit Trail Architectural Tactic in Hadoop
SVM Slipper J48 Bagging AdaBoost Bayesian TD Voting
Precision 0.08 0.02 0.03 1.00 0.03 0.04 1.00 0.67
Recall 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.50 0.71 0.50
F-Measure 0.13 0.04 0.06 0.44 0.06 0.07 0.83 0.57
Sensitivity 0.99 0.95 0.96 1.00 0.96 0.95 1.00 1.00
In practice a classifier with sensitivity of %95 is not a good methods as it means that the developers
of a medium scale project like Apache Hadoop would receive over 100 of false positive notifications.
6.4.2 Authentication Tactic
Similarly for Authentication architectural tactic as reported in the table 6.12 the Tactic Detector
outperformed the other methods, by achieving the F-Measure of 0.66. In case of Authentication, the
tactic detector correctly retrieved 70% of relevant source files while the precision of 61% indicates
the high rate of false positive cases.
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Table 6.12: Classifiers Comparison: Authenticate Architectural Tactic in Hadoop
SVM Slipper J48 Bagging AdaBoost Bayesian TD Voting
Precision 0.14 0.16 0.57 0.58 0.17 0.15 0.61 0.47
Recall 0.52 0.61 0.59 0.56 1.00 0.37 0.70 0.66
F-Measure 0.22 0.26 0.58 0.57 0.30 0.21 0.66 0.55
Sensitivity 0.9473 0.9224 0.9929 0.9935 0.9243 0.9657 0.9929 0.98
Similarly we discovered that majority voting has also failed to achieve the better accuracy. This is
mainly because the weaknesses of the classifiers participated in the voting.
6.4.3 HeartBeat Tactic
In case of heartbeat tactic, four of the classifiers achieved a recall of 0.96 and higher. However
three out of four exposed a high false positive rate. Tactic Detector has achieved the maximum
F-Measure among all the classifiers.
Table 6.13: Classifiers Comparison: HeartBeat Architectural Tactic in Hadoop
SVM Slipper J48 Bagging AdaBoost Bayesian TD Voting
Precision 0.07 0.31 0.22 0.50 0.35 0.07 0.66 0.57
Recall 0.11 0.59 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.04 1.00 0.96
F-Measure 0.09 0.41 0.36 0.67 0.51 0.05 0.79 0.71
Sensitivity 0.98 0.98 0.94 0.98 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.99
6.4.4 Resource Pooling Tactic
In case of Resource Pooling tactic, although all the methods achieved similar sensitivity rate, J48,
Bagging, AdaBoost and Tactic Detector performed very well achieving a F-Measure of 0.87 to 0.93
and the voter achieved similar performance. SVM method performed well in identifying non-tactical
source files, achieving a high precision but it has failed to identify most of the tactical files.
6.4.5 Resource Scheduling Tactic
In case of the Scheduling architectural tactic, the performance of the classifiers was less diverse.
Tactic Detector and Voting methods exhibited the highest F-Measure.
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Table 6.14: Classifiers Comparison: Resource Pooling Architectural Tactic in Hadoop
SVM Slipper J48 Bagging AdaBoost Bayesian TD Voting
Precision 0.71 0.13 0.89 0.88 0.87 0.16 0.88 0.89
Recall 0.11 0.44 0.97 1.00 0.87 0.33 1.00 0.96
F-Measure 0.19 0.20 0.93 0.93 0.87 0.22 0.93 0.92
Sensitivity 1.00 0.83 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.90 0.99 0.99
The scheduling architectural tactic was implemented across several modules of Hadoop and over
87 source files. Therefore the precision of 65% and recall of 70% for example, will result in about
44 false notifications, and 82 true positive cases. Considering the size of Hadoop project, this is a
significant enhancement in productivity.
Table 6.15: Classifiers Comparison: Scheduling Architectural Tactic in Hadoop
SVM Slipper J48 Bagging AdaBoost Bayesian TD Voting
Precision 0.36 0.65 0.64 0.65 0.66 0.32 0.65 0.68
Recall 0.63 0.20 0.87 0.89 0.77 0.78 0.94 0.89
F-Measure 0.46 0.30 0.74 0.75 0.71 0.46 0.77 0.77
Sensitivity 0.94 0.99 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.91 0.97 0.98
6.4.6 Asynchronous Method Invocation Tactic
In comparison to other architectural tactics, Asynchronous Method Invocation has a different nature
where the evidence of tactic existence can likely only be seen structurally. However, in Hadoop, we
were able to extract instances of this tactic based on comments about the type of communication.
The results of applying different methods on Apache Hadoop projects shows that in five out of
eight methods we achieved similar performance. The Bayesian Logistic Classifier, entirely failed to
correctly retrieve a single instance of tactical files.
Table 6.16: Classifiers Comparison: Asynch Architectural Tactic in Hadoop
SVM Slipper J48 Bagging AdaBoost Bayesian TD Voting
Precision 1.00 0.19 1.00 1.00 0.82 0.00 1.00 1.00
Recall 0.72 0.44 0.72 0.72 0.50 0.00 0.72 0.72
F-Measure 0.84 0.26 0.84 0.84 0.62 0 0.84 0.84
Sensitivity 1.00 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 1.00 1.00
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6.4.7 Hash Based Method Authentication
HMAC exhibited the lowest F-Measure across all architectural tactics. The Tactic Detector with
F-Measure of 0.11 listed as the last classifier for HMAC, although it had the highest precision of
0.86. The problem is due to the large false positive rate. The Tactic Detector could correctly
identify 6 out of 7 java files implementing HMAC,but it also retrieved about 99 files which had
nothing to do with HMAC. Across all the other architectural tactics, Tactic Detector shown to be
efficient in decreasing the false positive rates.
Table 6.17: Classifiers Comparison: HMAC Architectural Tactic in Hadoop
SVM Slipper J48 Bagging AdaBoost Bayesian TD Voting
Precision 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.06 0.12
Recall 0.63 0.50 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.71 0.86 0.57
F-Measure 0.15 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.11 0.20
Sensitivity 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.94 0.98
6.4.8 RBAC Tactic
In case of RBAC architectural tactic, most classification methods, could not achieve even 50% of
recall. The Tactic Detector was the only exception with recall of 97%. The precision of Tactic
Detector, indicates that out of all the retrieved cases about one third are correctly classified java
files.
For example in the Hadoop case study, about 121 java files are identified as RBAC of which about
38 of them are correctly classified files, 1 file has been misclassified as unrelated and 83 files are
false positives. These numbers are considered the best in terms of accuracy across other classifiers.
Table 6.18: Classifiers Comparison: RBAC Architectural Tactic in Hadoop
SVM Slipper J48 Bagging AdaBoost Bayesian TD Voting
Precision 0.12 0.19 0.20 0.42 0.35 0.03 0.31 0.69
Recall 0.13 0.49 0.21 0.21 0.28 0.13 0.97 0.23
F-Measure 0.12 0.27 0.20 0.28 0.31 0.05 0.48 0.35
Sensitivity 0.98 0.95 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.90 0.95 1.00
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6.4.9 Secure Session Management
The performance comparison of the classifiers for secure session tactics, shows that SVM and
Bayesian classifiers have incorrectly classified most of the tactical files. Slipper classifier ranked
first among all the classifiers, then Bagging is the second best classifier. Tactic Detector, AdaBoost,
J48 and even the Voter all performed in a similar manner.
In comparison with the other architectural tactics, this is the first time that Slipper classifier wins
the competition. In most previous cases tactic detector had performed better than the rest.
Table 6.19: Classifiers Comparison: Secure Session Architectural Tactic in Hadoop
SVM Slipper J48 Bagging AdaBoost Bayesian TD Voting
Precision 0.07 1.00 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.09 0.84 0.84
Recall 0.11 1.00 0.84 1.00 0.84 0.31 0.84 1.00
F-Measure 0.09 1.00 0.84 0.91 0.84 0.14 0.84 0.91
Sensitivity 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 1.00 1.00
Table 6.20: Classifiers Comparison: CheckPoint Session Architectural Tactic in Hadoop
SVM Slipper J48 Bagging AdaBoost Bayesian TD Voting
Precision 0.29 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.12 1.00 1.00
Recall 0.35 1.00 0.94 0.94 0.97 0.68 1.00 0.94
F-Measure 0.32 1.00 0.97 0.97 0.99 0.21 1.00 0.97
Sensitivity 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.90 1.00 1.00
6.4.10 CheckPoint Architectural Tactic
The last architectural tactic we studied was CheckPoint, in which the Slipper classifier performed as
well as the Tactic Detector. Although J48, Bagging, AdaBoost and Voting classifiers also achieved
a very close F-Measure of 0.97 and higher. SVM and Bayesian performed worst among all the
methods.
6.5 Examining Research Questions
This section, examines the following research question identified for this part of the research:
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• RQ6 What is the best classification technique for detecting architectural tactics?
In this work, for which dataset creation and validation is extremely time consuming, we decided to
focus on evaluating the practicality of the classifiers in the context that they are going to be used.
The results of Hadoop study indicates that the Tactic Detector outperformed the voting approach
and this is mainly due to the problem of weak voters.
Furthermore, the purpose of this work is to port a classifier into a Integrated Development Envi-
ronment such as Eclipse IDE. Therefore first we need to select a classifier which is reliable, easy to
use , relatively stable and does not require a heavy involvement of the developers or the actual user
to tune or make use of it.
Table 6.21: F-Measure Reported for Different Classifiers in Hadoop Case Study
Audit auth heartb Pooling sche Asynch HMAC RBAC Sess Check
SVM 0.13 0.22 0.09 0.19 0.46 0.84 0.15 0.12 0.09 0.32
Slipper 0.04 0.26 0.41 0.20 0.30 0.26 0.19 0.27 1.00 1.00
J48 0.06 0.58 0.36 0.93 0.74 0.84 0.20 0.20 0.84 0.97
Bagging 0.44 0.57 0.67 0.93 0.75 0.84 0.20 0.28 0.91 0.97
AdaBoost 0.06 0.30 0.51 0.87 0.71 0.62 0.20 0.31 0.84 0.99
Bayesian 0.07 0.21 0.05 0.22 0.46 0.00 0.22 0.05 0.14 0.21
TD 0.83 0.66 0.79 0.93 0.77 0.84 0.11 0.48 0.84 1.00
Voting 0.57 0.55 0.71 0.92 0.77 0.84 0.20 0.35 0.91 0.97
Considering this context and the nature of our dataset, we performed a rank comparison of the
classifiers. Table 6.21 reports the F-Measure from all the previous experiments in a table and
highlights the top classifier. In detecting 10 different architectural tactics from source code, the
Tactic Detector, could rank first, in eight datasets out of ten while in 2 cases the Bayesian and
Slipper classifiers performed better than the tactic detector.
Further statistical analysis were performed to examine if the differences between the classifiers are
statistically significant or not. Table 6.22 shows descriptive statistics of our data points. In this
table we report both mean and median for the F-Measure of each classifier. This data point does not
follow a normal distribution, therefore we used Friedman ANOVA test which is a non-parametric
test for comparing the median of paired samples.
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Table 6.22: Descriptive Statistics for F-Measure of Different Classification Techniques
Group N Mean Rank Median
SVM 10 2.60 .170381
SLIPPER 10 3.55 .266862
J48 10 4.60 .661641
Bagging 10 5.85 .707120
AdaBoost 10 4.40 .565247
Bayesian 10 2.40 .174968
Tactic Detector 10 6.50 .813725
Voting 10 6.10 .741164
Total 80 .458313
Friedman test (Table 6.23) indicates the there is a statistically significant difference between the
performance of all the classifiers used in our study. However this test does not provide any insight
about which classifier is better than the other ones.
Since the Tactic Detector exhibited the highest mean and median (Table 6.22) across 10 different
architectural tactics in Hadoop, we performed a pairwise comparison between Tactic Detector and
the other classification techniques.






To test the statistical significance between performance of Tactic Detector Table 6.24 reports the
results of this experiment using both non-parametric and parametric tests. Uniformly both tests
indicated that Tactic Detector is more accurate than SVM, Slipper, AdaBoost and Bayesian classi-
fication technique and this conclusion is statistically significant with a p-value of 0.05. Furthermore
Tactic Detector performs better than Bagging and J45 classification methods but this conclusion
with a p-value of 0.05 and confidence level of 0.95 is not statistically significant.
Similarly although Tactic Detector performs better than the Voting mechanism, the difference
between two is not statistically significant. However Tactic Detector is certainly a better approach
to be used than Voting, simply because Voting mechanism utilizes the Tactic Detector as a voter.
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Table 6.24: Pairwise Comparison of Classifiers with Tactic Detector














0.001 0.012 0.103 0.154 0.044 0.000 0.193
In terms of stability of the approach, the performance of Tactic Detector has not drastically changed
from a cross-validation experiment to a large scale experiment on unseen data of Hadoop. In all the
other classifiers, there have been a major change in false positive notifications over Hadoop project.
This questions the stability of the methods, across different learning and testing set sizes which
can quite often occur in the software engineering context. In many cases we may need to detect
architectural tactics in projects of different sizes and also with the different ratios of correct and
incorrect classes in the dataset.
Furthermore, approaches such as Bagging, Boosting and Slipper are not simple approaches, they
require creation of different rule learners. In contrast, Tactic Detector is a simple, linear classifier
which works the same on different dataset sizes. This classifier is easy to use, easy to understand
and has now assumptions about the data.
6.6 Summary
This chapter presented several experiments used to rank the performance of a number of Off-the-
shelf text categorization methods, tactic detector and a majority voting classifier. The results
indicate that over 10 architectural tactics, our approached performed as a top classifier.
We ran two types of experiment, first a set of 5-fold cross-validation experiments, and secondly an
experiment on unseen data of Apache Hadoop. While most of the classification methods performed
well on 5-fold cross validation, their accuracy significantly dropped over Hadoop case study, mainly
due to a large number of false positive cases.
Part III
Traceability for Architecture Erosion
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Previous chapters, described our approach for creating a strategic infrastructure of architecturally-
relevant traceability links. In this part of the research we investigated techniques for effectively
utilizing those links to keep developers informed of relevant architectural decisions. Developing a
trace usage technique and integrating it with programming IDEs is important for the simple reason
that even when traceability links have been created, practitioners often do not utilize them because
of the inaccessibility of traceability links to support daily software engineering tasks. [27]
Contribution: The developed architectural tactic discovery technique is used to establish trace-
ability links. The traceability links then are used for keeping developers informed of underlying
architectural concerns so that they can modify the design and code without inadvertently degrading
the architectural quality. To achieve this goal, our developed solution involves monitoring architec-
turally significant classes, and providing timely notifications to developers to keep them informed
of underlying architectural decisions related to any classes they may be modifying. The monitoring
and notification scheme is build upon Event-based Traceability (EBT) [28–30] which allowed trace
users to be registered as listeners for change events to specific artifacts. In this chapter we extend
EBT so that all classes mapped to a tTP are monitored by the EBT system, and notifications are
displayed within the IDE (integrated development environment) to the current user.
109
Chapter 7 Notifications and Visualization 110
7.1 Usage of Event Based Traceability
In this work we incorporate EBT it into our prototyped infrastructure. Our approach has the
following steps:
• The tactic detector is used to classify all the classes in a project and create Tactic-Level
traceability links.
• The constructed trace links are represented to developers in the form of recommendations,
and they are asked to approve or reject the identified links.
• All the tactical classes, are registered as event initiators to the event server through their
subscriber manager.
• The source code monitoring module, monitors all the tasks the developer performs. In case
of a change to a class implementing a tactic, this monitoring module publishes an event to
the notification module.
• The notification module, informs the developer by sending a message to the warning list
of the IDE. If the developer clicks on the message, a traceability visualization panel will
open which shows the tTP which the changed file is traced to. The developer will see the
tactical architectural decisions, and requirements which could be impacted by his/her change.
Additionally he/she can view further design knowledge such as codification of tactic, rationale
and the business goals behind the tactical decision.
Figure 7.1 depicts the sequence of these actions. First, all the tactical code snippets are registered
with a central coordinator which monitors those code snippets for modifications, and generate
informational messages to keep the maintainer informed of underlying architectural decisions.
The visual notifications are integrated with a monitoring platform which monitors the code changes
and visually informs the developers of potential architectural decisions behind the code, possibly
impacted requirements and business goals. The Event-Based Asynchronous Pattern is used to
implement the code monitoring infrastructure. This pattern support implementation/integration
with the IDE in various ways. Time consuming tasks such as on demand detection of tactics,
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Figure 7.1: Monitoring Critical Architectural Element during Maintenance
and visualization of design knowledge are accomplished “in the background”, without interrupting
programmers activities or slowing down their programming environment. The monitoring infras-
tructure implemented by this pattern executes multiple operations simultaneously, handle all the
activities done by programmers and provide visual notifications when each completes. In the fol-
lowing sections first we present an illustrative example which demonstrates how a tTP can be used
in practice. Furthermore we examine the following research question:
RQ7. To what extent can automatically reconstructed unvetted trace links support change
notification without inundating developers with excessive false positives?
7.2 Two Notification Scenarios
To illustrate how notifications and visualizations can be used to address the erosion problem, we
demonstrate two examples of actual changes here. The first example uses tTP and EBT infras-
tructure at the model level, while the second one uses tactic detector at the code level. These
two examples are selected to show how we can use the architecture level trace links during daily
activities of programmers.
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7.2.1 Illustrative Example at Model Level using tTP
To illustrate how tTPs can help mitigate the erosion problem, we provide a step-by-step example of
a specific change request executed within the context of Sparx Enterprise Architect (EA). It should
be noted that event monitoring and basic notifications are fully functioning in our tool. The actual
implementation is in eclipse but could easily be implemented in other environment such as EA.
Some of the GUIs depicted in this change scenario are still under development.
For this example we use part of the Lunar Robat Architecture presented in Appendix A.2. In our
maintenance scenario, we decide to modify and enhance the robot architecture by adding a high
resolution stereo camera to the system to work in conjunction with existing forward looking infrared
cameras and laser sensors. The new data is processed by modifying an existing algorithm in the ob-
stacle detection (OD) component from the navigation domain. The OD component utilizes infrared
cameras and other resources to identify obstacles in the planned path. It sends obstacle messages
to two Path Planning (PP) components. However, an underlying architectural decision to use the
heartbeat tactic to monitor the availability of the OD component is not explicitly documented, even
though the design calls for the OD component to embed heartbeats into the obstacle messages sent
to the PPi component. This means that obstacle messages must be sent regularly, regardless of
whether an obstacle is detected or not.
In the change scenario, the developer starts modifying the OD component to interface with the
infrared camera, and to integrate data from the camera into the obstacle detection logic. As the
OD component is a monitored element (i.e. registered as playing a role in the heartbeat pattern),
an ‘architectural’ icon is displayed on the screen. This is labeled as (1) in Figure 7.2 and shown as
a pyramid over the OD component on the left hand side of the Enterprise Architect (EA) screen.
Once an architectural event is detected, the related architectural tactics are visualized in the IDE.
In our prototype we display the tactic in a separate pane on the right hand side of the screen
(labeled (3)), and color-coordinate specific roles in the primary architectural view (labeled (2))with
those of the tactic.
In this way, the developer modifying the OD component is informed of architectural tactics that
impact the OD component. The tactical roles of the OD are clearly visible in the visualized tactic,
and in this case show that the OD plays the role of a heartbeat emitter, and that the heartbeat is
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Figure 7.2: Visualizing architectural tactics within Enterprise Architect
packaged into the obstacle message sent to the PPi component. Although the PPii component also
receives the obstacle message, it does not monitor the heartbeat and is therefore not involved in the
tactic. This example illustrates how tTPs are used during the maintenance process.
7.2.2 Illustrative Example at the Code Level using Tactic Detector
The second example shows how trace links can be used to help prevent architectural erosion at the
code level. We illustrate this with an actual scenario from another project. In TraceLab project
[122], there is a change scenario in which a new developer joins the team and starts modifying a
part of the system implementing serialization to transmit a copy of the needed data from the shared
memory (blackboard) to the executing component. Our traceability framework therefore instigates
a “change-impact analysis” request to inform him of the consequence of change. The notification
and visualization mechanism in our framework utilizes trace links automatically generated from
code to architectural decisions and from architectural decisions to rationale and goals behind the
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Figure 7.3: A Screen Shot of the Archie Tool showing Traceability Established from Implemented
Code via the Architectural Decisions to use the Blackboard Pattern to Quality Concerns related to
Performance and Usability
serialization code. Figure 7.3 shows parts of our trace infrastructure implemented through our
Archie tool suite.
Archie introduces a pluggable tool which provides an architectural protection layer for use in a
variety of programming IDEs and software modeling tools. Archie utilizes the Tactic Detector to
detect and monitor code snippets that implement key architectural decisions in the source code
and proactively keep developers informed of underlying architectural decisions during maintenance
activities.
In its current form Archie provides support for modeling architectural tactics as tTPs, and for
mapping code to elements in the tTP. Mapping can be done manually for all types of decisions and
automatically for tactical decisions. Figure 7.3 depicts a screen shot of using Archie to establish
trace links by mapping the components implementing Blackboard TIM to its code in the TraceLab
project.
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You are modifying Datanode.java.  This file appears to play the 
role of heartbeat emitter in the heartbeat tactic. 
 
This class therefore contributes to reliability and availability 
goals.  Tell me more. 
 




Heartbeat emitter (Prob 79%) 
Heartbeat sender (Prob 75%) 
Supporting role  
Unrelated to heartbeat 
 
Figure 7.4: Utilizing Traces to Generate Maintenance Notifications
7.3 Examining Research Questions
This section, examines the following research question identified for this part of the research:
RQ7. To what extent can automatically reconstructed unvetted trace links support change
notification without inundating developers with excessive false positives?
An important, yet often unexplored research question addresses the issue of whether automatically
reconstructed traceability links are good enough for use. Prior work has assumed that the generated
(candidate) links must be presented to the user for evaluation and feedback prior to their use [41][40].
We therefore designed an experiment to evaluate the usefulness of the notified messages through
coarse-grained traceability links for supporting software maintenance. This task is of particular
interest to our work, because of the previously discussed problems of architectural degradation. The
experiment utilized the Hadoop change logs for the past four releases, and simulated the scenario in
which the generated tactic-level traceability links were used to determine whether a modified class
was tactic-related. If it was, we simulated the generation of a message to inform the developer about
the underlying architectural tactic. For example, a modification made to the Datanode.java class
might result in the notification message shown in Figure 7.4 which utilizes traceability to provide
useful architectural information.
Table 7.1(a) reports on the number of successfully generated notifications (true positives), the num-
ber of unnecessary notifications (false positives), the number of missed notifications (false negatives),
and the number of correctly ignored maintenance tasks (true negatives). It also computes recall
(the fraction of changes that were tactic-related for which messages were actually sent), precision
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Table 7.1: Accuracy of Generated Notification Messages during Simulated Modifications to
Hadoop










Audit 159 5 4405 0 1 0.96 0.99
HeartBeat 256 57 4256 0 1 0.81 0.98
Scheduling 709 1301 2559 0 1 0.35 0.66
Res. Pooling 315 19 4235 0 1 0.94 0.99
Authentication 259 266 4037 7 0.97 0.49 0.93
Averages: 0.99 0.71 0.91










Audit 159 1 4409 0 1 0.99 0.99
HeartBeat 256 9 4304 0 1 0.96 0.99
Scheduling 709 262 3598 0 1 0.73 0.93
Res. Pooling 315 4 4250 0 1 0.98 0.99
Authentication 259 19 4284 7 0.97 0.93 0.99
Averages: 0.99 0.92 0.98
(the fraction of sent messages that were for tactic-related classes), and specificity (the fraction of
changes that were unrelated to any tactics and for which no notifications were sent). Recall of 1.0
was achieved for four of the tactics, and 0.97 for the Authentication tactic. Specificity was over
0.93 in all cases except for the scheduling tactic; however precision ranged from 0.35 to 0.96. Table
7.1(b) reports on a second scenario in which we assume that the developer rejects incorrect notifica-
tion messages, in effect rejecting the underlying traceability link and leading to its removal. Under
these circumstances, feedback from initial notifications increases recall, precision, and specificity
significantly higher for all five tactics. In fact all metrics are over 0.92 except the precision for the
scheduling tactic which remains at 0.73.
The results reported for this case study demonstrate that our approach generates tactic-grained
links capable of supporting a critical task such as architectural preservation. Therefore the answer
to research question of RQ7 is positive; however, it also highlights the importance of capturing
relevance feedback from the developers as they receive impact notifications in order to gradually
filter out the false-positive links, and ultimately develop a relatively accurate set of traces.
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7.4 Summary
In this chapter we utilized previously developed traceability infrastructure and developed a notifi-
cation & visualization mechanism to help reduce the risk of design erosion. Our approach achieves
this by keeping the developers informed of tactical architectural decisions behind the code and no-
tifying them which architectural tactics and consequently software qualities can be affected by the
changes they implement. This would address one of the key causes of architectural erosion known
as insensitivity to design. The notification mechanism is built primarily on top of automated trace
reconstruction technique and has been evaluated in Hadoop case study.
The work presented in this chapter represents an initial attempt to address the challenges introduced
by Grady Booch [18] in his IEEE article named “Draw me a picture”. In this article, he asks the
software engineering community to develop new visualization tools capable of providing greater
insights into underlying frictions, design decisions, and social factors of a software system. Our
traceability approach makes a partial contribution to addressing this challenge through notifying





You won’t get it right the first time anyway!
Frederick P. Brooks
Chapter 8
Variability Points and Design Pattern
Usage in Architectural Tactics
In this chapter we conducted a novel analysis of the potential for merging design pattern detection
with tactic detection i.e. using one to support the other. We examined various open source soft-
ware, with the aim of using design pattern detector to increase the accuracy of tactic detector. Our
observations indicated that the use of design patterns was sparse (based on the study) and therefore
the conclusion was that it would not be worth the cost and effort to incorporate an additional step
of design pattern detection into the tactic detection. Nevertheless in the course of conducting the
study, we observed that design patterns use in tactics produced some advantages that contribute
to our broader goal of preventing architectural erosion. Therefore this chapter aims to utilize a
complimentary perspective in preventing architecture erosion. Following David Parnas’ notion of
“Design for Change”[97][98], we propose a concrete set of guidelines to using design patterns to im-
plement or modify a tactic so that tactic implementation becomes more efficient and tactics become
easier to maintain. The guidelines are created through an extensive analysis of hundreds of open
source systems; They are presented, through a set of decision trees which support a programmer in
his decision making process to select a design pattern based on the constraints or forces he faces in
implementing a tactic.
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8.1 Implementation Issues of Architectural Tactics
Once a decision is made to utilize a tactic, the developer must generate a concrete plan for the
low level design and implementation of the tactic in the code. The code reviews we conducted on
various systems showed that, there are various contextual forces, idioms and variability points in
each individual tactic which require developers to make numerous decisions in order to implement a
tactic. All these variability points, can make implementation of tactics a challenging task, especially
for less experienced developers. Figure 8.1 illustrates this point with two concrete examples of
developers posting requests for help to online forums because they did not understand how to
implement specific tactics. We found many examples of such questions.
Figure 8.1: Developers seek help in online forums to implement architectural tactics
This is a typical knowledge gap that exists between high level architecture design decisions and
low level programming decisions, especially for less experienced programmers and unfortunately
it has been ignored in many books, materials and tutorial published on software architecture and
architectural tactics. If not all, most existing materials focus on high level design and there is not
enough guidance for how to implement these tactics specially using well know design patterns.
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Unlike design patterns which are described in terms of specific classes and associations, tactics
are defined at a higher conceptual level of roles and responsibilities [81] similar to those defined
in tTIMs[91]. It is really the responsibility of a programmer to grasp the nuances of the tactic,
take into consideration a wide range of project-specific factors that serve as forces upon the tactic,
consider various implementation options, and ultimately derive a suitable design solution.
Another important observation in our study of real systems was that usually there is not a single way
to implement an architectural tactic. A single architectural tactic could be implemented entirely
differently in different systems. Some of these implementations tend to be more efficient, structured,
well shaped and well designed and consequently easier to understand and maintain, while there are
implementation which are not easy to understand even with a rigorous code review. This increased
our interest to investigate the better ways that a developer could implement architectural tactics
to make them more suitable for long-time maintenance and evolution.
For example, the heartbeat tactic is a relatively simple tactic used to monitor the availability
of a critical component. However, in a previous study of over 20 open source systems [92] we
observed numerous variations in how the tactic could be implemented. These included (i) direct
communication between the emitter and receiver roles8.2(a), (ii) use of the observer pattern in
which the receiver registered as a listener to the emitter 8.2(b), (iii) the decorator pattern in
which the heartbeat functionality was added as a wrapper to a core service8.2(c), and finally (iv) in
numerous proprietary formats that did not follow any specific design pattern. While an experienced
developer can certainly come up with a functioning implementation, it is difficult for any but the
most experienced developers to have a complete understanding of all the issues and trade-offs, that
might go into making an informed implementation decision.
To achieve the envisioned goal for this part of research and answer the following research questions
we conducted an extensive study of tactics implementation over a large number of open source
systems.
RQ8. Do developers tend to use specific design patterns to implement architectural tactics?
RQ9. What forces influence the choice of design patterns for implementing architectural
tactics?
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(a) HeartBeat with configuration files
(b) Observer design pattern to implement the tactic
(c) Decorator design pattern to implement the tactic
Figure 8.2: Hadoop : (a)Hadoop, Chat3, smartfrog (b)Amalgam System (c)Thera, JSRB,
Rossume Systems
In this study, we investigated the way developers used design patterns within the implementation
of architectural tactics (from now on referred to as tactic/pattern overlaps). Our approach, findings
and examination of research questions are discussed in the following sections.
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8.2 Mining Tactic Implementations
Finding a representative sample of tactic/pattern instances is far from trivial. We therefore devel-
oped a semi-automated process shown in figure 8.3 for retrieving candidate instances of tactic-related
classes implemented using the gang-of-four (GoF) design patterns [51].
This process involves: (i) building a code repository, (ii) detecting and extracting instances of
architectural tactics, (iii) detecting and extracting instances of design patterns, (iv) computing
the overlap between tactics and design patterns to identify tactic/pattern instances, and lastly (v)
manually inspecting the results to remove false positives and to clearly delimit the boundaries of
each tactic and each identified pattern. The output from this process provides the raw data needed
in the remainder of our study.
(i) Building a code repository The code repository was built by downloading 500 open source
projects using Sourcerer [124], which is an automated crawling application designed to extract
projects from publicly available open source repositories such as Apache, Java.net, Google Code
and Sourceforge.
(ii) Extracting architectural tactics To identify architectural tactics, we utilized our previously
developed tactic detection algorithm and tool [93] (Chapter 5). The tactic detector was ran against
all 500 previously downloaded projects. Projects were then ranked according to the number of
detected tactics, and the top 36 scoring projects were carried forward into the next stage of the
analysis.
The final projects are listed in Table 8.1. For each project we report its name, the number of classes
in the system, the number of tactic types covered (maximum 13), number of candidate design
patterns detected (maximum 20), and the final count of pattern/tactic overlaps as predicted by our
automated tools. As depicted in this table, most of the inspected projects provided coverage of 5
or more tactic types; however in order to ensure coverage of all the studied tactics, we included a
couple of additional projects simply because they included the targeted tactic type, even though
the overall tactic coverage was low.
(iii) Detecting Design Patterns in the Code Pattern detection was performed on the selected
projects using an algorithm and tool developed previously by one of our collaborators [107]. The
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Figure 8.3: An Overview of our semi-automated process for mining open source repositories to
retrieve samples of tactic/pattern code, identifying tactic-specific variability points, and generating
reference models
approach incorporates a catalog of various pattern definitions and applies multiple search technolo-
gies during the matching process. The pattern definitions are based on the concept of a feature
type, defined as an elementary property of a design pattern likely to recur across different pattern
types (e.g., an aggregation relation between two classes or a method return and the instance of the
class that contains it). Pattern definitions can be created through composing feature types. A set
of 44 feature types were defined and enabled the detection of all 23 so-called Gang of Four (GoF)
patterns [51] as well as several of their variants.
Different search technologies have been used which utilize the catalog of pattern definitions and
search the source code or reverse engineered class diagram of source code to detect design patterns.
The approach has been evaluated and achieved high recall and precision rates of 96-100% for three
systems[107].
To detect patterns in the 36 open source projects, we used our existing catalog of pattern definitions
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Table 8.1: Studied Projects: Size, identified tactics, detected design patterns and observed overlaps
# of Tactic Pattern Over-
Area Name classes types types laps
Enterprise
ERP/CRM
Apache OFBiz 1987 11 14 44
Apache Tobago 632 9 7 3
Compiere ERP 1476 10 13 27
Enterprise 5920 11 3 0
Jpos 430 7 13 16
Neogia 3667 11 12 25
nomadpim 4364 10 18 105
Open SubSystem 8201 13 17 130
PaperDog 347 6 7 8
QuickFix 2291 6 3 1
Frameworks/
Middleware
Apache Cocoon 2945 10 14 62
Apache DS 1324 9 13 22
Jboss 5703 13 15 99
LuntBuild 412 7 7 9
nomadpim 4364 10 18 105
open3ds 66 4 1 0
Oracle CAC 720 10 12 38
Posit 2545 8 13 22




Arsenal-1 3065 9 10 19
Charliebot 180 8 7 11
icemud 93 5 3 0
Projectvianet 1056 9 11 36
Operating
Systems
MVctrl 43 2 0 0
tinyOS 6244 11 16 31
Internet archive-crawler 757 11 12 38Sino 3055 11 14 42
Content
Management
Apache Lenya 3661 10 16 65
mdfiction 227 5 9 11
Distributed
Computing
Apache Hadoop 2735 12 14 81
Apache Triplesec 375 9 9 32
Mobicents-parlay-ra 2813 6 10 18
mx4j 891 8 13 40
OpenJMX 313 7 11 14
pfc 541 5 13 7
Spumoni 75 5 10 3
[107]. However due to precision issues we had in detecting similar design patterns, we made the
decision to report results from the State and the Strategy pattern together because their structural
representation is hard to differentiate. Furthermore we completely omitted results for the Abstract
Factory and the Facade pattern as we felt that additional rules and evaluation were needed to detect
these correctly. As a result, our pattern detection algorithm was run for 20 GoF design patterns.
Results from the 36 projects are reported in Table 8.1. Column 5, labeled ‘Pattern Types’, reports
the number of distinct design patterns found in each of the projects. Numbers range from zero,
meaning that no patterns were detected, to 18, meaning that 18 of the possible 20 pattern types
were discovered.
(iv) Computing Overlap The tactic classifier and design pattern detector algorithms were run


























































Active Redundancy 0.60 0.25 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.40 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.35 0.00 0.20 0.10 0.10 0.50 0.30 0.00
Audit 0.67 0.42 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.58 0.00 0.33 0.17 0.08 0.67 0.50 0.00
Authenticate 0.69 0.26 0.23 0.09 0.00 0.11 0.11 0.49 0.77 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.69 0.06 0.26 0.14 0.29 0.51 0.37 0.00
CheckPointing 0.56 0.33 0.17 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.17 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.33 0.00 0.17 0.06 0.06 0.50 0.17 0.00
HeartBeat 0.63 0.31 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.38 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.13 0.06 0.19 0.25 0.56 0.44 0.00
Kerbrose 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00
Load Balancing 0.35 0.35 0.13 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.17 0.48 0.00 0.13 0.04 0.35 0.00 0.09 0.13 0.04 0.30 0.30 0.00
PBAC 0.64 0.41 0.18 0.23 0.00 0.09 0.18 0.36 0.68 0.00 0.09 0.05 0.68 0.05 0.32 0.14 0.18 0.55 0.45 0.00
PingEcho 0.57 0.24 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.14 0.38 0.24 0.00
Pooling 0.69 0.34 0.29 0.11 0.00 0.11 0.09 0.34 0.74 0.00 0.09 0.03 0.66 0.06 0.26 0.31 0.26 0.66 0.43 0.06
RBAC 0.53 0.40 0.20 0.17 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.33 0.70 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.67 0.07 0.33 0.27 0.30 0.63 0.50 0.03
Scheduler 0.74 0.35 0.26 0.10 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.39 0.74 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.58 0.03 0.29 0.23 0.16 0.68 0.39 0.03
Session 0.38 0.25 0.13 0.17 0.00 0.08 0.13 0.21 0.38 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.21 0.21 0.04 0.33 0.33 0.00
Figure 8.4: Overlaps produced automatically and reported prior to human evaluation
independently across each of the selected 36 projects. The classes detected by the tactic classifier
were compared against those detected by the design pattern detector in order to identify tactic/-
pattern overlaps. If a pattern and tactic shared at least one class then a candidate overlap was
declared. For example, in one case, a decorator design pattern added heartbeat functionality to an
http service, and was identified as a decorator/heartbeat instance despite the fact that only a single
class overlapped.
The un-vetted results of automatic overlap analysis showing occurrences of each pattern within each
of the tactics is reported in Figure 8.4. The numbers in each cell represent the percentage of times
a tactic of the given type overlapped with the specified design pattern. For example, the top left
hand cell shows that in 60% of the occurrences of the redundancy tactic, there was overlap with
a class from the adapter pattern. Similarly, the bridge pattern overlapped with the redundancy
tactic in 25% of its occurrences. It is important to remember that these are raw values computed
automatically by our tools and therefore not guaranteed to be accurate until they are evaluated in
the next phase.
The color coding of Figure 8.4, shows stronger overlaps in red or orange, and lesser ones in paler
colors. It highlights several interesting trends. Some of the design patterns are clearly used more
prevalently in tactics than others. For instance adapter, flyweight, memento and strategy are the four
most commonly occurring patterns. This is may not be really surprising as these patterns contribute
to scalability, flexibility, and state restoration, all of which are important in high-performance sys-
tems. Furthermore, this could be biased with the imprecision of design pattern detector in detecting
these tactics. Unsurprisingly there are no individual tactics that implement a high percentage of
patterns.
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Column 6 in Table 8.1 shows the number of overlapping tactic/pattern pairs per project. These
numbers range from zero, in projects in which no design patterns overlapped with the identified
tactics, to 130 in the OpenSubsystem project.
(v) Manual Inspection Given the huge search space of classes in these open source systems, our
automated approach significantly reduces the amount of human effort needed to find tactic/pattern
overlaps. Nevertheless it is still necessary to manually inspect the results in order to eliminate
the incorrectly identified instances and also understand how and why the pattern was used in the
tactic. We tried to extract contextual characteristics of each projects which was forcing utilization
of specific patterns in implementation of an architectural tactic.
Identifying correct instances of patterns for deeper analysis was done by initially skimming the
pattern instance and eliminating obviously incorrect classifications (i.e. the pattern detector claimed
a group of classes to be the heartbeat pattern where clearly they were not). Analysis continued until
we found three correct uses of the pattern in the tactic, ran out of cases to evaluate, or searched
through 10 tactic/pattern instances without finding a correct use of the pattern. Instances that
were not initially ruled out were then checked more carefully to confirm that they represented the
claimed pattern and tactic. As part of this process we evaluated approximately 300 instances, and
attempted to disperse our efforts equally across the different tactic/pattern pairs. The following
steps were then followed:
For each correct tactic/pattern instance we evaluated the pattern to answer the question ‘what
purpose does this pattern play in the tactic?’ In cases where the same pattern was implemented
for different purposes we studied additional pattern instances until we gained understanding of the
multiple contributions the pattern played in the tactic. For each pattern/purpose pair in a tactic,
we constructed a generalized class diagram, capturing the classes and their associations needed to
implement the design pattern in the context of the tactic. Finally we documented specific factors
which might trigger a decision to utilize a specific pattern in the tactic.
On average we found that approximately one tactic/pattern pair was correct for every five evalu-
ated. This is expected, given the precision of the two underlying tools, plus the additional step of
combining results [92, 107]. The tactic/pattern overlaps for which we identified correct uses of both
the pattern and tactic are depicted in Figure 8.4 with a bold border.
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The following sections reports on three different tactic types, and the design patterns that were
used to implement them. These tactics are scheduling, resource pooling, and heartbeat. We do not
claim to have identified all possible patterns that could be used to implement these tactics, after all
it is likely that a creative developer could figure out a way to incorporate almost any design pattern
in any tactic. However, what we do claim is that we have identified many common uses of design













































































(f) Many task types: Bridge
Figure 8.5: Design Patterns used to address variability points in the Scheduler Tactic
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8.3 Scheduling Tactic: Forces and Solutions
The first tactic studied was the scheduler. This tactic is commonly adopted to improve system
performance in the face of resource contention. It is defined in terms of elements to be scheduled,
the scheduler responsible for scheduling them, and a scheduling policy such as FIFO (First in first
out), fixed-priority, or dynamic priority scheduling [14, 81, 132]. Bachman et al. identify five
independent parameters that must be considered when designing and implementing a scheduler.
These include the execution times of units of concurrency, arrival distribution, number of units of
concurrency, number of processes, and number of processors. These parameters are used to fine-
tune the performance of the scheduler in order to satisfy a response measure such as worst-case
latency; however they say nothing about how the scheduler must actually be implemented. As with
all design solutions, there are numerous trade-offs to consider. In the case of the scheduler these
center around latency, scalability, and code maintainability.
We identified several design patterns which were used quite prevalently to implement the sched-
uler tactic. These included adaptor, bridge, composite, flyweight, memento, observer, proxy, and
strategy. To more fully understand the purpose of these patterns in the tactic, we analyzed their
implementations following the steps outlined previously.
As a result, six primary reasons were identified for adopting design patterns in scheduler imple-
mentations. We termed these variability points because, in most cases, they could be added as
additional features to augment the basic behavior of the tactic. Each variability point is described
below.
1. Many tasks: If the scheduler is responsible for scheduling a large number of tasks, incurred
memory costs may be high and it may be necessary to minimize memory usage. Tasks share intrinsic
state such as task priority or task type, while also exhibiting individual properties such as start time,
resources required, and so on. The flyweight pattern reduces the memory resource requirements,
and also reduces time needed to start a task. This concept is generalized in Figure 8.5(a).
2. High resource demand When individual tasks have high resource demands (e.g. high mem-
ory), it is more efficient to create them immediately prior to use and destroy them immediately
afterwards. The proxy pattern can be used so that a proxy object serves as a stand-in for the task
while it waits in the queue. The scheduler is unaware that the proxy exists. However, the proxy
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creates, invokes, and destroys the task as soon as it is scheduled for execution. This is depicted in
Figure 8.5(b).
3. Stateful tasks When the state of the task needs to be preserved between scheduled runs, the
memento pattern is used to preserve state at the end of a run, and restore previous state at the
beginning of the next run. This is depicted in Figure 8.5(c).
4. Task monitoring Tasks often need to be monitored to ensure that they are active and progress-
ing. The observer pattern allows a task progress monitor (which could be the scheduler itself)
to register as an observer of the task and receive status update notifications. In more complex
systems, it may be necessary to have hierarchies of monitors. In this case the composite pattern
can be used to compose monitors into hierarchies. These uses of patterns are depicted in Figures
8.5(d) and 8.5(e) respectively.
5. Remote tasks The proxy pattern can be used to provide a local object as a stand-in for a
task that is running remotely. This is not shown in the Figure.
6. Multiple task types When a scheduler is responsible for managing multiple types of tasks i.e.
MapTask, ReduceTask, DFSTask, etc, and new types of tasks may be added in the future and/or
behavior of those tasks may change over time, then the bridge pattern can be used to create a
flexible environment in which both the tasks and their behavior can change independently. This
is depicted in Figure 8.5(f). When there are multiple types of tasks to be scheduled, and different
types of tasks involve different steps (i.e. retrieving data, checking priorities etc) then the adapter
pattern can be used to adapt each task with the required steps. In this case a generic schedule
method is invoked for all tasks and this method is then adapted according to task type.
The identified patterns used in the scheduler are modeled as the decision tree shown in Figure 8.6.
A developer needing to implement the scheduler tactic could use the decision tree to examine the
variability points of the tactic with respect to the specific project.
8.4 Resource Pooling Tactic: Forces and Solutions
The second tactic evaluated was resource pooling. This tactic allows limited resources to be shared
between clients if neither exclusive nor continual access is needed to the resource. Pooling is typically
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Figure 8.6: Decision tree for the scheduler tactic
used to share threads, database connections, sockets, and other such resources [15]. Based on our
analysis of resource pooling implementations, we identified several design patterns which were used
quite prevalently to implement the tactic. These included prototype, singleton, template method,
strategy, factory method, chain of responsibility, and memento. The following variability points were
identified.
1. Lazy load Shared resources are typically created either at start-up time or upon demand. When
the cost of creating a resource in the standard way is high, the prototype pattern can be used to
efficiently create a clone of a prototypical object.
2. Single point of access Access to a resource pool is managed by a pooler role. If many different
components need to access the pool there can be significant overhead for establishing and managing
a sharing scheme. The problem can be addressed through using singleton to ensure that there is
only one instance of the pooler at runtime.
3. Multiple kinds of resources When there are multiple types of resources (i.e. thread pooling,
connection pooling, session pooling), and if the types are stable, i.e. it is unlikely that new types will
be introduced, the template method can be used to customize resource management according to
resource type. When new types are expected to be introduced the factory pattern can be used to
create the pools and their associated resources (sometimes referred to as ponds), while the strategy
pattern can be used to select the appropriate factory method according to type.





















Figure 8.7: Decision tree for Resource Pooling
4. Complex steps When the task of creating, managing, and using a resource pool is complex, the
chain of responsibility pattern can be used to decouple the sender of a request from its receiver.
For example a series of requests for checking the existence of the pool, checking the number of
objects, or checking the maximum allowed number of objects, can be passed as a command along
a chain of objects until the request is handled.
5. Reset before use A resource pool recycles resources. Before a recycled resource can be reused
it needs to be reset to its original state. Use either memento to reset the resource to its original
state, or prototype to create a new clone before each use.
These variability points and their associated design solutions are modeled in the decision tree shown
in Figure 8.7. However, due to space constraints we do not provide class diagrams for each design
pattern.
8.5 Heartbeat Tactic: Forces and Solutions
The third tactic studied was the heartbeat tactic. This is used to monitor the availability of a
critical component. The monitored component emits a periodic heartbeat message while another
component listens for the message. The original component is assumed to have failed if the heartbeat
fails [81].
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Our study identified six different patterns used to implement the heartbeat. These included dec-
orator, template method, observer, composite, Bridge, flyweight, and state. From these we derived
the following variability points.
1. Wrap around The heartbeat tactic often needs to be added onto other services or functions
which have availability concerns. The decorator pattern can be used to wrap those services with
heartbeat functionality without the need to modify the services themselves.
2. Piggybacking Sending periodic messages such as a heartbeat can add significant communication
overhead and impact system performance. The heartbeat can therefore be piggybacked on other
messages such as logging messages used for check-pointing. The template pattern can be used to
construct a message which carries different kinds of information.
Wrap around 
Piggy backing 














State Many tasks 
Figure 8.8: Decision tree for Heartbeat
3. Heartbeat monitor When multiple components emit heartbeats that need monitoring, the
observer pattern can be used to register one or more monitors with the heartbeat emitter. In more
complex systems where hundreds or thousands of components are being monitored, the composite
pattern can be used to establish a hierarchy of monitors. In this case a low level monitor checks
the health of a group of threads, while its own health is checked by a higher level of monitor.
4. Different monitor types When different types of component are being monitored, the fault
monitor must support different monitoring techniques (HTTPS, HTTP, FTP, etc). In this case, the
Bridge pattern can be used to monitor different types of heartbeat messages, and also check the
health of different heartbeat senders in ways that are appropriate for their type.
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5. Mass Creation When the heartbeat connection service requires mass creation of the same
service specification for many clients, the Flyweight pattern can be used to create multiple objects
in an efficient way. For example, this approach is appropriate if a HTTP connection is heartbeat
enabled in a given project, there are many requests for such connections, and connections and
heartbeat services exhibit common properties across all the client requests, then flyweight pattern
can be used to create and share multiple HeartbeatHTTP objects.
6. Many tasks: The heartbeat receiver’s responsibilities vary based on the status of heartbeat
sender. For example the receiver could be in (i) steady-state, i.e. receiving regular messages at
predefined intervals from the sender, (ii) compromised-state, when one or more senders is failing to
transmit, or in (iii) recovery-state when steps are taken to remediate the problem of the unavailable
sender. The state pattern can be used to manage these various states.
8.6 a Tactic Reference Model
In sections 8.3 - 8.5 we presented individual patterns implemented in scheduling, resource pooling,
and heartbeat patterns respectively. We also presented a decision tree for each of the tactics,
depicting the factors driving the adoption of each design pattern.
These factors and their associated implementation solutions can be seen as variability points of
the tactic. As in a product line, features can be mandatory, optional, or variants. Mandatory
features represent the essence of the product. In the case of architectural tactics, the core roles,
responsibilities, and interactions that define the tactic can be seen as its mandatory features [126].
For example, in the scheduling tactic, there must be a scheduler and one or more schedules, while in
the heartbeat tactic there must minimally be an emitter and a receiver. Optional features are those
features which can be added to the product to bring additional value. Finally a variant feature is
an abstraction of a group of mandatory or optional features, which provides alternate methods of
delivering the functionality. In the case of architectural tactics, the identified variability points of
the tactic represent a mixture of optional and variant features.
Figure 8.9 shows the reference model we developed for the scheduler tactic. All of the design
patterns discussed in section 8.3 are integrated into this model. However, we do not claim that







































































Figure 8.9: A reference model for the scheduler tactic. Variability points are marked as stereo-

















DFS Layer Parallelization Layer
Figure 8.10: The high level architecture of the Parallel Computing Infrastructure used in our
Case Study
this is the only possible way of combining the design patterns into a complete design solution, nor
do we claim that it is the best way. We merely present this solution as a viable design given the
variability points of the tactic and their related design patterns.
This reference model can help developers to implement the tactic. Although our longer-term goal
is to automate the generation of a customized reference model from a decision tree, we currently
provide only the static reference model, where each variability point is labelled with a unique
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Figure 8.11: Desired variability points selected by the developers for the PCI system
«MultiStepSchedul,
































Figure 8.12: The reference model modified to retain only desired variability points
stereotypes. This is depicted in Figure 8.9 which shows stereotypes attached to classes, attributes,
and to methods. Stereotypes on attributes and methods are shown above the element and refer to
all elements underneath. A stereotype on a class means that the whole class with all its attributes
and methods contributes to a single variability point and could simply be removed if this variation is
not part of the desired configuration. For classes that contribute to multiple variations, the elements
inside the class are stereotyped and will be removed if not needed in the desired configuration. If
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these reductions result in elements without attributes and methods, then the class itself must be
removed and its associations replaced with associations that connect source and target directly.
All core elements, e.g., Task, ConcreteTask, taskOperation(), initialSettings, are not stereotyped
and will accordingly form the mandatory elements of all configurations, even if all variations are
removed.
We present an illustrative example of a system, which we will refer to as Parallel Computing
Infrastructure (PCI). PCI is a development environment in which developers can write and/or
run parallelized computing tasks. A high-level architectural view is depicted in Figure 8.10. This
example is loosely built upon the architecture and implementation of the Hadoop system. PCI has
two main layers, the distributed file system (DFS) layer and the parallelization layer. In the DFS
layer, Datanodes components are responsible for managing and storing data chunks while NameNode
is a central control point responsible for managing the file system namespace and controlling access
by external clients. It keeps track of datachunks managed by datanode and also is responsible for
distributing replicated data. The parallelization layer is designed to execute tasks through a map
reduce paradigm. Operations are submitted by a client and then started by jobtracker. Jobtracker is
also responsible for creating a set of taskTrackers to track and report on task status. Job scheduling
is a critical function of process parallelization so that the system can achieve high throughput and
low response times. The system is expected to handle thousands of concurrent requests.
To explore the possible design space of the scheduler, the architect and/or developers use the
scheduler decision tree from section 8.3, and mark the variability points of interest. Their choices
are summarized in Figure 8.11. The first key characteristic of the PCI system is it needs to schedule
a very large number of tasks. We therefore check off Many Tasks to increase parallelization and
decrease the performance time. The PCI architecture is cloud-based in which physical redundancy
and parallelization are achieved through distributing tasks on different machines. The scheduler
therefore needs to manage remote tasks running in different address spaces. We therefore check off
Remote Task. Scheduling user defined tasks requires customized initialization across the Map
Reduce schema, therefore we check multiple task types and multi-stepped scheduling. Finally we
opt for simple monitoring of tasks and check simple monitoring. Armed with these decisions, the
developer utilizes the stereotypes provided in the reference model to remove unwanted parts of the
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design and customize the reference model for the PCI project. The end result is shown in Figure
8.12.
8.7 Examining Research Questions
The research questions identified to examine achievement of the automation goal are:
RQ8. Do developers tend to use specific design patterns to implement architectural tactics?
RQ9. What forces influence the choice of design patterns for implementing architectural
tactics?
The results of manual inspection indicated that there is a meaningfull relationship between design
pattern usage in each of the tactics. Furthermore, as a result of this inspection we could find the
forces impacting each tactic (see sections 8.3, 8.4, 8.5). However we need to conduct further qual-
itative and quantitative experiments to evaluate the extend each of the design patterns contribute
to the implementation of a tactic.
8.8 Summary
This chapter illustrated the results of an extensive study conducted into the use of design patterns
for implementing architectural tactics. This study revealed interesting usage trends from which
we were able to identify variability points, associate specific design pattern solutions with each
variability point, and construct a tactic-specific reference model. In its current form a developer
can manually transform the reference model into a customized class diagram showing only the
desired features of the tactic. This provides guidance to developers as they implement architectural




“I was born not knowing and have had only a little




This dissertation has explored the idea of using Software Traceability as a means of preventing the
erosion of architectural decisions and degradation of architectural qualities. The work has focused
on the new notion of decision-centric-traceability which can potentially address the aforementioned
problems through explicitly documenting relationships between quality requirements, architectural
decisions, and source code and also using this explicit relationship to perform change impact anal-
ysis.
The traceability method developed in this dissertation puts architectural decisions (aka tactics) as
the centre of the tracing activity to connect the driving requirements into the implementation source
code. Such links later can be used to support change impact analysis and program comprehension
during the maintenance process by revealing underlying design decisions behind each code snippets.
Establishing the traceability links requires the recovery and discovery of architectural decisions in the
source code. While several other researchers have developed architecture reconstruction techniques
for the sake of reverse engineering and design comprehension, this work publishes the first results
that utilized such a technique to help developers perform architecture based software development
and to strategically maintain critical architectural decisions in the code. First, a hybrid-classifier
is utilized to develop an architecture-decision detector, which can be used for regenerating the
traceability links. Then the reconstructed traceability links are used to create an architecture
protection layer that can be embedded into various modeling environments such as Enterprise
Architect, and also within programming Integrated Development Environments (IDEs). The work
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presented in this dissertation, automatically detects and monitors architecturally significant classes
and when developers modify those classes, it provides timely notifications informing the developers
of the relevant underlying architectural decisions. The monitoring and notification scheme is built
upon an event-based infrastructure in which all classes related to an architectural decision are
monitored, and notifications are displayed to the current user within the IDE.
This chapter summarizes the main findings and conclusions of this dissertation. It also lists several
ways in which the work can be extended in the future.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 9.1 presents a summary of the main results of this
thesis, and answers the nine key research questions of this work. Section 9.2 discusses the main
threats to the validity of the results as well as the controls that were used to mitigate these threats.
Finally, Section 9.3 lists possible extensions and future research directions.
9.1 Summary of Results
The work of this thesis investigates several research questions regarding the utilization of software
traceability for partially addressing the problem of architectural erosion. Overall the work is di-
vided into 6 parts. First part focuses on studying several real, large scale software systems and
to Development of a Decision Centric Traceability Method which can be used for establishing and
using the traceability links. The second part utilizes the developed traceability models and aims at
Automating the Construction of the Traceability Links using a classification technique. Furthermore
this part includes several experiments for Comparing Off-the-Shelf Classifiers with Tactic Detector.
The third part of this dissertation focuses on Utilization of Traceability Links. The fourth part of
this dissertation goes beyond traceability and aims at Investigating the Notion of Design for Change
for Architectural Tactics and fighting the problem of erosion with more maintainable implementa-
tion of architectural tactics. Lastly this dissertation takes the developed tactic detector technique
and focuses on Building a Smart IDE to Help Developers Address the Design Erosion Problem.
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9.1.1 Development of a Decision Centric Traceability Method
One of the early goals of this dissertation was to conduct an extensive study of architectural de-
cisions in highly dependable and complex systems and understand the important issues in tracing
architectural concerns. To our knowledge, this kind of study has not previously been conducted
in such a systematic manner, and as a result existing traceability approaches for tracing ASRs
and supporting design rationales are not fully practical and tend to suffer from well documented
traceability maintenance, and usage problems.
As a result of this study, we proposed the generic decision-centric meta-model to trace quality con-
cerns into design and implementation artifacts. This meta-model recommends that tracing quality
concerns should be done through the design decisions into design components and implementation
modules. We extended the notion of the meta-model for each specific architectural tactic, and
proposed an augmented model called tTP in which, it is clear where to create traceability links in
order balance the costs versus benefits of tracing architectural concerns.
Each tTP is centered around a tactic and defines both backward traceability to the driving require-
ments, quality concerns and rationales of the tactic, and forward traceability to the architectural
elements in which it is realized. Furthermore, each tTP defines the internal structure of a tactic in
terms of its primary roles and parameters, also relationships between the roles.
The first research question investigated in this part of research was:
RQ1. Does using tTPs potentially reduce the cost and effort of establishing and maintaining
traceability links?
The answer to this research question is positive. The utilization of tTPs provides guidelines for the
trace user to trace architectural tactics and at the same time tTPs will result in fewer traceability
links.
In practice, a common way of estimating the traceability effort is to count the number of traceability
links. Therefore, we conduct an experiment to compare the number of traceability links needed to
trace architectural tactics both with and without the use of tTPs. The design artifacts of a Lunar-
Robot system was used for this purpose.
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Consequently, two different traceability matrices were created. The first matrix, established trace-
ability by using tTPs and mapping architectural elements to tTP proxies. The second matrix
established traceability in a more traditional way without using tTPs.
As our results have indicated, tTPs reduce the cost and effort of traceability through providing a
set of re-usable traceability links. However, upfront effort is required to create the tTPs. Clearly
our approach is constrained by the extent to which similar tactics are reused across projects.
Our observations also have shown that the tTP simplifies the traceability task and therefore reduces
the cost and effort of creating a traceability link. For two key reasons, we believe that the results
of this case study is sufficient to draw a conclusion. First of all, the Lunar Case study is a real
system not a toy example and the tactics covered in this example are realistic example of tactics
which might be used in any industrial project. Secondly, the nature of experiment is in a way that,
without loss of generality we can expect to see the similar results in any other system.
One main reason for reduction of trace link is that tTPs change the task of link creation to mapping
and therefore a set of trace links will be reused and not re-created. The links which are internal to
a tTP are reused every time a tactic is traced and the trace user instead of creating all the links
just maps the proxy to the design or code elements.
The second research question investigated in this part of research was:
RQ2. How useful are tTPs for notifying the developers of potential erosion through architecture-
change impact analysis?
The traceability links created through tTPs can be used to provide change impact analysis support
for the developers during software maintenance. Architecture level change impact analysis can
minimize the risk of design erosion.
A set of change scenarios studied over architecture of Lunar Robot Case Study shows that tTPs
can be used for proactively keeping developers informed of underlying design decisions when they
make changes to the system.
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9.1.2 Automating the Construction of the Traceability Links
The first contribution of this work is the introduction of the Tactic Traceability Patterns, how-
ever this concepts required manually establishing the traceability links between quality concerns
and source code. Therefore chapter 5 presented a technique for automating the reconstruction of
traceability links between classes and their related architectural tactics. This automated technique
called Tactic Detector and uses a classification method to identify tactical source files and has been
used to support the developers stablish the links in each tTPs.
Two different training methods have been used to train the Tactic Detector, the first training method
involved using tactic descriptions to train the classifier, while the second experiment used actual
code snippets taken from classes implementing each of the tactics for the training purpose. The
underlining assumption is that, establishing a training set based on tactic descriptions is far easier
than establishing a training set based on code snippets but the accuracy of the tactic detector tends
to be better with code snippets.
For automating the discovery of architectural tactics in the source code and establishing the trace
links, the following research questions have been investigated:
RQ3. How accurately does the Tactic Detector generate trace links using two different training
methods of tactic descriptions and code snippets? Which one produces better classification
results?
The investigation of this research question shows that both code trained and description based clas-
sifiers accurately identify tactic related classes. However the code trained classifier outperforms the
description based classifier. Therefore the Tactic Detector method utilized this training mechanism.
RQ4. How effectively can the Tactic Detector identify tactic-related classes for the five tar-
geted tactics in HADOOP?
The evaluation of this method within the context of the large-scale performance-centric case study
of Hadoop system, indicates that this technique is capable of generating fairly accurate links. Fur-
thermore, integrating the concept of tTPs with existing notions of trace retrieval and classification
introduces a novel approach to tracing architectural concerns, minimizes the human effort required
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to establish traceability, produces traces which can be used to support critical software engineer-
ing tasks such as software maintenance, and ultimately helps mitigate the pervasive problem of
architectural erosion.
RQ5. How accurately does the Tactic Detector generate role-level trace links for each archi-
tectural tactic?
The hybrid approach to reconstruct role-level trace links did not simultaneously achieve high levels
of recall and precision for all the roles in a tactic, and suffered from a large number of false positive
cases. Therefore we are not able to have a positive answer for RQ5 and conclude that constructing
role-level trace links using our approach was successful.
9.1.3 Comparing Off the Shelf Classifiers with Tactic Detector
In a series of studies we compared Tactic Detector method with a number of Off-the-shelf classifi-
cation methods. This part of the dissertation, presented a comparison of the performance of our
tactic detector approach presented in the previous chapter with a number of Off-The-Shelf text cat-
egorization methods. In particular, we evaluate the performance of classifiers from different families
of Decision Tree, Support Vector Machines, Bayesian Network. The following research questions
were examined:
• RQ6 What is the best classification technique for detecting architectural tactics?
The Tactic Detector was recognized as the best classifier among those studied in this dissertation.
We reported the results obtained using Recall, Precision, F-measure and Specificity as measures of
overall performance. These are commonly used evaluation metrics for such problems. Our results
show that overall the Tactic Detector performed better than the other methods, and ranked first.
However this was a ranking study based on win/lose cases. A second study was performed to
examine if the differences between accuracy of the classifiers are statistically significant or not.
The results indicate that Tactic Detector performs better than SVM, SLIPPER, AdaBoost and
Bayesian Logistic Regression. The difference between accuracy of the Tactic Detector and these
four classifiers is statistically significant.Although Tactic Detector performs better than J48 and
Bagging, we need additional data points to conclude that this difference is statistically significant.
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Overall simplicity and stability of Tactic Detector make it a better classification technique to be
used in integration with a programming IDE.
9.1.4 Trace Link Usage
Previous sections of this dissertation, described our approaches for creating a strategic infrastructure
of architecturally-relevant traceability links. In this part of the research we investigated techniques
for effectively utilizing those links to keep developers informed of relevant architectural decisions.
Developing a trace usage technique and integrating it with programming IDEs is important for the
simple reason that even when traceability links have been created, practitioners often do not utilize
them because of the inaccessibility of traceability links to support daily software engineering tasks.
The research question investigated in this section was:
RQ7. To what extent can automatically reconstructed unvetted trace links support change
notification without inundating developers with excessive false positives?
The answer is that the link created using Tactic Detector can be used to effectively keep developers
informed of the design decisions behind the code. The low ratio of false positive messages makes
the approach more reliable.
The research goal discussed in this section focuses on the task of keeping developers informed of
underlying architectural concerns so that they can modify the design and code without inadvertently
degrading the architectural quality. To achieve this goal, our proposed solution involved monitoring
architecturally significant classes, and providing timely notifications to developers to keep them
informed of underlying architectural decisions related to any classes they may be modifying.
To examine the research question RQ7. the Hadoop change logs for the past four releases were
utilized, and simulated the scenario in which the generated tactic-level traceability links were used to
determine whether a modified class was tactic-related. The generation of a message were simulated
to inform the developer about the underlying architectural tactic.
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The results of applying the Tactic Detector over Hadoop projects and utilizing the change logs of
Hadoop in four releases demonstrate that our approach generates tactic-grained links capable of
supporting a critical task such as architectural preservation.
Therefore the answer to research question of RQ7. is positive; however, it also highlights the
importance of capturing relevance feedback from the developers as they receive impact notifications
in order to gradually filter out the false-positive links, and ultimately develop a relatively accurate
set of traces.
9.1.5 Design Patterns to Implement Architectural Tactics
In this part of work, a novel experiment was conducted to examine the potentials of using low level
programming design patterns to implement architectural design patterns. The following research
questions were examined:
RQ8. Do developers tend to use specific design patterns to implement architectural tactics?
RQ9. What forces influence the choice of design patterns for implementing architectural
tactics?
The answer to RQ7. is positive. The results of a study containing various open source software
systems revealed interesting usage trends from which we were able to identify variability points,
associate specific design pattern solutions with each variability point, and construct a tactic-specific
reference model.
Tactic reference model illustrate various forces which drive the utilization of design patterns for
implementing architectural tactics. In its current form a developer can manually transform the
reference model into a customized class diagram showing only the desired features of the tactic.
This provides guidance to developers as they implement architectural tactics in a more flexible way
and therefore less likely to be eroded over time.
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9.1.6 Archie: A Smart IDE
The ultimate goal of this work has been the creation of a Smart IDE, capable of supporting the devel-
oper to prevent the problem of architecture erosion through increasing their architecture awareness
and sensitivity to the design.
Long term goals of the Archie project are to provide a proactive environment to support secure
software development though detecting, monitoring and visualizing the critical code snippets in a
project, and also preserving the quality of these code snippets through helping developers make bet-
ter architectural choices. Once completed, we plan to integrate Archie into the Software Assurance
Marketplace (SWAMP) www.cosalab.org.
Archie introduces a pluggable tool which provides an architectural protection layer for use in a
variety of programming IDEs and software modeling tools. Archie utilizes information retrieval and
machine learning techniques to:
• Detect and monitor code snippets that implement key architectural decisions in the source
code, including security related ones.
• Proactively keep developers informed of underlying architectural decisions during maintenance
activities .
• Automatically trace external architecture specification documents to the source code or design
model.
• Perform change impact analysis of architectural concerns at both the code and design level.
9.2 Threats to Validity
This section presents a summary of the main threats to the validity of the results of this thesis, as
well as a discussion about the controls that were set in place to mitigate these threats.
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9.2.1 Tactic Traceability Patterns
Evaluating a new process is always challenging. Ideally such an evaluation should be conducted
within the context of a real project over a period of time as the project progresses from early design
decisions to deployment and finally on into the maintenance phase. As this has not been feasible at
the current stage of our research, we evaluated the approach through the use of a case study and
two quantitative experiments.
The case study of the Lunar Robot created a realistic environment for evaluating the utility of tTPs
for preserving architectural qualities, as its architectural decisions are typical of those found in other
safety critical software systems. Counting the number of traceability links represents a commonly
adopted technique for estimating traceability effort, although given our observations that less effort
is required to create traceability links using a tTPs, this approach likely underestimates the realized
savings. Furthermore, the maintenance scenarios were constructed using a standard framework, and
were therefore representative of a broad spectrum of maintenance tasks. The results from this study
therefore suggest that our findings will be applicable across a broad range of systems which utilize
some of the architectural tactics we have specified as tTps. The primary threat to validity of our
results is that our approach was studied only in a controlled environment, and has not yet been
used within the context of a real project. This will be the focus of future work.
9.2.2 Automated Study
There are several threats to validity that may have impacted the automation section of this work.
The primary threat is related to the construction of the datasets for training the classifiers. The
datasets included 50 open source projects, where from each projects two architectural samples were
drawn, one representing tactic-related code and another one unrelated code snippets. The task of
locating and retrieving these code snippets was conducted primarily by two members of our research
team and was then reviewed by two additional members. This was a very time-consuming task that
was completed over the course of three months. The systematic process we followed to find tactic
related classes and the careful peer-review process gave us confidence that each of the code snippets
was representative of its relevant tactic.
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A greater threat to validity is that the search for specific tactics was limited by the preconceived
notions of the researchers, and that additional undiscovered tactics existed that used entirely dif-
ferent terminology. However we partially mitigated this risk through locating tactics using direct
search and indirect search by looking at projects meta-data and documents. In the case of the
Hadoop project, we elicited feedback from Hadoop developers on the open discussion forum. This
type of study is always concerned with generalizability of the results. To address this problem
we created our initial code-snippets datasets from tactics found in over 50 different open source
systems. The leave-one-out and 5-fold cross-validation experiments we conducted are a standard
approach for evaluating results when it is difficult to gather larger amounts of data. Furthermore,
the Hadoop case study was designed to evaluate the tactic classifier on a large and realistic system.
Hadoop has three major sybsystems and many hundreds of programs. We therefore expect it to be
representative of a typical software engineering environment, which suggests that it could generalize
to a broader set of systems. On the other hand, IR approaches are inherently dependent upon the
use of terminology and so there are no guarantees that our classifier will recognize all instances of
a particular tactic.
9.2.3 Off-the-Shelf Classifiers
There are several threat to validity related to the classification ranking study we conducted. Al-
though the results indicates that Tactic Detector is the best classifier for detecting tactical code
snippets, this is only valid for the studied architectural tactics.
In terms of stability of the approaches, we only evaluated it over a single case study of Apache
Hadoop. However this case study included 10 different architectural tactics. The changes in the
number of false positive rate for unstable classifiers followed a uniform pattern for all the tactics.
This work only reports the results of the classifiers which performed well in identifying architectural
tactic. An initial study contained several classifiers which the best ones were selected to be included
in this work.
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9.2.4 Design for Change
The tactic/pattern overlap datasets were created using two data-mining techniques, neither of which
is 100% precise. This approach introduces potential errors of ommision and commission. Ommission
errors were reduced by setting the thresholds in both mining tools quite low in order to favor high
recall over high precision. However this also increased the manual evaluation effort which could have
resulted in failure to identify instances of correct tactic/pattern implementations. As a result, we
clearly cannot claim that we have identified all common cases of design pattern usage in architectural
tactics. Instead we claim to have identified many of the common uses. Commission errors were
reduced significantly by manually inspecting the resulting overlaps. This task was performed by
one author of this paper and validated by the other two. Nevertheless, this is a non-trivial task
which sometimes involves deep understanding of the source code. While we are confident that the
use of patterns was correctly identified, it is possible that we misinterpreted the intent of using
the pattern in a particular context. This danger was somewhat mitigated by examining multiple
instances of each pattern use within each of the reported tactics.
Second, our work studies the actual use of design patterns for implementing architectural tactics
in open source systems. However, just finding a pattern use does not necessarily mean it was used
correctly. Developers may choose less than effective design solutions. To mitigate this problem we
only included a pattern in our framework if we found it used in a similar way across three or more
systems, or else found its use particularly convincing. Given the nature of open-source development,
a pattern that is used in several systems suggests community consensus that it is a solid idea.
Finally, an additional threat to validity arises in the construction of the reference models. These
models represent a synthesis of designs found across multiple projects as well as standard knowledge
of design patterns available in text books and other material [51]. We have presented our approach
as applicable to a broad range of patterns; however due to the time-consuming nature of our study,
we have only developed such models for the three tactics discussed in detail in this paper. Based
on our study of the other tactics described in this paper, we see no reason to believe this approach
is not generalizable.
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9.3 Future Work
Automatically detecting parts of a software system that implement tactical architectural decisions
can enhance a number of critical software engineering activities, such as change-impact analysis at
an architecture level, compliance verification, safety-case construction, program comprehension and
prevention of architecture degradation. This work has received the ACM SIGSOFT Distinguished
Paper Award at ICSE 2012 and is currently in the technology-transfer stage at the US Department
of Homeland Security (DHS). The automatic discovery of critical code snippets that impact major
software qualities, opens new opportunities for novel research, and enables many researchers to
conduct deep analysis of the interplay between these critical code snippets and various software
characteristics, such as stability of the software, changes, co-changes, and bugs.
In the following several possibilities for the future work is discussed.
9.3.1 Extensions
Seperating Instances of Architectural Tactics: At the current stage of the work, the tactic
detector retrieves all the code snippets that implement a particular architectural tactic. In case of
some of the architectural tactics, specially the cross-cutting ones there is only one instance of the
architectural tactic implemented in a project. However for several of the architectural tactics, there
might be one or more instances of the tactic implemented in a project (e.g. Heartbeat). In future
work, we aim to incorporate a set of structural analysis and graph theory techniques to distinguish
the different instances of an architectural tactic.
The current implementation of Archie, leaves it to the developers to manually distinguish instances
of a tactic and connect then to a tTPs. Being able to distinguish instances of an architectural tactic
will reduce developers manual effort and also can provide better insight into the architecture of a
software.
Fine-Grained Traceability: This dissertation included several experiments for establishing the
coarse-grained traceability links at the tactic level and also fine-grained traceability links to the roles
in each architectural tactic. Although the results for coarse-grained links were quite promising, the
fine-grained link recovery method did not achieve a reliable accuracy. Therefore, for future work
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we aim to utilize more detailed structural analysis and pattern matching techniques to identify the
roles each source file plays in implementing an architectural tactic.
Design Patterns and Architectural Tactics In future work we plan to adopt concepts from the
feature modeling domain so that each tactic and its variability points will be specified as a feature
model from which we can automatically generate a class diagram. We will also extend our work on
reference models by adding dynamic views.
In Depth comparison of Several classification Techniques One of the challenges we have
faced in comparison of the tactic detector and off-the-shelf classification methods relates to the
lack of access to a large number of the datasets. In future, we plan to include 30 more security
architectural tactics and conduct a more comprehensive comparison of the classifiers. The current
comparison indicates that the tactic detector outperforms the other classifiers but including more
data point can help better examine if there is a statistically significant difference between these
classifiers or not. To achieve such conclusion a larger and more divers dataset is required.
9.3.2 New Direction
Holistic Software Architecture Reconstruction: Although existing approaches address im-
portant aspects of architecture recovery and software program comprehension, they tend to focus
only on recovering the structure of software, and fail to discover the complete ground truth archi-
tecture. State-of-the-art and state-of-practice tools are currently limited in their ability to retrieve
a rich and complete picture of the underlying architecture.
An effective reverse engineering technique should be able to reconstruct the design knowledge gen-
erated and consumed during forward engineering of a software product, from early phases of re-
quirements engineering to design and implementation. It is necessary to develop reverse engineering
techniques that discover not only the design decisions, but also architecturally significant require-
ments, business goals, design rationales, various important views of the architecture such as the
deployment view and functional view.
This requires using novel methods from various areas of data mining, information retrieval, bio-
informatics, principal component regression, code analysis, and structural analysis. More notably,
these research trends are beginning to influence the practice of software development in industry.




This section describes all the case studies used along this proposal.
A.1 Case Study of NASA Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV)
This section presents the case study of Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) system from NASA’s
Constellation System of Systems. CEV is an exploratory vehicle that is designed to provide round
trip transportation for human crews between Earth and space. The CEV is designed to coordinate
with transfer stages, landing vehicles, and surface exploration systems in order to support manned
voyages to the Moon and beyond. Requirements, architectural decisions, and architectural models
of CEV were obtained from a published documentation manual [116] [115].
This case study focuses on the CEV’s Guidance, Navigation & Control (GN&C) flight software archi-
tecture designed to provide evolving automation, fault detection, isolation and recovery throughout
all phases of the flight. The CEV GN&C architecture consists of three major components: the
OTM (Onboard Trajectory Manager), the Vehicle Executive, and the core GN&C. The OTM is
responsible for trajectory planning. It provides a direct interface for communicating with the crew,
and it utilizes a telemetry interface to communicate with ground control and receive activity lists
and mode commands. The OTM’s primary output is a queue of flight dynamics tasks intended to
be executed in sequence by the core GN&C module. This task list is created by the FD Task List
Selector (FDTLS) sub-module. The Vehicle Executive is responsible for The OTM and core GN&C
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Figure A.1: Tactical Decisions, Rationales, and Driving Requirements in CEV
FSW exchange information via the Vehicle Executive FSW. The Vehicle Executive subsystem is re-
sponsible for scheduling and executing all of the vehicle’s subsystem executives; e.g., GN&C, power,
environmental control, and life support. GN&C is responsible for vehicle navigation during differ-
ent phases of the mission, and includes primary components of guidance, navigation, control, and
targeting processes. GN&C communicates with sensors such as the Inertial Measurement Unit and
Effectors such as the Chutes/Landing System through its Subsystem Operating Programs (SOPs).
Each GN&C sensor and effector type has its own software subsystem dedicated to receiving raw
data from the hardware; FDIR is another component of GN&C which is responsible for Fault De-
tection, Isolation and Recovery at subsystem level. However health management across different
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Vehicle subsystems is performed by the Integrated Health Management System.
The most important architectural decisions, requirements and quality goals in this system are
demonstrated in table A.1.
Figure A.2: Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) system from NASA’s Constellation System of Sys-
tems
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A.2 Case Study of NASA Lunar Robot
The case study of a Lunar Robot system, reconstructed from an extensive set of publicly available
NASA documents [70, 95] was conducted to examine the research questions. The robot’s primary
mission is to autonomously traverse the lunar surface, collect sample data related to comets, dust,
and celestial objects, record temperatures, perform scientific experiments, and send results back
to the earth-based Mission Control Center (MCC). From a maintenance perspective, our interest
is in ensuring that quality concerns, as realized through the various architectural decisions, are
maintained throughout the lifetime of the Lunar-Robot software system. Such systems often live far
beyond a single lunar mission, as individual components and sometimes entire architectures are often
reused in future implementations. Maintenance activities therefore include initial modifications
made during the early development phase, modifications made to the system after deployment
(which in the case of the lunar robot often means transmitting new software after the robot has
been launched into space), and finally modifications made to the system if it is re-used in a new
robot system.
A selection of the Lunar Robot’s functional and non-functional requirements are shown in Table
A.1. An initial analysis of these led to a series of design decisions including the ones depicted in
Table A.2. In turn, these decisions resulted in the high-level architectural design shown in Figure
A.3. The Lunar-Robot architecture is structured around a control system (CS), Integrated Vehicle
Health Management (IVHM) system, the Sensors Virtual Machine and Actuators virtual machine,
a communication system, and an operator panel. Data from the sensors is first passed through the
IVHM component for correctness checking and is then forwarded to the CS. The CS uses the data
to make decisions and to process high level commands. It then sends lower level commands to the
actuators. One of the most interesting components is the integrated vehicle health management
system (IVHM) responsible for monitoring the health of the robot, and when necessary, performing
dynamic reconfigurations to maintain functionality. The Lunar Robot received inputs from cameras,
GPS receivers, rate gyros, and star trackers, and issues commands to mechanical devices such as
the power controller, wheels, and scientific instruments.
It is worth noting that the component and connector view of Figure A.3 provides only limited
visual clues concerning the architectural decisions behind the design. Certain architectural decisions
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are clearly visible, such as the use of partitions to separate different types of functionality. Other
decisions are partially visible, such as the decision to include redundant components (given the plural
descriptions for GPS receivers and Rate Gyros). However, many of the important architectural
decisions listed in Table A.2 are not visible at all, either in this diagram or in lower level diagrams.
This lack of visibility is one reason that maintenance efforts often result in architectural degradation.
Figure A.3: Lunar Robot: High Level Component and Connector View
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Figure A.4: Lunar Robot: Composite Structure Navigation Domain
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Figure A.5: Lunar Robot: Deployment View
Table A.1: Lunar Robot: A Sub-set of High-level Requirements
ID Requirement Type
1. The Lunar-Robot (LR) shall have the capability to operate in two
modes: manual and autonomous.
Functional
2. At any time, the LR shall be either inactive, waiting, or active. Functional
3. When the LR is inactive, it will check periodically for activation com-
mands.
Functional
4. The LR shall perform the following functions: move, plan, collect, an-
alyze, record, and transmit functions.
Functional
5. When the LR is in manual mode it will respond to specific commands
received from MCC.
Functional
6. When the Lunar-Robot is in autonomous mode it will determine and
execute the correct steps needed to perform a higher level function de-
fined by MCC. Examples of such functions include reaching a specified
location, or gathering atmospheric samples.
Functional
7. If the Lunar-Robot is in manual mode and and receives no com-
mands from MCC for over maximum outOfRange period it shall switch
to autonomous mode and return to the geographical coordinates of
last point of known contact.
Availability
8. The Lunar-Robot will have a probability of uncorrectable failure of
0.00001 or less during 90 days of its mission on the surface of the moon.
Reliability
9. Commands sent from MCC to LR will be acknowledged within 3 sec-
onds when communication is feasible.
Responsiveness
10. Transmissions between MCC and the LR shall be secure. Security
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Table A.2: Lunar Robot: Primary Architectural Decisions
ID. Decision
1. The Lunar Robot control system will be replicated using active redundancy with graceful degradation.
There will be replications.
2. Each instance of the Guidance, Navigation and Control subsystems(GN&C) will run on a separate process,
and will be configured uniquely.
3. The tasks to be performed at various phases of the mission will be managed in individual configuration
files by the robot executive and domain executive modules. The task sequencer reference model is used to
achieve real-time task distribution and execution
4. Task scheduling will be performed using the semantic-based scheduling algorithm. This approach takes
priorities of various tasks, and the current mode of operation into consideration. It allows task priorities
to be established according to the current operating mode.
5. Each of the three domains will have a dedicated health management module which will implement two-
self checking for each running thread (i.e. two separate threads will run the same task and must be in
agreement). In case of a mismatch, the result which most closely matches the data produced by the
simulation engine will be used.
6. Critical modules in each of the Guidance, Navigation and Control (GN&C) domains will be redundantly
coded in three different programming languages by three independent teams.
7. Thread execution will be scheduled according to predefined priorities using preemptive scheduling.
8. All sensors will be monitored using the heartbeat tactic.
9. All data received from sensors will be tested for validity i.e. using CRC.
10. A majority voting schema will be used to select the most accurate data from a set of replicated sensors.
11. Two separate buses will be used for conveying sensor data and control data respectively. Note: This allows
different scheduling strategies to be applied to each bus.
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A.3 Case Study of Hadoop Framework
The Hadoop project is one of the Apache Foundation’s projects. It is a framework that allows for
the distributed processing of large data sets across clusters of computers using simple programming
models. It is designed to scale up from single servers to thousands of machines, each offering local
computation and storage. Rather than rely on hardware to deliver high-avaiability, the library itself
is designed to detect and handle failures at the application layer, so delivering a highly-availabile
service on top of a cluster of computers, each of which may be prone to failures. Hadoop is modeled
after Google’s MapReduce / GFS framework and is implemented in Java.
Hadoop is economical, It is preferable to have more low-performance, low-cost hardware working
in parallel than to have less high-performance, high-cost hardware. Also it’s reliable, it’s applicable
in distributed systems where failure becomes the norm. With Hadoop design, At some point,
the number of discrete systems in a cluster will be greater than the mean time between failures
(MTBF) for any hardware platform, no matter how reliable, so fault tolerance must be built into
the controlling software.
Major Subsystems:
• Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS): A distributed file system that provides high-
throughput access to application data.
• Hadoop MapReduce: A YARN-based system for parallel processing of large data sets.
• Hadoop YARN: A framework for job scheduling and cluster resource management.
• Hadoop Common: The common utilities that support the other Hadoop modules.
Main Architectural Styles Master-Slave style is dominant across all Hadoop’s subsystems. The
master-slave architecture is a variant of the main-subroutine architecture style that supports fault
tolerance and system reliability. In this architecture, slaves provide replicated services to the master,
and the master selects a particular result among slaves by certain selection strategies. The slaves
may perform the same functional task by different algorithms and methods or by a totally different
functionality.
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A.3.1 HDFS Architecture
Hadoop distributed file system is built around two major components:
NameNode: A master server that manages the file system namespace and regulates access to files










Application Process  
Figure A.6: Hadoop Distributed File System: Module View
One of the main goal of HDFS is fast parallel processing of lots of data. To accomplish that it’s
necessary to have high level of redundancy. Client need to break his/her own data file into smaller
“Blocks”, and place those blocks on different machines throughout the cluster. Copying the blocks
of data on more machines will increase the redundancy level and throughput of parallel operations.
Also as these machines may be prone to failure, the data redundancy will guarantee that data loss
will not happen. Therefore in HDFS each block will be replicated in the cluster as its loaded. The
standard setting for Hadoop is to have (3) copies of each block in the cluster. However this is a
configurable parameter (inside hdfs-site.xml).
The copy operation on HDFs has the following workflow (shown in A.7): For each block, the Client
consults the Name Node (usually TCP 9000) and receives a list of (3) Data Nodes which should
have a copy of the block. Then it’s the responsibility of the Client to write the block directly to
the Data Node (usually TCP 50010). The replication is done through the receiving Data Node, it
will replicate the copied block to (two) other Data Nodes, and the cycle repeats for the remaining
blocks. The Name Node will not be in the data path. The Name Node is playing the role of a look
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up table or dictionary which only provides the map of where data is and where data should go in
the cluster.
Client Name Node 
DataNode 1 DataNode 5 DataNode 6 DataNode N 
I want to write 
blocks A,B, C of 
file.txt 
Blk A Blk B Blk C 
File.txt 
Blk A Blk B Blk C 




protocol The protocol package is used in communication between the client and the namenode
and datanode. It describes the messages used between these servers.
security security is used in authenticating access to the files. The security is based on token-based
authentication, where the namenode server controls the distribution of access tokens.
server.protocol server.protocol defines the communication between namenode and datanode, and
between namenode and balancer.
server.common server.common contains utilities that are used by the namenode, datanode and
balancer. Examples are classes containing server-wide constants, utilities, and other logic that is
shared among the servers.
client The client contains the logic to access the file system from a user’s computer. It interfaces
with the datanode and namenode servers using the protocol module.
datanode The datanode is responsible for storing the actual blocks of filesystem data. It receives
instructions on which blocks to store from the namenode. It also services the client directly to
stream file block contents.
namenode The namenode is responsible for authorizing the user, storing a mapping from filenames
to data blocks, and it knows which blocks of data are stored where.
Appendix A. Case Studies 168
balancer The balancer is a separate server that tells the namenode to move data blocks between
datanodes when the load is not evenly balanced among datanodes.
tools The tools package can be used to administer the filesystem, and also contains debugging code.
Figure A.8: Hadoop Framework: Module View1
A.3.2 Hadoop Map-Reduce Architecture
As we already said, Hadoop is a Map-Reduce framework. It is implemented based on a programming
paradigm called Map-Reduced. The Map: A map transform is provided to transform an input data
row of key and value to an output key.value: That is, for an input it returns a list containing zero
or more (key,value) pairs:
The Reduce: A reduce transform is provided to take all values for a specific key, and generate a new
list of the reduced output.
Hadoop implements this programming paradigm through the following components:
JobTracker : Job Tracker oversees and coordinates the parallel processing of data using Map Reduce.
In the Master-Slave architectural style, Job Tracker plays the role of master node.
TaskTracker : Does the actual work given by Job Tracker- It does either map or reduce. In the
Master-Slave architectural style, Task Trackers play the role of slave nodes.
1Included with permission from Dr. Rick Kazman. Original Source: http://itm-vm.shidler.hawaii.edu/HDFS/
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A.3.3 Combined Architectural View
The combined view shows how different components of data layer (HDFS) and paralleling layer
(Map-Reduce) work together. Figure A.9 shows different categories of machines and components
deployed on them. The Master nodes oversee the two key functional pieces that make up Hadoop:
storing lots of data (HDFS), and running parallel computations on all that data (Map Reduce).
The Name Node coordinates the data storage function (HDFS), while the Job Tracker coordinates
the parallel processing of data using Map Reduce operations. Slave Nodes make up the majority of
machines on the cluster and do all the labour work of storing the data and running the computations.
Each slave node runs both a Data Node and Task Tracker threads which communicate with and
get instructions from their master nodes. The Task Tracker thread is a slave to the Job Tracker,
the Data Node thread is a slave to the Name Node.
Client machines must have Hadoop installed, but are neither a Master or a Slave. The primary
responsibilities of the Client machine are to load data into the cluster, submit Map Reduce jobs
describing how that data should be processed, and then retrieve or view the results of the job when
its finished. These roles are logical, it means that in small clusters ( 40 nodes) a single node (server)
can play multiple roles, such as both Job Tracker and Name Node. While in large clusters it is
common to have distinct machines for each role.
The summary of cooperations among these nodes is: Client machine submits the Map Reduce
job to the Job Tracker, asking ”How many times does Refund occur in File.txt“ The Job Tracker
consults the Name Node to learn which Data Nodes have blocks of File.txt. The Job Tracker then
provides the Task Tracker running on those nodes with the Java code required to execute the Map
computation on their local data.
The Task Tracker starts a Map task and monitors the tasks progress. The Task Tracker provides
heartbeats and task status back to the Job Tracker.
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Figure A.9: A Combined View: Server Roles in Hadoop
A.3.4 HDFS Architectural Issues
HDFS does not have any interesting layering. Its portability concerns are, by and large, addressed
by the technique of “implement in Java”. The governing architectural pattern in HDFS is a master-
slave style, which is a run-time structure. While modifiability has been important in Hadoop, it
has been addressed simply by keeping the code base at a relatively modest size and by having a
significant number of committers spending considerable time learning and mastering this code base.
Figure A.10: HDFS Reverse Engineered Code Structure2
2Included with permission from Dr. Rick Kazman. Original Source: [17]
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A.3.4.1 Availability
Availability is managed by maintaining multiple replicas of each block in an HDFS file, recognizing
failure in a DataNode or corruption of a block, and having mechanisms to replace a failed DataNode
or a corrupt block.
Furthermore, the data copy is done through pipeline schema facilitating the speed of file transfer.
In this schema as the subsequent blocks of a file are written, the initial node in the pipeline will
vary for each block, spreading around the hot spots of in-rack and cross-rack traffic for replication.
Detecting Failure:
The Name Node is the master server coordinating the data node servers in the cluster. Name node
contains all the file system metadata for the cluster and and coordinates access to data located on
data nodes. Data Nodes send heartbeat messages to the Name Node every 3 seconds via a TCP
handshake, using the same port number defined for the Name Node daemon, which is usually TCP
9000. The heartbeat is implemented by piggybacking, therefore every tenth heartbeat is a Block
Report, where the Data Node tells the Name Node about all the blocks it has. The block reports
are used by the Name Node to build its metadata and insure (3) replicas of the block exist on
different nodes, in different racks. In this design, if the Name Node is down the HDFS is down.
Re-replicating the Missing Replicas Missing heartbeat message means the loss of data on a Data
Node. Name Node uses the block reports it had been receiving from the dead data node, to decide
which blocks of data are lost along with the node and therefore it makes the decision to re-replicate
those blocks to other Data Nodes. Name node will consult the Rack Awareness data in order to
maintain the two copies in one rack, one copy in another rack replica rule when deciding which
Data Node should receive a new copy of the blocks. This rule guarantees that if a rack of servers
crashes or fall of the network because of the rack switch failure the client will lose all the data.
Figure shows this process.
Single Point of Failure in HDFS Name node could be a single point of failure in HDFS. In
the case of an unplanned event such as a machine crash, the cluster would be unavailable until an
operator restarted the NameNode, or planned maintenance events such as software or hardware
upgrades on the NameNode machine would result in windows of cluster downtime. This means that
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the availability of the whole HDFS depends on the health and availability of Name Node. Standby
tactic with the following details is used to avoid single point of failure in Hadoop (Figure A.11).
• In a typical HA cluster, two separate machines are configured as NameNodes. At any point
in time, exactly one of the NameNodes is in an Active state, and the other is in a Standby
state.
• The Active NameNode is responsible for all client operations in the cluster, while the Standby
is simply acting as a slave, maintaining enough state to provide a fast failover if necessary.
• To keep the state synchronized, the current implementation requires that the two nodes both
have access to a directory on a shared storage device (eg an NFS mount from a NAS)- Point
of Failure - This restriction will likely be relaxed in future versions.
• When any namespace modification is performed by the Active node, it durably logs a record
of the modification to an edit log file stored in the shared directory. The Standby node is
constantly watching this directory for edits, and as it sees the edits, it applies them to its own
namespace.
• For fast failover, the Standby node must have up-to-date information regarding the location
of blocks in the cluster. Therefore the DataNodes are configured with the location of both
NameNodes, and send block location information and heartbeats to both.
• Only manual failover is supported. HA NameNodes are incapable of automatically detecting
a failure of the Active NameNode, and instead rely on the operator to manually initiate a
failover. Automatic failure detection and initiation of a failover will be implemented in future
versions.
A.3.4.2 Security
The major security goal of HDFS is to keep data in HDFS secure from unauthorized access. To
achieve this goal, HDFS architecture adopted the following architectural guidelines.
• Users must be authenticated




Its been an 
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File system metadata 
File.txt=A,C 
Figure A.11: Synchronization between Primary NameNode and Secondary NameNode
• Since Map/Reduce run applications as user, they must authenticate the users.
• Since servers HDFS or Map/Reduce are entrusted with user credentials, they must also be
authenticated.
• Kerberose is the key authentication system in HDFS.
• Security on/off option to handle the trade-off between performance and security. Specially in
cases which the cluster is used by a single user or company and security is a less concern.
To prevent unauthorized HDFS access, it is decided that all HDFS clients must be authenticated.
This includes tasks running as part of MapReduce jobs and Submitted jobs. Users must also
authenticate servers, Otherwise fraudulent servers could steal credentials. The idea in the current
version of the Hadoop is to integrate Hadoop with Kerberos to provide well tested open source
distributed authentication system.
A few major authentication issues of Hadoop were that Hadoop 0.20 completely trusted the user,
also user passes their username and groups over wire. The next releases of Hadoop added the
feature request to have authentication on both RPC and Web UI. About authorization, HDFS had
owners, groups and permissions since 0.16. However Map/Reduce had nothing in version 0.20.
A.3.4.3 Performance
Scheduling is one of the key tactic used to tune the performance on Hadoop. This framework
implements a set of scheduling mechanisms FIFO: Under Hadoop’s default FIFO scheduler as
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soon as a job is sent to Hadoop for execution, the JobTracker will assign as many TaskTrackers as
necessary to process that job. This strategy has express Checkout for smaller Jobs. Therefore it
tends to follow a fair strategy in scheduling the tasks, avoiding starvation.
Fair Scheduler: Multiple jobs, each having a Pool. Each Pool gets a guaranteed number of task
slots (map/reduce). ”fair sharing“ such that each job gets roughly an equal amount of compute
resource after exceeding the pool size.
Capacity Scheduler: shares similar goals with the Fair Scheduler. The Capacity Scheduler works
on queues rather than pools. Within a queue, jobs have priority. Queues are guaranteed a fraction
of the capacity of the grid. Each queue enforces a limit on the percentage of resources allocated to
a user at any given time, if there is competition for them
Examining TaskTrackers: Heartbeat tactic and some performance metrics are used to detect
task failure, or tasks which do not preform well. Therefore those tasks will be killed and restarted.
Pooling: is used in various parts to increase performance.
Load Balancing: is used to balance data and workload on various computers of the Hadoop
cluster.
Nodes in Hadoo cluster are classified asÂăhighly-utilized,Âăaverage-utilized, andÂăunder-utilized.
First, it acquires neighborhood details: When the load increases in a DataNode to the threshold
level, it sends a request to the NameNode. The NameNode had information about the load levels
of the specific DataNode’s nearest neighbors. Loads are compared by the NameNode and then the
details about the free-est neighbor nodes are sent to the specific DataNode.
Next, the DataNodes go to work: Each DataNode compares its own load amount with the sum of
the load amount of its nearest neighbors. If a DataNode’s load level is greater than the sum of
its neighbors, then load-destination nodes (direct neighbors AND other nodes) will be chosen at
random. Load requests are then sent to the destination nodes.
Last, the request is received: Buffers are maintained at every node to received load requests. A
message passing interface (MPI) manages this buffer. A main thread will listen to the buffered
queue and will service the requests it receives. The nodes enter the loadbalancing execution phase.
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Table A.3: Instances of Architectural Tactics in Apache Hadoop
Tactic Classes Explanation Package Name or Subsystem
Heartbeat 27 HDFS uses a master/slave architecture with replication. All slavessend a heartbeat message to the master (server) indicating their
health status. Master replicates a failed node (slave).
MapReduce Subsystem
The MapReduce subsystem uses heartbeat with piggybacking to
check the health and execution status of each task running on a
cluster.
HDFS Subsystem
Resource Pooling 36 MapReduce uses thread pooling to improve performance of many
tasks e.g. to run the map function.
mapred package
7 A global compressor/decompressor pool used to save and reuse
codecs.
compress package
47 Block pooling is used to improve performance of the distributed
file system.
HDFS subsystem
5 Combines scheduling & job pooling . Organizes jobs into “pools”,
and shares resources between pools.
MapReduce subsystem
Scheduling 88 Scheduling services are used to execute tasks and jobs. These
include fair-, dynamic-, & capacity-scheduling
common & MapReduce
Audit Trail 4 Audit log captures users’ activities and authentication events. mapred package
Authentication 35 Uses Kerberos authentication for direct client access to HDFS
subsystems.
security package
The MapReduce framework uses a DIGEST-MD5 authentication
scheme.
MapReduce & HDFS subsys.
Secure Session 35 Uses Kerberos authentication for direct client access to HDFS
subsystems.
security package
The MapReduce framework uses a DIGEST-MD5 authentication
scheme.
MapReduce & HDFS subsys.
Asynchronous Com-
munication
13 Handles communication with all the NodeManagers and provides
asynchronous updates on getting responses from them
mapreduce & datanode
Hash Based Method 8 Verifies message replies using base64Hash. security package & NameNode
Authenti-cation
(HMAC)






39 Authorizes access to the directories, files as well as operations on
data files
HDFS & fs & NameNode
authorizes access to the queue of jobs. MapReduce.
An authorization manager which handles service-level authoriza-
tion.
Security.
CheckPoint 32 Periodic checkpoints of the namespace to keep NameNode and
Backup NameNode in synch and help Namenode restart.
HDFS
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